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The wind of change keeps blowing south of the Sahara. With 
an estimated population of 1.2 billion people, expected to keep 
growing steadily in the next decades and largely below the age 
of 15, Africa is the continent of an ever-closer future. It is true 
that many sub-regions are still riven by conflicts and political 
violence. This is the case of western Sahel and the Lake Chad 
Basin, where insurgent and jihadi armed groups’ activities in-
crease community vulnerabilities and fuel inter-ethnic tensions. 
Or of the Great Lakes region, made unstable by militias inter-
ested in profiting from natural resources. Yet, social, political 
and economic transformations are changing the face of Africa. 
Today’s enormous challenges are addressed by regional and con-
tinental integration as in the case of the African Continental 
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which brings together all African 
countries – Eritrea is the only exception – with the aim of re-
ducing the structural fragilities of the national economies and 
increasing the capacity to speak with one voice. 
Against this backdrop, the rise of new leaders promises to 
accelerate and steer change in the continent’s political scenar-
io. All too easily associated with authoritarian and long-last-
ing regimes, Africa has seen a gradual strengthening of demo-
cratic processes – albeit still fragile and far from problem-free 
– as shown recently by elections in Nigeria and Mauritania. 
The opening of wider and more relevant spaces for political 
participation and electoral turnovers contribute to dismantle 
the foundations of a widespread discourse describing Africa 
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as a continent continuously going backwards on democracy. 
Grassroots pressures that triggered the collapse of Omar al-
Bashir’s regime in Sudan and the launch of a political transition 
based on a power-sharing deal between military actors and civil 
society organisations speak volumes about the continent’s ef-
forts to open up politics and reduce the room for personalistic 
and autocratic rule. While the road ahead remains a long one, 
substantial progress has been made.
This ISPI Report builds on these premises and focuses on 
leadership transitions and development prospects in Africa. The 
rise of new leaders, coming to power within a few months of 
each other in some of the most strategically relevant states in 
the continent, fosters expectations for a change in contexts of 
deep economic, political and social crisis. It also provides the 
opportunity to analyse the linkage between political leaderships 
and socio-economic development. 
The volume looks at these issues from different angles. First, it 
addresses the topic of leadership change by arguing that African 
leaders – and particularly the way they reach power – do con-
tribute to shaping their country’s progress and achievements. 
Second, it zooms in on some of the most influential African 
leaders, following their personal trajectories and the path that 
brought them to power while reflecting on the political pros-
pects of their government action. The picture that comes out 
tells of an Africa where leaders more often than not contribute 
to fostering broad changes.
In the opening chapter Giovanni Carbone provides a general 
overview of the leadership-development nexus. He investigates 
the historical evolution of political regimes and African lead-
erships looking back to the post-independence authoritarian 
turns in the ‘60s and the widespread changes that occurred in 
the continent during the ‘90s. The chapter shows how the de-
cline of one-party military rule coincided with the launch of 
democratic processes, although in many cases the latter were 
abruptly hindered due to further autocratic regress. The distinc-
tion between democracies, authoritarian states and hegemonic 
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systems that defines the current African political scenario pro-
vides an essential lens to interpret Africa’s steps towards elector-
al turnovers and democratic leadership changes. Mentioned in 
the chapter, ISPI African Leadership Change dataset including 
all power handovers since 1960 to 2018 is an innovative tool to 
account for the way in which leaders take office and to examine 
their impact on development. 
The following chapters cover particular case studies of 
emerging (in South Africa, Angola, Ethiopia, and Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) and consolidated leaderships (in 
Rwanda), outlining the political and development challenges 
lying ahead for African leaders. Jonathan Fisher looks at the 
most prominent and iconic among the new power-holders: 
Abiy Ahmed Ali, who was recently awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize. The author traces Abiy’s “surprising” rise in Ethiopia, de-
scribing his ambitious reform plans in a political system closed 
in on itself and yet tremendously focused on acquiring a grow-
ing centrality at the regional and international level. Abiy’s po-
litical and economic pledges to open the system and reform the 
polity are counterbalanced by enduring hurdles at the domes-
tic level, where deep-rooted ethnic unrests feed instability and 
pose delicate challenges to the new prime minister.
Steven Friedman examines Cyril Ramaphosa’s return to the 
forefront of South African politics. Jacob Zuma’s years in office 
fuelled a severe political crisis in Pretoria, due to the creation 
of patronage networks and abuses of power that weakened the 
legitimacy of political institutions in a country once deemed 
a model of democratic achievements. Ramaphosa’s public fig-
ure stood out as a symbol of struggle for good governance and 
against corruption. His rise to the top of the ruling ANC and 
the state presidency aims at restoring the proper functioning of 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy. Time will tell if he will 
be up to the task.
Alex Vines analyzes João  Lourenço’s leadership in Angola. 
Having come to power following José Eduardo dos Santos’s 
resignation after some forty years in office, Lourenço was initially 
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considered as a compromise candidate that would allow the for-
mer President and his family to keep wielding power for the pur-
suit of their pervasive economic and political interests. However, 
Lourenço displayed an unforeseen independence in power, work-
ing to ensure a real change in the Angolan polity by modernising 
the country and diversifying the fragile national economy, still 
highly dependent on oil exports. He also encouraged the dis-
mantling of dos Santos-linked networks of interest and the purge 
of corrupted officials and businessmen close to the previous re-
gime. In short, Lourenço fostered expectations of deeper change 
in Angola, although the tightening of his hold on power risks 
reproducing the same power imbalances of the dos Santos era.
Filip Reyntjens and Kris Berwouts put the spotlight on Félix 
Tshisekedi’s historical (yet contentious) election in Congo-
Kinshasa, which almost ended Joseph Kabila’s regime. Alleged 
fraud in the electoral process, as well as a confidential agree-
ment between Tshisekedi and the former head of state – meant 
to preserve Kabila’s interests – raise questions on whether real 
prospects for change do exist in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The authors stress the need for the newly-elected 
Congolese leader to reconstruct the grounds of legitimacy and 
restore the basic state functions throughout the country as a 
precondition for development, thus shedding light on the dan-
ger of a renewal of the kleptocratic practices at the roots of the 
post-colonial state in Congo. 
The last chapter focuses on Paul Kagame, probably the most 
controversial leader in the continental landscape, who polarises 
international public opinion. Fred Golooba-Mutebi investi-
gates Kagame’s “assertive leadership”, tracing Rwanda’s break-
through on the path to sustainable growth and development. 
The author points out that, though far from being a conven-
tional or mature democracy, Rwandan politics is actually based 
on participation and consensus-building more than is normally 
conceded. The combination of such decision-making processes 
with strong leadership and a steady sense of urgency lie at the 
heart of Rwanda’s development model.
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Looking at the connections between democratic leadership 
and development, evidence shows that democratically-elected 
leaders have the capacity to better address the socio-econom-
ic challenges in their countries. Political incentives encourage 
them to adopt policies and initiatives that foster development 
performances, as much as the political systems are competitive 
and open to democratic leadership handovers. The focus on key 
African leaders in this Report helps the reader understand if 
and to what extent they can be drivers of change in their coun-
tries and beyond. As Ramaphosa put it “there are times when 
leadership needs to take a bold move forward”. Across much of 
Africa, this is one of those times.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director

1.   African Leaders. A Changing 
      Landscape and Its Implications
 Giovanni Carbone
Africa’s Evolving Leadership Scenario
Leaders and leadership turnovers have been in the spotlight 
more than ever over the last few years in Africa. Across the 
region, some longstanding rulers were unexpectedly ousted. 
Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and the Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh, 
for example, were rather abruptly replaced in 2017 – if in very 
different ways – as had been Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré 
earlier and Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir much more recently. The 
four had been in office for an average of some thirty years each. 
For the large majority of Zimbabweans, Gambians, Burkinabè 
and Sudanese, this was the first time they saw someone new at 
the top.
A number of other countries joined in. The departure of 
Mauritania’s Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, also in 2019, was the 
result of the former coup-maker’s surprising decision to retire 
at the end of his second and last constitutionally-allowed man-
date. Joseph Kabila similarly abode by presidential term limits 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, if only reluctant-
ly and after a three-year delay. Both in Mauritania and in the 
Congo outgoing leaders made sure they would be succeeded by 
palatable figures. Nigerians, meanwhile, renewed their mandate 
to Muhammadu Buhari, who had made history in 2015 as the 
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country’s first president elected from the ranks of an opposition 
party.
The power handovers that drew the most attention and antic-
ipation, however, were those that brought new faces at the helm 
in Ethiopia, Angola and South Africa. The largely unforeseen 
rise of Abiy Ahmed led to the swift adoption of wide-ranging 
initiatives, sending shockwaves both within Ethiopia and across 
the Horn. National and regional actors are still struggling to 
find new equilibria in an unfolding scenario. Compared to 
Ethiopia, the challenges faced by new leaders in Luanda and 
Pretoria may appear somewhat less complex, and certainly more 
domestically-oriented. João Lourenço followed in the footsteps 
of José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola, as the latter resolved to 
pass on power after a hefty thirty-eight years in office. The new 
President quickly proved far more autonomous and forceful 
than many had anticipated as he tried to dismantle the person-
al and patrimonial networks of the dos Santos regime and to 
reinvigorate the economy. In South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa 
was entrusted with somewhat similar goals as he successfully 
manoeuvred from within the ANC to oust Jacob Zuma from 
the presidency and to unravel his contentious power system.
At the head of the continent’s most advanced economy, 
Ramaphosa well exemplifies how the rise of some new leaders 
galvanised expectations in Africa and beyond. An influential 
global magazine devoted its cover to him as “South Africa’s best 
bet”, and went on to task the new President with “stopping 
the rot” and even “saving the nation”1. Another major outlet 
broadened the spotlight to include “the five leaders who could 
transform the region” (Ramaphosa himself, but also the afore-
said Lourenço, Abiy, Buhari as well as Félix Tshisekedi of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo)2.
1 “To stop the rot in South Africa, back Cyril Ramaphosa”, The Economist, 25 
April 2019.
2 J. Devermont and J. Temin, “Africa’s democratic moment? The five leaders who 
could transform the region”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 98, no. 4, July/August 2019, pp. 
131-143.
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The current emphasis on the new wave of sub-Saharan rul-
ers – and the great hopes they generated – is reminiscent of 
at least two past periods the region went through. One is the 
independence era, between the late 1950s and the early 1960s. 
At that time, it was the founding fathers of newly-sovereign 
African states who embodied the promise of change and rap-
id social and economic progress. From Sekou Touré (Guinea) 
to Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), from Modibo Keïta (Mali) to 
Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and 
many others, the new heads of African polities were almost as 
revered as monarchs – indeed, a number of them notoriously 
went on to adopt “President-for-life” titles. While the primary 
concern of this first generation of leaders was arguably more 
political than economic – with a central focus on establishing 
new states and forging new nations – their achievements in 
terms of development were on the whole largely disappoint-
ing. By the late-1990s, a second group of “new leaders” – this 
time heading a much more limited number of countries – were 
celebrated by some international observers as charismatic and 
innovative figures that, following the violent overthrow of gov-
ernments by the guerrilla movements they led, appeared to be 
re-shaping the development trajectories of Uganda (Yoweri 
Museveni), Ethiopia (Meles Zenawi), Eritrea (Isaias Afwerki), 
Rwanda (Paul Kagame) and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (Laurent-Désiré Kabila)3. A majority of them are still in 
office today (Museveni, Isaias and Kagame), while the remain-
der were likely only prevented to stay on by death, whether 
the result of murder (Kabila) or of natural causes (Meles). In 
three cases out of five – Uganda, but more recently especially 
Ethiopia and Rwanda – development outcomes have indeed 
been quite impressive. While the Kigali and Addis Ababa re-
gimes are at times presented as models of African-style “devel-
opmental states”, some observers warn that “both records are 
3 D. Connell, Dan and F.  Smyth, “Africa’s new bloc”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 
2, 1998, pp. 95-106; M. Ottaway, Africa’s new leaders. Democracy or state reconstruction?, 
Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999.
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exceedingly dependent on the leaderships of single men, and 
one wonders what happens after they have been, inevitably, 
replaced. Indeed, Ethiopia now faces this question, directly”4. 
Ultimately, one may add, rulers emerging from guerrilla in-
surgencies have been a rarity rather than standard practice in 
Africa. In spite of the many armed conflicts that have historical-
ly plagued the region, their number does not extend much be-
yond the few abovementioned examples. The prevailing modes 
of leadership change south of the Sahara have taken an entirely 
different route.
For the better part of three decades after independence – in 
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s – African countries were domi-
nated by one-party and military rulers. The pluralistic arrange-
ments originally adopted in many new states as European colo-
nial authorities handed over power to African elites were soon 
dismantled by leaders who hastened to make opposition parties 
illegal or were themselves ousted by coups d’état. By the 1990s, 
domestic and international pressures for political change were 
felt across the region, as country after country embarked upon 
introducing elections and opening politics, at least formally, to 
opposition parties. A blunt divide thus separates the first half 
of Africa’s sixty years of independence (1960s-1980s), during 
which multiparty experiences were rendered marginal, from the 
second half (1990s-2010s), when they became the norm. The 
region as a whole shifted from rule by unelected leaders (as a 
matter of fact, many of them were elected unopposed under 
single-party voting) to elected leaders who typically reached of-
fice and/or where confirmed in office via multiparty contests. 
Beyond the surface, however, wildly diverse degrees of “democ-
racy” separated the relatively open and lively politics of coun-
tries such as Ghana, Senegal or even Kenya, from hegemon-
ic systems that de facto remain under the overwhelming and 
blatant dominance of the same political elite in places such as 
4 N. van de Walle, “Conclusion: democracy fatigue and ghost of  modernization 
theory”, in T. Hagmann and F. Reyntjens, Aid and authoritarianism in Africa: devel-
opment without democracy, London, Zed Books, 2016, p. 174.
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Congo-Brazzaville, Chad or Gabon. Indeed, as it was recently 
pointed out: “the modal African country is not democratic so 
much as an electoral autocracy in which multi-party elections 
are regularly scheduled and the regime adopts the language and 
rituals of democracy, but remains profoundly authoritarian, 
with unaccountable executive branches of government, politi-
cised judicial systems and various human rights abuses”5. 
Leaders and Development
Surviving in office for as long as possible is often thought to be 
the primary concern of political leaders. The latter’s true suc-
cess, however, arguably lies not so much in the ability to stay 
on, but rather in their ability to guide a country and its people 
towards progress and development. Indeed, with the exception 
of national independence or international war, a country’s so-
cial and economic advancement is usually the main criterion a 
political leader is assessed against. This implies the common if 
often overlooked assumption that leadership does matter for 
development; that, while it certainly has to contend with a 
wide array of other factors, leadership can make a difference, 
for good or for bad.
The issue has been little delved into by researchers6. A rare 
and early investigation brought into the open the aforemen-
tioned conjecture by asking whether “new leaders make a 
difference” in terms of “policy priorities”7:
5 Ibid., p. 165.
6 For some recent exceptions, see B. Jones and B. Olken, “Do leaders matter? 
National leadership and growth since World War II”, Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 
vol. 120, no. 3, 2005, pp. 835-864; D. Brady and M. Spence, “Leadership and 
Politics: A Perspective from the Commission on Growth and Development”, in 
D. Brady and M. Spence (eds.), Leadership and Growth, World Bank Publications, 
Washington DC, 2010; W. Easterly and S. Pennings, Shrinking dictators: assessing the 
growth contribution of  individual national leaders, mimeo, October 2018; C. Berry and A. 
Fowler, Leadership or luck? Randomization inference for leader effects, mimeo, April 2018.
7 V. Bunce, Do new leaders make a difference? Executive succession and public policy under 
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leadership succession is the most visible and salient aspect of 
the political process … whether through election or coup d’état, 
[it] is considered important not only because it concerns power 
and the powerful but also because of its implications for change. 
New leaders may mean new policies … or a change in govern-
ment performance […] Thus […] the central importance of 
leadership succession is not the process itself, but rather its ex-
pected impact8. 
Bunce’s empirical findings confirmed that – regardless of the 
politico-institutional gulf separating Western democracies from 
socialist states – in both sets of countries “leadership change 
mean[t] policy change”9. Contrary to the claim that chief exec-
utives were largely inconsequential, “dispensable actors”10, they 
turned out to be key players shaping policy processes, notably 
in terms of a government’s budgetary priorities11. 
Thirty years later, Brady and Spence (2010b) adopted a sim-
ilar perspective, if with a more specific focus on economic de-
velopment, pointing at what high-growth stories across world 
regions teach us:
leadership plays a role in generating sustained growth … There 
is no one style of leadership […] nor is leadership the only in-
put […] [Yet] practitioners and observers and a wide range of 
scholars are right in believing that, at least at times, leadership 
makes a difference in terms of altering the trajectory of a devel-
oping economy […] The obvious first stage is where the lead-
ership chooses an economic model or strategy […] The second 
stage […] concerns how leaders adjust strategies and choices to 
changing circumstances12.
capitalism and socialism, Princeton, Princeton, University Press, 1981, p. 44.
8 V. Bunce, “Changing leaders and changing policies. The impact of  elite succes-
sion on budgetary priorities in democratic countries”, American Journal of  Political 
Science, vol. 24, no. 3, 1980, p. 373.
9 Ibid., p. 384.
10 F. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, Markham Publishing Company, Chicago, 
1969, p. 47.
11 V. Bunce, (1980), p. 391.
12 D. Brady and M. Spence, (eds.), Leadership and Growth…, cit., pp. 2-5.
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While leaders are not unconstrained, it is thus argued, they do 
have significant room for shaping a country’s development path 
and progress. Yet not all of them succeed. What is it, then, that 
explains which leaders exploit the leverage they potentially hold 
– and strive for their nation’s advance – as opposed to adopting 
behaviours and measures that are detrimental to that very goal?
The key political and institutional changes observed across 
Africa – as briefly summed up in the previous section – offer 
good ground for a comparative scrutiny and understanding of 
the broader implications of leadership dynamics. On the one 
hand, the elected leaders of the current multiparty era can be 
contrasted with their predecessors during the one-party/military 
epoch to examine which of the two groups was associated with 
better development achievements, if any. On the other hand, 
the progress and performances attained by today’s democratical-
ly-elected rulers can be set against those of their current authori-
tarian peers – also now typically elected – to learn whether con-
temporary Africa is a place for reaping the fruits of a democratic 
dividend or, on the contrary, of an authoritarian advantage.
Towards a Comprehensive Analysis
To fully account for the development impact of sub-Saharan 
leaders, an entirely new collection of data, called the Africa 
Leadership Change (ALC) dataset, was recently built13. For all 
countries on the continent from 1960 – or subsequent year of 
independence – to 2018, the dataset includes all handovers of 
the top political office. This most typically implies a presidential 
turnover, but at times, or for specific countries, it may take the 
form of a power transfer involving prime ministers, monarchs 
13 G. Carbone and A. Pellegata, Political leadership in Africa. Leaders and development 
South of  the Sahara, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020 (forthcoming). 
The ALC dataset and related Codebook can be freely downloaded from the ISPI 
website at https://www.ispionline.it/en/africa-leadership-change-project, where 
a number of  interactive visualisation tools are also available.
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or heads of military juntas. The ALC data comprehensively ac-
count for the way leaders take office and how they leave it (e.g. 
via a popular vote or through a coup d’état or an armed guerrilla, 
handpicked by their predecessors or defeated by the opposition, 
etc.), how much time they spend in power, the changing nature 
of their power base and legitimacy during their stay (for exam-
ple, when elections are introduced by a coup-maker), as well as 
several other aspects of their rule. 
The overall picture that emerges from the ALC project shows 
how deeply leadership dynamics have transformed across the 
region between the pre- and post-1990 periods. Duration in of-
fice, for a start, declined significantly. Eighty per cent of Africa’s 
“twentennials” – i.e. the 36 leaders who remained in power for 
two decades or more – reached office in the 1960s, 1970s or 
1980s; only a minority did so after that. Meanwhile, coups 
d’état have become rarer and rarer (although removals such as 
Compaoré’s and al-Bashir’s remind us that military interven-
tions – in these specific cases ignited by popular protests – are 
still an option, particularly with presidents who overstay in of-
fice), whereas holding elections with multiple parties has now 
turned into an established practice with few exceptions. It is true 
that a number of African power-holders – from Guinea’s late 
Lansana Conté to Chad’s Idriss Déby, from Uganda’s Museveni 
to Djibouti’s Ismaïl Guelleh, and others – managed to alter or 
by-pass presidential term limits so that they could remain in 
office longer than allowed by existing norms. But many others 
were unsuccessful in their attempts – from Frederick Chiluba 
in Zambia to Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria – or they desisted 
for a variety of reasons, either way helping consolidate some-
what constitutional rule. The current scenario, therefore, in-
creasingly consists of shorter average stays in office, as pointed 
out, and much more frequent power handovers, in the form of 
both electoral “successions” (i.e. where the incoming and out-
going power-holders belong to the same political force) as well 
as electoral “alternations” (i.e. where an opposition leader wins 
office, bringing about a government turnover).
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What Kind of Rulers?
Political reforms thus ushered in a post-1990 landscape that 
requires updating our understanding of African power-hold-
ers and leadership trends. A highly influential study of leaders 
across the continent, for example, had framed them as “personal 
rulers”14. While the authors did draw some distinctions among 
national strongmen – and famously labelled them “princes”, 
“prophets”, “autocrats” or “tyrants” – they stressed the preva-
lence of an underlying, common leadership style from Malawi 
to Liberia, from Côte d’Ivoire to Swaziland and beyond. The 
latter revolved around the centrality of authoritarian and neo-
patrimonial practices as political survival strategies, to the detri-
ment of formal political processes, rule of law and open politics. 
After independence, public institutions had quickly weakened 
in most sub-Saharan polities and now hardly offered alternative 
centres of power to counter the individual at the top. 
While there is certainly no shortage of corruption and au-
tocratic rule in contemporary Africa, the analytical value of 
Jackson and Rosberg’s framework has gradually declined. The 
constitutional changes that were undertaken since the latter 
decade of the twentieth century set the background for the 
growing relevance of institutions in shaping African politics15.
The changing leadership trends can be illustrated with help 
from a new typology based on the three criteria laid out in 
Figure 1, namely: duration in office, openness to multipartism, 
and degree of democracy16. First, the typology sets apart the 
14 R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, Personal rule in black Africa. Prince, autocrat, proph-
et, tyrant, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of  California Press, 1982; 
R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, “Personal rule: theory and practice in Africa”, 
Comparative Politics, vol. 16, no. 4, 1984, pp. 421-442.
15 D. Posner and D. Young, “The institutionalization of  political power in Africa”, 
Journal of  Democracy, vol. 18, no. 3, 2007, pp. 126-140; D. Posner and D. Young, 
“Term limits: leadership, political competition and the transfer of  power”, in N. 
Cheeseman, (ed.), Institutions and democracy in Africa. How the rules of  the game shape 
political developments, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 260-277.
16 G. Carbone and A.  Pellegata (2020) (forthcoming).
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numerous leaders who only held sway in an African capital for 
a very short spell – that is, less than one year – whether because 
they were abruptly or even violently ousted or because from the 
very beginning they were simply meant to bridge over a transi-
tion period. Colonel Christophe Soglo’s three-month tenure in 
Benin (1963-1964) or Kgalema Motlanthe’s eight-month spell 
in South Africa (2008-2009), for example, fall in this catego-
ry. Overall, there were some 92 such interim office-holders, or 
“transients”, out of the 360 leaders who served in office between 
1960 and 2018. They represent a hefty 25.5% of all rulers, but 
only governed for a combined 28 years, or 1% of all coun-
try-years for the entire period (see Table 1). About one third of 
transients remained in power for no longer than three months. 
Some did occasionally play important functions – for instance, 
by favouring regime transitions or peace deals – but, one may 
argue, a few months hardly offered them the opportunity to 
shape their country’s social and economic progress (or failure) 
in a more direct way. 
As a second criteria, leaders who were elected via multipar-
ty voting are separated from those who were not (some who 
were formally entrusted with popular mandates are still deemed 
‘unelected’ when they run unopposed). The latter group are 
labelled “autocrats”. Because many African leaders started off 
as elected presidents or prime ministers only to subsequent-
ly eliminate open elections (especially in the 1960s), while a 
number of others initially gained office as unelected rulers, 
but went on to allow multiparty competition (especially since 
the 1990s), each of them is categorised as elected or unelect-
ed depending on whether or not he or she had a multiparty 
electoral mandate for the better part of his/her stay in office. 
The 119 autocrats thus identified represent by far the largest 
of our groups. Moreover, with an average eleven years in office, 
they ruled independent African countries for virtually half of 
all country-years (i.e. 1,276 out of 2,577). All but one of the 
post-independence ‘personal rulers’ that Jackson and Rosberg 
(1982) scrutinised in their work fall in this category, including 
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the likes of Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire), Ahmadou 
Ahidjo (Cameroon), Hastings Banda (Malawi), Ahmed Sékou 
Touré (Guinea), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Idi Amin Dada 
(Uganda). 
Finally, we divide elected leaders depending on whether or 
not minimal standards for open and pluralist politics were met 
for the better part of their tenure (i.e. as indicated by a Polity 
2 country score averaging 6 or more during their entire stay)17. 
Leaders satisfying this last criterion are labelled “democrats” – 
they are 84 and account for 23.4% of all leaders (for example 
Yayi Boni in Benin, John Kufuor in Ghana or Mwai Kibaki in 
Kenya) – while those stopping short of it are deemed “hegem-
ons”, a group comprising 65, or 18.1% of all rulers (Joaquim 
Chissano, Armando Guebuza and Filipe Nyusi of Mozambique 
all fall into this group, as do Benjamin Mkapa, Jakaya Kikwete 
and John Magufuli of Tanzania). While hegemons are less nu-
merous, however, they are prevalent when we turn to average 
stays in office (almost twelve years against democrats’ six) and 
overall number of years they ruled the region (i.e. 755 coun-
try-years against democrats’ 518).
17 The Polity2 score assigned to a country for 2017 – the last year currently 
covered by the Polity Project – were extended to 2018. For details on the Polity2 
measure of  democracy see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.
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Fig. 1.1 – Criteria for a new typology of African leaders
Source: G. Carbone and A. Pellegata (2020). 
Note: elected leaders include those who constitutionally “inherit” 
an electoral mandate following resignation or death of an elected incumbent.
Tab. 1 – The distribution of African leaders across leadership types
N of leaders Country-years in office Avg. years in office
N % N %
Transients 92 25.5 % 28 1 % 0.3
Autocrats 119 33 % 1,276 49.5 % 10.7
Hegemons 65 18.1 % 755 29.4 % 11.6
Democrats 84 23.4 % 518 20.1 % 6.2
360 100 % 2,577 100 % 7.2
 
Source: G. Carbone and A. Pellegata (2020).
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Fig. 2 - Types of leaders in Africa, 1960-2018
Source: G. Carbone and A. Pellegata (2020).
Since the aim of this classification is to help understand Africa’s 
evolving leadership scenario, what is most revealing is the 
overtime trend in the prevalence of different types of leaders. 
Drawing on the ALC data, Figure 2 displays the changing in-
cidence of autocrats, hegemons, democrats and transients from 
1960 to 201818. The resulting picture is largely self-explaining, 
with the often long-serving autocrats taking the largest share of 
the left-hand side of the graph – peaking in 1977, when they 
numbered 41 in 45 then-independent states – but declining 
progressively afterwards. Hegemons and democrats follow a 
somewhat symmetrical course, as they expand their ranks, re-
spectively, starting from the 1980s and the 1990s. The increase 
of hegemons begins earlier largely because they include leaders 
18 Note that in the figure the total number of  leaders is at times higher than that 
of  independent countries in the region as a result of  there being years in which 
a single country had one or more transient leaders.
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who were already in office prior to the reforms of the 1990s but 
eventually spent a longer time in power with an electoral man-
date (for example, Paul Biya in Cameroon, Blaise Compaoré 
in Burkina Faso, Omar Al-Bashir in Sudan or even Joaquim 
Chissano in Mozambique). While the annual number of he-
gemons stabilises at around twenty-something from 1995 on 
(with a peak of 25 in 2000-2001), democrats take time to catch 
up but ultimately become the largest group, if only margin-
ally, from 2015 on. Across the entire period, the presence of 
transient leaders remains a more regular and limited phenom-
enon, only marginally entering the overall picture. As of mid-
2019, sub-Saharan Africa counted 23 democrats, 20 hegemons 
and 6 autocrats (including Sudan’s Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman 
Burhan, who might eventually turn out a transient leader, 
alongside eSwatini’s Mswati III, Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki, South 
Sudan’s Salva Kiir, Somalia’s Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed 
“Farmajo”, and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni19). 
Life under more democratic rulers – as opposed to life under 
hegemons and autocrats – differs, by definition, in terms of the 
extent to which liberties and rights are respected or trampled 
upon. But do the differences leaders are associated with also 
extend to a country’s development prospects?
Leading for Development in Africa
When Africans began demanding political changes across the 
region, during the 1980s, the notion that they needed to get rid 
of rulers and elites who had often proved inept at improving 
their living conditions – and in many cases had overseen the 
latter’s deterioration and the spread of malfeasance – was a key 
motive in their mobilisation. They wanted new leaders under 
new political arrangements as a pre-condition for resetting their 
19 Uganda is currently an electoral authoritarian regime like many others in Africa. 
Yet Museveni ruled for two decades in the absence of  multiparty elections, only 
introducing them over the subsequent, shorter period of  his time in office.
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countries’ failing quest for development. On the whole – as 
shown above – the political reforms they obtained did substan-
tially alter the way African power-holders access, remain in, and 
ultimately leave office. New leaders thus emerged, alongside 
better regularised turnovers. But have contemporary Africa’s 
elected rulers improved their countries’ progress better than the 
previous, mostly unelected ones?
The country-year structure of the ALC data allows for an 
easy combination with performance indicators covering dis-
tinct development dimensions, such as economic growth, 
welfare measures and many others, thus favouring the use of 
econometric analysis for assessing the impact of different lead-
ers – and types of leaders – on the advancement of the nations 
they head.
Empirical evidence is largely supportive of the notion that 
African elected power-holders – particularly but not only when 
electoral competition is democratic – are incentivised to adopt 
behaviours and initiatives that favour a variety of development 
achievements20. In general, elected office-holders are more suc-
cessful developers than coup-makers, overstaying leaders, and 
unelected dictators: voting processes prove to be a plus not just 
on moral ground (i.e. in terms of freedom, political equality or 
justice), but they are also a tool towards a broader social and 
economic impact – particularly when popular votes are more 
open, narrowly contested and cyclically reiterated. Electoral 
successions and alternations – that is, rotation in office via 
elections, both when occurring in the context of ruling party 
continuity and when resulting from an opposition victory – 
are further ingredients that appear to spur social and economic 
performances.
When we turn specifically to the leadership types identi-
fied above, and look at their growth performances, it is not 
just sub-Saharan democrats but also elected hegemons who 
20 G. Carbone and A. Pellegata (2020) (forthcoming).
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outperform autocrats (interim office-holders are excluded)21. 
Similarly, both democrats and hegemons appear to do some-
what better than autocrats in improving citizens’ wellbeing, 
particularly when measured through indicators such as life ex-
pectancy increases or child mortality reductions. Finally, while 
elected rulers are not systematically associated with reduced 
corruption, both democrats and hegemons (particularly the 
former) are empirically linked to the strengthening and amelio-
ration of the administrative and extractive capacities of African 
polities. Thus, what type of leader is at the helm – the way he or 
she has achieved office, how he or she maintains the position, 
and the modes in which he or she can be replaced – counts not 
only from a political survival perspective, but also from a devel-
opmental point of view.
Conclusion
Leaders remain central to contemporary African politics. But 
their position has changed inasmuch as they typically now op-
erate in political settings that are significantly different from 
those prevailing in the past. Today, institutions have increasing-
ly come to bear upon their actions, if imperfectly and incom-
pletely. This in turn affects the “leader effect” on development, 
or on the lack thereof. Overall, the presence of electoral in-
centives tends to improve a leader’s performance and achieve-
ments, and partly so even when a country’s political regime is 
not truly democratic. Some three decades ago, sub-Saharan 
Africa adopted new mechanisms for selecting and replacing its 
leaders. It now appears that these very leaders are increasingly 
contributing to shaping new trajectories for Africa.
21 Ibid.
2.  A Shining Example for the Horn? 
     Abiy Ahmed’s Surprising Leadership 
     in Ethiopia
Jonathan Fisher
In February 2018, in the midst of ongoing political turmoil and 
the second declaration of a state of emergency in as many years, 
few could have predicted the radical political change of direc-
tion Ethiopia would experience within a matter of weeks and, 
seemingly, courtesy of just one man. The election in March 
2018 of Abiy Ahmed as Chairman of the ruling Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and conse-
quently the country’s Prime Minister1 heralded – to the surprise 
of many – the beginning of a major shift in leadership style and 
approach in one of Africa’s most authoritarian polities. 
Within his first 100 days Abiy2 had released and offered am-
nesty to thousands of political prisoners, liberalised harsh press 
and freedom of speech controls, legalised various once-crimi-
nalised opposition groups, placed his own stamp on Ethiopia’s 
sprawling and fearsome military-security complex, committed 
the country to genuine multi-party democracy and, perhaps 
most impressive of all, ended 18 years of latent conflict with 
neighbouring Eritrea. As many observers had expected, Abiy, 
1 Abiy was elected chairman of  the EPRDF on 27 March 2018, elected as Prime 
Minister of  Ethiopia by the House of  Representatives on 2 April 2018 and 
sworn in on the same day.
2 By convention, Ethiopians are known by a single, personal name, while also 
possessing a separate patronymic and, in most cases, an avonymic.
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who at 42 is the continent’s youngest leader, was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in late 2019. The first aim of this chapter is 
to examine and account for this extraordinary rise. How could 
someone like Abiy emerge as the leader of a political system 
such as Ethiopia’s, and what are the prospects for his reform 
agenda?
In that regard, a degree of analytical caution and tempered 
optimism is advised. Abiy has unleashed and benefited from 
forces beyond his control. His ascendancy resulted from cen-
trifugal ethno-political forces tearing apart the country and the 
ruling coalition, forces which Abiy’s actions have done little to 
alleviate and a fair amount to exacerbate. Moreover, his leader-
ship style has been – perhaps by necessity – unashamedly per-
sonalised, with major policy decisions and volte-faces decided 
upon with little reference to ruling party structures. This means 
that not only are critical Abiy-era successes – notably peace 
with Eritrea – built on somewhat shaky ground but also that 
popular expectations of radical change rest very firmly on his 
shoulders alone. As the general election of 2020 approaches, 
Ethiopians are likely to begin reflecting more critically on how 
far their leader has delivered on his promises.
More broadly, Abiy remains something of an unknown 
quantity. Many of the continent’s other “new leaders”, such as 
Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa or João Lourenço of Angola, 
had long served as party leaders or senior Cabinet ministers 
before their eventual elevation to the presidency. By contrast, 
Abiy was a relative newcomer until shortly before becoming 
Prime Minister. A technocrat within the then Oromo People’s 
Democratic Organisation (OPDO, one of the four members 
of the EPRDF coalition), he was appointed Deputy President 
of the Oromia region in October 2016 and became eligible for 
the premiership only five weeks before his election, after being 
selected as OPDO Chairman in February 2018. In addition, 
what is known about his professional history sits somewhat 
incongruously alongside his statements and actions as Prime 
Minister, particularly in relation to freedom of expression. An 
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intelligence officer by training, Abiy was co-founder and even-
tually acting Director of Ethiopia’s Information Network and 
Security Agency during a period when state control over online 
space and debate was at its most acute and uncompromising.
The second aim of this chapter is therefore to situate Abiy 
and his leadership more clearly within the Ethiopian political 
context. Abiy is not someone who “came from nowhere”; he 
owes his position to groups within as well as outside the rul-
ing coalition. Understanding his rise and considering what the 
future holds for Ethiopia under his premiership require criti-
cal reflection on what has shaped his leadership, as well as the 
countervailing forces that it must contend with.
Ethiopia’s Gathering Storm:  
Ethnic Federalism and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi
Abiy’s election as EPRDF Chairman occurred at a time of pa-
ralysis and political crisis for Ethiopia’s ruling coalition. The 
authoritarian regime was in its third year of facing down major 
protests, and was deeply divided over how best to tackle this 
unprecedented threat to its hold on power. Some voices with-
in the coalition argued for political reform, democratisation 
and compromise, while others pressed for a continuation and 
strengthening of the hard-line crackdowns which had been the 
cornerstone of EPRDF public security practice since the mid-
2000s. In October 2016 Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn 
declared a state of emergency, and by February 2018 hundreds 
had lost their lives in brutal clashes between the security forces 
and protesters. Hailemariam, by his own admission a leader 
with little room for manoeuvre3, failed to agree a modus vivendi 
among the warring factions within the EPRDF and was left 
with little option but to tender his resignation, which he did 
on 15 February. “I believed that there had to be a new person 
3 G. Mills, “Ethiopia’s Need for “Deep Renewal”, Daily Maverick, 14 August 2018, 
(last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
Leaders for a New Africa32
with a dominant force who could save the country”, reflected 
the former Prime Minister six months later4. That person, ulti-
mately, would be Abiy Ahmed.
Abiy’s emergence owed much to two key interlinked ele-
ments of the polity built by the EPRDF since coming to pow-
er in May 1991. The first was ethnic federalism. The EPRDF 
was born in 1988 as a somewhat artificial union of three rebel 
movements, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 
the OPDO and what would eventually become the Amhara 
National Democratic Movement (ANDM). The armed coali-
tion was assembled and dominated by the TPLF, a self-styled 
liberation movement founded in 1975 in Tigray, Ethiopia’s 
most northerly region, and led since 1989 by the shrewd polit-
ical operator and intellectual Meles Zenawi. The TPLF, and the 
wider EPRDF, identified ethno-political chauvinism as the cen-
tral injustice of the socialist Derg regime – in power since 1974 
– and its imperial predecessors. Both, they argued, had been 
dominated by members of Ethiopia’s Amharic ethnic group and 
had constructed and reinforced a socio-political and economic 
system which embedded Amharic privilege and systematically 
discriminated against Ethiopia’s many other nations and peo-
ples5. The latter included Tigrayans – whose region was among 
the poorest in 1970s Ethiopia – but also Oromos, the largest 
ethnic group in the country and the ethnicity of around one in 
every three Ethiopians. In 2018 Abiy Ahmed became the first 
Oromo leader of Ethiopia in modern times.
After wresting control of Tigray from the Derg army in 1988, 
the TPLF helped to found the OPDO and the future ANDM 
from prisoners of war and offshoots of previously vanquished 
rebel groups. This was an effort to assemble a future Ethiopian 
government with a more credible claim to represent the coun-
try’s diverse ethnic groups than one drawn solely from Tigray. 
4 Ibid.
5 G. Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of  Africa, New Haven, CT, 
Yale University Press, 2009; J. Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
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After taking Addis Ababa itself in 1991, the new EPRDF gov-
ernment sponsored the creation of similar ethno-nationalist 
parties across the country, and one of these – the Southern 
Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) – even-
tually became the fourth member of the EPRDF coalition6. 
The four coalition parties, together with their nascent satellite 
parties, became the building blocks of a major constitutional 
restructuring under the EPRDF: ethnic federalism.
The rationale behind ethnic federalism was to devise a po-
litical system that would embed the rights of different ethnic 
groups and peoples within the state itself and prevent a sin-
gle ethnic group dominating the rest. To that end, the 1995 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
provided for a federal political system based on nine regions 
whose shapes and boundaries derived from the ethnicity of the 
majority of citizens living there. Each Regional State would 
possess its own elected legislature and entrenched rights, up to 
and including the right of secession from the federation itself. 
As an effort to dilute Ethiopia’s long history of centralised gov-
ernment, however, ethnic federalism would do little in practice 
to alter the relationship between Addis Ababa and the regions, 
at least until the mid-2010s.
One of the main factors behind this – and the second key 
element – was the leadership style of one of Abiy’s predecessors, 
Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s President and later Prime Minister 
from 1991 until his death in August 2012. Meles was not a 
founding member of the TPLF but slowly climbed the move-
ment’s ranks securing influence and power as a leading intel-
lectual and a canny, ruthless politician. It would not, however, 
be until 2001 – after thirteen years as EPRDF Chairman and a 
decade as Ethiopia’s leader – that Meles would turn from primus 
inter pares (the default posture of the TPLF’s Marxist-Leninist 
collective leadership) into an authoritarian strongman – at least 
as portrayed by his detractors. 
6 J. Fisher, East Africa After Liberation: Conflict, Security and the State since the 1980s, 
New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming 2019.
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In the aftermath of a punishing war with onetime ally Eritrea 
(see below), a powerful faction within the TPLF challenged 
Meles’ record, accusing him of despotism and betrayal at the 
height of a national emergency. This prompted a damaging split 
within the TPLF and greatly imperilled Meles’ position. Meles 
eventually won, emerging stronger than ever by manipulating 
party procedures and, crucially, leveraging support from the 
other three coalition members which had until that point been 
largely silent partners in the TPLF-dominated government. 
Subsequently, to secure his position, Meles and his allies purged 
the TPLF of critics and detractors, and forced out figures in the 
other three parties (notably the OPDO) who had sided with his 
opponents during the crisis7. In doing so Meles re-shaped the 
EPRDF coalition into a body whose leaders owed their loyalties 
directly to him.
Beyond the centre, the post-2001 Meles government also 
sought to impose stricter and more personalised control over 
state and party machinery nationwide8. Regional Presidents – 
notionally chosen by elected Regional Assemblies – would be 
dismissed at will when perceived to be going against the centre. 
More broadly, state and party mobilisation structures linking 
Meles’ leadership to the smallest units of government were ex-
panded and enhanced by accommodating formerly-eschewed 
community leaders within local governance mechanisms. This 
process was accelerated after the EPRDF’s unexpectedly poor 
performance in the 2005 general election. The coalition and 
its satellite parties lost 154 of their 481 seats9, prompting both 
soul-searching within the EPRDF and a major crackdown on 
7 P. Milkias, “Ethiopia, the TPLF and the Roots of  the 2001 Political Tremor”, 
International Conference on African Development Archives, Paper 4, 2001, (last 
retrieved on 20 July 2019).
8 S. Vaughan, “Revolutionary Democratic State-Building: Party, State and People 
in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia”, Journal of  Eastern African Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, 2011, 
pp. 619-640.
9 There are 547 seats in Ethiopia’s House of  Representatives. 274 seats are re-
quired for a parliamentary majority.
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opposition and on freedom of speech and assembly. Within a 
few years the Meles regime had gained firm control, and the 
EPRDF won 499 seats out of 547 in the 2010 election. A year 
before Meles’ death the academic commentator Jon Abbink 
observed that “the actual power and interference of the federal 
government in regional and local affairs has become stronger 
than under any previous regime”10.
Crisis
The maturing of ethnic federalism and the incorporation of 
formerly-shunned local leaders into state and party machinery 
would nonetheless begin to gather its own momentum dur-
ing the 2000s11. Regional Presidents who enjoyed Meles’ sup-
port – such as the Somali Regional State’s Abdi Mohamoud 
Omar (“Abdi Iley”) – could increasingly act as they pleased, 
while the integrity of regional state boundaries – where Amhara 
Regional State ends and Tigray Regional State begins, for ex-
ample – would become an ever-growing point of contention as 
associations between ethnicity and political and developmental 
resources solidified. Emerging tensions across these areas were 
largely held in check under Meles by means of his personal hold 
over the party, the security forces and the wider polity. 
Meles died, however, in August 2012, leaving a vacuum. 
With no anointed successor and plenty of rival candidates, a 
power struggle ensued within the TPLF and the wider EPRDF. 
A stop-gap measure – and compromise – saw the SEPDM chair 
Hailemariam Desalegn, viewed within the movement as a po-
litical “neutral”, elected Prime Minister as the various factions 
plotted their next move12. Without a strongman directing from 
the centre, regional administrations and power-brokers saw an 
10 J. Abbink, “Ethnic-Based Federalism and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing 
the Experiment after 20 Years”, Journal of  Eastern African Studies, vol. 5, no, 4, 
2011, p.604.
11 Y. Tesfaye Fessha, “The Original Sin of  Ethiopian Federalism”, Ethnopolitics, 
vol. 16, no. 3, 2017, pp. 232-245.
12 G. Mills (2018).
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opportunity to flex their muscles; the Somali Region’s Abdi Iley 
worked with military officials based in his state to block federal 
attempts to remove him only months after Meles’ death13. 
This growing free-for-all also opened up new space for re-
gional leaders and citizens to reassess their relationships with 
one another and with the TPLF-dominated government. 
Increasingly, the rights and grievances of non-Tigrayan ethnic 
groups against the federal state would become a key point of 
mobilisation, leveraged successfully by some EPRDF satellite 
parties to secure greater independence and power, and catching 
others unawares, including the OPDO and ANDM. Several 
critical flashpoints emerged in this regard during 2015 and 2016 
in Ethiopia’s two most populous regions, Amhara and Oromia. 
In Amhara, the arrest of activists agitating for a reallocation of 
territory from Tigray to Amhara led to mass protests in mid-
2016. Six months earlier, in Oromia, a federal “master plan” to 
expand the Ethiopian capital – Addis Ababa, a chartered city 
– into Oromia state had produced a similar result. Over time, 
and partly in response to the government’s heavy-handed and 
violent response, the protests spread and shifted from being 
about the integrity of the country’s internal state boundaries to 
wider opposition to perceived political and economic margin-
alisation and human rights abuses by an authoritarian TPLF-
controlled system14. It was in this context that Hailemariam 
eventually resigned in February 2018.
13 T. Hagmann, Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The Search for an End to Conflict in the 
Somali Regional State in Ethiopia, Nairobi, Rift Valley Institute, 2014, (last retrieved 
on 20 July 2019).
14 J. Fisher and M.T. Gebrewahd, “‘Game Over?’ Abiy Ahmed, the Tigrayan 
People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopia’s Political Crisis”, African Affairs, vol. 118, 
no. 470, 2018, pp. 194-206.
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Abiy’s Triumph: Politicking and Transition 
in Ethiopia’s Ruling Coalition
Abiy was not a core player in the Oromia protests. The so-
called Qeerroo (“bachelor” in Oromo) movement at the heart 
of the phenomenon emerged semi-organically from Oromia’s 
(largely male) youth, many of whom felt their economic as-
pirations were being blocked by a Tigrayan-dominated polity 
and their grievances rejected by an aggressive security state. The 
movement combined Oromo nationalists, long-standing crit-
ics and opponents of the EPRDF and youth groups, students 
and labourers. It mobilised against both the EPRDF and its 
representative in Oromia, the OPDO. A similar scenario de-
veloped in the Amhara region, and while the two movements 
emerged and developed separately they increasingly came to as-
sociate themselves with one another. “We are all Oromos”, for 
example, became a popular slogan in the Amhara protests from 
mid-2016.
Faced with this situation, the OPDO and ANDM were con-
fronted with a difficult choice. One option would have been to 
uphold and defend the policies and approaches of the EPRDF 
government – their government – but risk losing yet more 
ground to forces beyond their control (both parties had already 
long been viewed by many in their regions as TPLF puppets). 
Alternatively, they could distance themselves from the TPLF 
and realign themselves with the protesters, repositioning them-
selves as defenders of Oromo or Amhara rights. Ultimately, 
both parties selected this latter option. 
In Oromia, though, it was not Abiy – Deputy President of 
the region and OPDO Deputy Chair – who initiated and over-
saw this reversal, but rather his immediate superior, the head of 
OPDO and President of Oromia, Lemma Megersa. A popular 
and charismatic politician, Lemma positioned himself during 
2016-2017 as a leading critic of the Addis Ababa expansion 
“master plan” and of the brutal response by the federal gov-
ernment and the military to the protests. “Team Lemma” – of 
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which Abiy was a member – gradually won the support of the 
protest movement, and by the time of Hailemariam’s resigna-
tion Lemma had emerged, in the words of The Economist, as 
Ethiopia’s “most popular politician” and a strong candidate for 
the premiership itself15.
Lemma was not, however, technically eligible for the post 
since he lacked a seat in the Ethiopian Parliament. By con-
trast, Abiy had been a member of the country’s House of 
Representatives since 2010. Consequently, and at Lemma’s 
urging, a week after Hailemariam’s announcement the OPDO 
Central Committee voted for Lemma and Abiy to change plac-
es, the former becoming Deputy Chairman of OPDO and the 
latter its Chairman. The OPDO had chosen to field Abiy as its 
candidate for Chairman of the EPRDF – and national premier 
– albeit as much by default as by conviction.
An Abiy victory in the March 2018 EPRDF politburo vote 
was by no means assured, however. Given the nature of the 
protests and Ethiopia’s wider ethno-political crisis, most polit-
buro members accepted that a Tigrayan candidate was proba-
bly a non-starter and that Hailemariam’s successor should be 
an Amhara or an Oromo, and indeed Demeke Mekonnen, the 
ANDM Chair, was at least an equally strong candidate in this 
regard. His administration had attempted a political realign-
ment in the Amhara region similar to that which Team Lemma 
had achieved in Oromia, albeit with slightly more ambivalence. 
Demeke also had the support of senior TPLF figures who felt 
that the Amhara chief would probably be more pliable than his 
Oromo counterpart. As EPRDF rules dictated that there could 
only be three candidates for its Chair, the TPLF nominated 
Demeke. The two other candidates nominated were Abiy (by 
the OPDO) and Shiferaw Shigute (the SEPDM Chair, nomi-
nated by his party).
15 The Economist, “Ethiopia’s Regime Flirts with Letting Dissidents Speak without 
Locking them up”, 27 January 2018, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
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To the surprise and consternation of many in the TPLF, 
however, Demeke declined the nomination – citing his desire 
to remain as EPRDF Deputy Chair, and, thus, Deputy Prime 
Minister of Ethiopia. The TPLF was then obliged to nominate 
its own leader – Debretsion Gebremichael – and transfer their 
support to him or to Shiferaw if they wanted to block an Abiy 
win. With ANDM support, however, Abiy would be difficult 
to defeat and, indeed, he emerged as victor with 108 votes to 
Shiferaw’s 58 and Debretsion’s two16. 
Abiy’s rise can be explained to some extent, then, by his work 
in Oromia realigning the OPDO with Oromo aspirations and 
acting, as part of Team Lemma, to tackle Oromo grievances 
against a federal government perceived to be oppressive, an-
ti-Oromo and chauvinistic. Ultimately, though, his ascent to 
the premiership owed as much to circumstance and the mach-
inations of colleagues as it did to his own ambition and strata-
gems. Had Lemma been a Member of Parliament, Abiy would 
probably not have been a candidate. Had Demeke accepted 
the nomination he might well have emerged triumphant as the 
choice of at least two of the four coalition parties. Indeed, it was 
the ANDM’s decision to support rather than challenge a poten-
tial OPDO premiership which ultimately made the difference. 
Outmanoeuvred, senior TPLF cadres would later argue that 
Demeke’s decision and therefore Abiy’s election had been en-
gineered by a “conspiracy” between the OPDO and ANDM17.
Who is Abiy Ahmed?
Abiy’s premiership was not anticipated, therefore, and before 
becoming Prime Minister Abiy himself was little known as a 
leader as opposed to an administrator. He had played a sig-
nificant, though ultimately secondary, role in OPDO/Oromia 
politics as Lemma’s deputy between 2016-2018, but by and 
16 J. Fisher and M.T. Gebrewahd (2018).
17 Ibid.
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large his career had been that of a fairly traditional EPRDF 
securocrat. 
Born in Jimma in what is now Oromia Regional State in 
August 1976 he reportedly joined the EPRDF struggle in its 
final months as a member – at the age of fifteen – of the nas-
cent OPDO. He enlisted in the Ethiopian military in 1993, fo-
cusing primarily on intelligence, and fought in the 1998-2000 
war with Eritrea, commanding an intelligence unit. While a 
military officer – rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel be-
fore leaving the army in 2010 – he studied for an undergradu-
ate degree in computer engineering at Addis Ababa University 
and a Masters degree in transformational leadership from the 
UK’s Greenwich University. He also co-founded Ethiopia’s 
Information Network and Security Agency (INSA) in 2008, 
stepping down as acting Director in 2010 when he was elected 
to Parliament. INSA during Abiy’s tenure, according to Iginio 
Gagliardone and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, was a “central 
component” of the government’s online censorship and sur-
veillance efforts, aimed in particular at opposition actors and 
websites18.
After his election to Parliament Abiy became particular-
ly active in Oromia and OPDO politics, being elected to the 
OPDO politburo in 2015 and appointed Deputy President 
of Oromia in October 2016. During the mid-2010s he held 
various other posts including – briefly – Federal Minister for 
Science and Technology (2015-2016) and Director General of 
the (state-run) Science and Technology Information Center. 
He also completed a PhD on Conflict Resolution in Jimma at 
Addis Ababa’s Institute for Peace and Security Studies in 2017. 
Little emerges from this picture that would suggest a re-
former and iconoclast. Abiy followed a path well trodden by 
many other Meles-era technocrats and political apparatchiks, 
and gave little indication that an Abiy premiership would be 
18 I. Gagliardone and F. Golooba-Mutebi, “The Evolution of  the Internet in 
Ethiopia and Rwanda: Towards a ‘Developmental’ Model?”, Stability: International 
Journal of  Security & Development, vol. 5, no. 1, 2016, p. 17.
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transformative. One biographical narrative favoured by Abiy 
supporters traces a personal commitment to inter-ethnic and 
religious reconciliation throughout his life – as an academic 
(degrees in leadership and conflict resolution), a soldier (a for-
mer peacekeeper in post-genocide Rwanda), and a politician 
(as a Member of Parliament and OPDO bureaucrat he over-
saw a number of inter-religious forums and dialogues following 
clashes between Muslims and Christians). Indeed, the fact that 
Abiy’s father was an Oromo Muslim and mother an Amharic 
Christian demonstrates for many of his adherents how far the 
Ethiopian leader actually embodies reconciliation and peaceful 
co-existence. 
Abiy’s promotion of unity and reconciliation pre-dates his 
time as Prime Minister, and appears to have been developed in 
particular during his period with Team Lemma. In an October 
2017 speech, for example, he argued that “We have only one 
option, and that is to be united […] our option should be to 
trust one another, heal our wounds together and work together 
to develop our country”19. Such rhetoric has become a famil-
iar part of Abiy’s public addresses as premier and, indeed, has 
been developed into a governing philosophy – medemer (“ad-
dition” or “summation” in Amharic) – which he summarised 
to Ethiopian legislators in June 2018 as “tender love instead of 
abject cruelty, peace instead of conflict, love over hate, forgive-
ness over holding a grudge, pulling instead of pushing”20. The 
official letterhead of documents issued by his office reads “A 
new horizon of hope”21.
But Abiy’s leadership style has not simply been characterised 
by warm words and sentiments. He has taken significant risks 
– some of which have paid off, some of which are increasing-
ly backfiring. He has also shown himself to be a leader with 
19 “Abiy Ahmed: Ethiopia’s Prime Minister”, BBC News Online, 14 September 
2018, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
20 J. Fisher and M.T. Gebrewahd (2018).
21 L. Schadomsky, “Is “Emperor Abiy” at the Gates in Ethiopia?”, DW.Com 
(Deutsche Welle), 24 June 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
Leaders for a New Africa42
mettle – facing off against some of the most embedded vested 
interests in the EPRDF state within months of taking office. He 
has not, however, demonstrated significant interest in building 
wider alliances to secure a more stable political trajectory for his 
government, preferring to rely on his own image and message 
as a mobiliser. This comes with considerable risks as different 
groups and parties muster in advance of next year’s election.
Iconoclast and man of the future
A major criticism levelled at Abiy by some of his opponents (in-
cluding some factions within the EPRDF) is that he is “all talk”. 
While there is some truth to this, the Ethiopian leader has gen-
erally proved decisive and iconoclastic when necessary. At times 
this has been more symbolic than anything else – condemning 
his predecessors, within weeks of becoming premier, of “terror-
ist acts […] and using force just to stay in power”, changing the 
name of the OPDO to Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) in 
September 201822, appointing a gender-balanced Cabinet and 
inaugurating a “Ministry for Peace” including, inter alia, Abiy’s 
creation INSA23. At other times, though, this has involved crit-
ical decisions which have profoundly disrupted the status quo. 
Within weeks of taking office, for example, Abiy dispatched 
the two most fearsome TPLF securocrats in the nation – the 
army chief of staff (Samora Yunis) and, much less ceremoni-
ously, the national intelligence chief (Getachew Assefa). Two of 
Meles’ most longstanding and effective enforcers, these figures 
were spoken of in hushed tones by even Hailemariam’s closest 
aides during his tenure. Their swift removal by Abiy indicated 
not only a changing of the guard but a Prime Minister who was 
prepared to enforce a new order where his predecessor had felt 
his hands tied.
22 The ANDM did the same, becoming the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP).
23 Y. Gedamu, “How Change Happened in Ethiopia: A Review of  How Abiy 
Rose to Power”, The Conversation, 3 February 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
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Moreover, Abiy has shown himself magnanimous, releasing 
thousands of political prisoners (with unintended consequenc-
es, as discussed below) and decriminalising opposition parties 
and armed groups once labelled terrorists, including one move-
ment – the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) – with a far more 
historic claim to represent Oromo nationalism than the OPDO/
ODP. His record with individuals, however – particularly those 
most strongly associated with the Meles era – is somewhat more 
ambiguous and in line with the more traditional EPRDF ap-
proach. Within months of his election Abiy oversaw the forceful 
removal of Abdi Iley in Somali Regional State, sending in heavy 
artillery to neutralise the powerful Regional President in an 
operation which significantly, and crudely, damaged relations 
between Addis Ababa and the Somali Regional State leadership.
Abdi Iley was subsequently arrested, as was Bereket Simon – 
a senior ANDM figure closely tied to Meles, and forced out of 
the party’s leadership in January 201924. Getachew Assefa was 
also charged with human rights abuses after his dismissal, evad-
ing arrest only because the TPLF refused to hand him over to 
federal forces. This is not to say that any of these charges or ar-
rests lack merit. They have, however, been seen by several con-
stituencies – particularly Tigrayans – as selective, vindictive and 
mainly designed to scapegoat the TPLF and those most closely 
associated with it for Ethiopia’s current, complex political chal-
lenges. These perceptions have been exacerbated by claims that 
under Abiy Tigrayan military officers and civil servants have 
been singled out for dismissal.
Indeed, Abiy’s medemer posture has not been built only upon 
uplifting words, progressive acts and reformist pledges, not least 
the holding of genuinely multi-party elections in 2020. It has 
also rested upon a more cynical and somewhat irresponsible 
positioning of itself as the un-doer and opposite of everything 
EPRDF that had come before – from federal-state relations to 
24 A.R.A. Shaban, “Ethiopia Arrests Ex-Govt Minister Bereket Simon Over 
Corruption”, africanews, 23 January 2019 (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
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political rights to the “developmental state” beloved of Ethiopia’s 
Western development partners. 
Cynical, because Abiy was himself a part of the EPRDF ma-
chinery throughout the 2000s and a senior figure in an intelli-
gence agency. Irresponsible, because in some of his speeches he 
has deliberately blurred critiques of the Meles/Hailemariam re-
gimes with attacks on the TPLF and, most significantly, slurs on 
Tigrayans themselves. This has served not only to stoke further 
tensions between Tigrayans and their Amharic and Afar neigh-
bours but – ironically – to strengthen the TPLF’s legitimacy and 
support in Tigray at a time when the party’s popularity had been 
in terminal decline in the region25. In effect, Abiy has helped the 
TPLF to reconnect with its base and to reposition itself as a cham-
pion of Tigrayan rights against an oppressive centre. Ultimately, 
this is not a sustainable situation for an Ethiopian leader looking 
to unite a deeply divided country, and a revitalised TPLF is not 
an opponent any Ethiopian leader would wish for.
“Emperor Abiy”? 
Indeed, Abiy has demonstrated much less interest in building 
coalitions and networks with the multitude of power players 
inside and outside the EPRDF than he has in appealing over 
their heads directly to the people. In the latter regard, he has 
managed to cultivate – in a very short time – genuine affection 
and support from wide and diverse populations. Shortly after 
taking office Abiy undertook a tour of the country, where his 
appeals for unity, reconciliation and change resonated widely 
and inspired many. Weary of insecurity and a heavy-handed 
and uncaring state, thousands have attended Abiy’s frequent 
rallies, and thousands more have placed their hopes and aspira-
tions in him as the man to transform their futures and temper 
the centrifugal forces tearing the country apart. For months 
after Abiy’s inauguration the country was in the grip of what 
many analysts described as “Abiymania”, an almost messianic 
25 Indian Ocean Newsletter, “TPLF Worried About Tigray”, 9 May 2014.
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phenomenon where the Prime Minister’s image or words could 
be seen everywhere.
Abiy and his advisers have done much to promote and foster 
such feelings, including carefully-coordinated international en-
gagements with foreign leaders and, in particular, the Ethiopian 
diaspora. The love of the crowd alone is, however, an unstable 
foundation for genuine progressive change in a country as split 
and multi-faceted as Ethiopia. This is particularly so as Abiy’s 
honeymoon period comes to a close and citizens begin to judge 
him by his achievements as well as his rhetoric26. Moreover, ever 
since a rally in Addis Ababa was targeted by Abiy’s opponents 
with grenades in June 2018, with one death and over 100 in-
juries, these affairs have been more and more tightly policed 
and uneasy. Increasingly, the Ethiopian leader appears in public 
behind bullet-proof glass.
Indeed, the grenade attacks highlight a particular challenge 
to Abiy’s populist leadership approach, especially in the run-up 
to an election. Those accused of the crime were Oromo youths 
who claimed that they had acted against the Prime Minister be-
cause they did not feel that he would deliver on his promises to 
the Oromo and that the OLF (now no longer banned) would 
be a more reliable champion27. Regardless of popular sentiment 
around Abiy the man, he remains the candidate of the EPRDF 
and OPDO/ODP, and must rely on their structures and – of-
ten unpopular – local officials to reach the citizenry outside 
of rallies, as he will to fight the next election. As noted above, 
Abiy’s elevation owed more to the savvy politicking – or mis-
judgements – of colleagues than it did to his own political ma-
noeuvring; widening and deepening his coalition is critical to 
his longer-term survival.
26 M. Fick and T. Negeri, “A Problem for Ethiopia’s Leader: The Young Men 
who Helped him to Power”, Reuters, 2 November 2018, (last retrieved on 20 July 
2019).
27 “Ethiopia Attack: Five Charged for Trying to Kill PM Abiy Ahmed”, BBC 
News Online, 28 September 2018, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
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Rather than attempting this, however, Abiy appears to have 
increasingly retreated into a highly personalised approach to 
government. Some of his most significant policy decisions – 
including the release of political prisoners – were made without 
reference to wider government stakeholders and were imple-
mented through informal or ad hoc mechanisms, to the cha-
grin of coalition partners. Following the assassination of the 
Amhara Regional State President Ambachew Mekonnen in 
June 2019 Abiy replaced him with one of his own closest se-
curity aides, Temesgen Tiruneh, while EPRDF officials have 
openly speculated that the Prime Minister will either transform 
the EPRDF into a unitary, pan-Ethiopian party, or run in the 
next election as head of a new party altogether28. “Is “Emperor 
Abiy” at the gates in Ethiopia?” queried one commentator fol-
lowing Ambachew’s assassination29. Certainly the next phase 
of Abiy’s premiership will require more institutionalisation of 
“Abiymania” if it is to produce sustainable results.
Peace with Eritrea and a Changing 
International Context
The same is true for Abiy’s leadership in foreign policy, the are-
na where he has undoubtedly achieved the most in the shortest 
amount of time. Securing peace with neighbouring Eritrea after 
an 18-year cold war between the two onetime bitter enemies 
was a major triumph for the Abiy government, and has pro-
found, and positive, implications for regional security, stability 
and cooperation. Like Abiy’s rise itself, peace with Eritrea was 
not anticipated by even the most seasoned analysts. The Eritrean 
regime of Isaias Afwerki made little comment on Abiy’s election 
and initially made no response to Abiy’s olive branch – an an-
nouncement by the EPRDF politburo on 5 June 2018 that it 
28 “Ethiopia Premier’s Aide Named to Lead Restive Amhara Region”, Reuters, 15 
July 2019 (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
29 L. Schadomsky (2019).
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would finally accept and fully implement the 2002 ruling of the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. 
Both the Meles and Hailemariam governments had refused 
to accept the Commission’s decision; doing so would have 
obliged Ethiopia to hand over various disputed territories on 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia/Tigray boundary, including the town of 
Badme, control over which had been the casus belli between 
the two states between 1998 and 2000. TPLF officials in par-
ticular baulked at Abiy’s decision and condemned his reasoning 
as “fundamentally flawed”. It was in demonstrating his prepar-
edness to challenge the TPLF position, though, that Abiy ul-
timately won the confidence of Isaias, and paved the way for 
a summit in Asmara on 9 July where the two leaders formally 
ended the conflict between their countries and enthusiastically 
re-established diplomatic relations.
The origins of the conflict can be located within the deeply 
complex and ambiguous relationship between the TPLF and 
Isaias’ former Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) when 
both were fighting as rebel movements against the Derg regime; 
at that point, Eritrea remained annexed to Ethiopia. For twenty 
years the relationship veered between fraternal closeness and 
bitter rivalry, ultimately spilling over into seemingly irreversi-
ble decline and, in 1998, open conflict when the two former 
insurgencies failed to find a modus vivendi as the governments 
of separate sovereign states. According to one senior Eritrean 
official it was Abiy’s removal of Samora and Getachew – both 
TPLF heavyweights – that persuaded Isaias that Abiy had side-
lined the TPLF and that peace with Ethiopia could therefore 
be contemplated30. Indeed, in explaining his decision to pursue 
peace with Abiy’s Ethiopia to Eritreans, Isaias referred to “the 
end of the TPLF’s shenanigans, which was aptly described as 
“game over”31.
30 Author interview with senior Eritrean official, Asmara, 20 June 2018.
31 J. Fisher and M.T. Gebrewahd (2018).
Leaders for a New Africa48
The normalisation of Ethiopian-Eritrean relations has none-
theless relied heavily on the maintenance of friendly personal 
relations between Abiy and Isaias, who have undertaken numer-
ous trips to each other’s capitals and beyond, exuding warmth 
and intimacy. The changed relationship between the two states 
remains, however, largely bound up with this personal rela-
tionship, rather than in a more formal, bilateral arrangement. 
Despite a declaration of intent signed in Asmara and Jeddah in 
2018, numerous key issues including trade, tariffs, currency, se-
curity and citizenship remain outside any formal legal arrange-
ment, as Kjetil Tronvoll has observed32. While perhaps unfair 
to expect such things to come into being so soon after one of 
the most significant rapprochements in the modern history of 
the Horn, it is crucial to remember that it was precisely this is-
sue – an Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship founded on elite personal 
ties with no framework for regulating economic and citizenship 
issues – which led to the 1998-2000 conflict itself33. 
More generally, a resurgent Eritrea – and an Isaias returned 
to the heart of regional diplomacy after decades of ostracism 
– carries both opportunities and risks for Ethiopia, particular-
ly given the growing significance of Gulf powers in the Horn. 
Isaias with his EPLF was the senior partner in the EPLF-TPLF 
wartime relationship, and the Eritrean leader has struggled to 
come to terms with his status as the ruler of a much smaller and 
less powerful country than his onetime juniors. While Isaias 
and Abiy have successfully supported one another’s economic 
and diplomatic ambitions in the region to date – in Somalia, 
for example – there is no guarantee that this mutually beneficial 
arrangement will last, particularly without a more formal legal 
basis for the two states’ relationship. 
Divergences are currently apparent, for example, in the two 
leaders’ approaches to the political crisis in Sudan after the 
32 “Is Ethiopian PM Abiy’s Reform Drive Running Out of  Steam”, DW.Com 
(Deutsche Welle), 1 April 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
33 J. Fisher (2019); M. Woldemariam, “The Eritrea-Ethiopia Thaw and Its 
Regional Impact”, Current History, vol. 118, no. 808, 2019, pp. 181-187.
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deposing of Omar al-Bashir. Abiy has been tasked by the African 
Union (AU) with mediating the conflict between the Khartoum 
military regime and protesters, while Isaias has argued that the 
AU should stay out of the matter altogether34. Eritrea also has 
a coastline, which Ethiopia does not, and Asmara has leveraged 
this very successfully in cultivating ties with Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, offering them airstrips and ports as 
staging posts for their war in Yemen. Ethiopia also has aspi-
rations to strengthen and expand its economic and political 
networks in the Gulf, but will require Eritrean cooperation to 
access the Red Sea35.
Unlike Isaias, though, Abiy enjoys the support and confi-
dence of Western aid donors, who continue to finance a sig-
nificant part of Ethiopia’s national budget, and its security 
complex. While to some extent he inherited these ties from his 
predecessors – Meles cannily positioned Ethiopia as a crucial 
security ally of Washington, London and Brussels in particu-
lar – they are also founded on a genuine optimism in Western 
capitals regarding the Ethiopian leader. For decades, Western 
donors to Ethiopia have awkwardly balanced a stated foreign 
policy commitment to promoting democratisation and respect 
for human rights with unfailing support to authoritarian re-
gimes in the name of security and stability. Abiy represents an 
opportunity for donors to support a reformer and a force for re-
gional stability. The Ethiopian leader has perhaps demonstrated 
his political acumen most clearly of all in his engagement with 
this constituency, conscious perhaps of its ability to provide po-
litical cover for him should his domestic position deteriorate, 
or should he come to the view that the 2020 election needs to 
be delayed.
34 M. Plaut, “The Glow of  the Historic Accord Between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
Has Faded”, Quartz Africa, 9 July 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
35 J. Mosley, “Eritrea-Ethiopia Rapprochement and Wider Dynamics of  Regional 
Trade, Politics and Security”, Life and Peace Institute, 3 October 2018, (last re-
trieved on 20 July 2019).
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The End of the Honeymoon: 
Challenges Ahead for Abiy Ahmed
A critical appraisal of Abiy’s leadership must also take into ac-
count the immense challenges of governing a state as diverse and 
complex as modern Ethiopia. Since the 1930s every Ethiopian 
leader but one has been forced from office, while insecurity 
and conflict have rarely been absent from many communities’ 
everyday lives. That said, Ethiopia today faces an acute political 
and humanitarian crisis: the ethno-political tensions discussed 
above have led to a range of local conflicts – sustained by the 
organising of local militias and revenge attacks – which have 
made Ethiopia the country with the largest number of inter-
nally-displaced persons on the planet. To what extent is Abiy 
Ahmed’s leadership what is required to address these challenges?
In my view the jury is still out. The Ethiopian leader’s hope-
ful rhetoric and progressive policies provide much-needed hope 
and optimism for the future following years of authoritarian 
drift and paralysis. Abiy’s early successes as a regional trou-
ble-shooter are impressive, and his preparedness to challenge 
and overturn some of the most vicious and problematic features 
of the EPRDF polity shows courage and decisiveness. That be-
ing said, a review of his record cannot help but leave one with 
the impression that he is contending with forces the magnitude 
and shape of which he has yet to fully grasp. The assassina-
tion of Ambachew Mekonnen mentioned above, for example, 
was part of a wider Amhara nationalist assault on the EPRDF 
in which the military chief Se’are Mekonnen was murdered in 
Addis Ababa at the same time as the head of security in Amhara 
Regional State was leading an attempted coup d’état in its capi-
tal, Bahir Dar. The security chief in question, Asaminew Tsige, 
was among the political prisoners released on Abiy’s orders in 
his 2018 amnesty36. 
36 N. Manek, “Abiy Ahmed’s Reforms Have Unleashed Forces He Can No 
Longer Control”, Foreign Policy, 4 July 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
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This implies that rather than tempering ethno-political rad-
icalism, Abiy’s tenure to date has – whether through naiveté, 
unintended consequence, rashness or deliberate stoking – done 
little to arrest a worrying trajectory. We also know little about 
how the Ethiopian Prime Minister responds to pressure. As 
noted, Abiy came to power through a combination of circum-
stance and EPRDF politicking, and he has enjoyed a political 
honeymoon based on hopeful rhetoric and a decisive changing 
of the guard. The attempted Amhara coup was perhaps the first 
major test of his character as a leader since he stepped onto the 
national stage. Abiy’s initial reaction was telling; appearing on 
national television in army fatigues, he countenanced a nation-
wide internet shutdown which lasted for days – the traditional 
default mode of his maligned predecessors37. Hundreds were ar-
rested, also, under the very anti-terrorism legislation that Abiy 
had previously condemned. In many respects Abiy is a leader 
caught between two postures – that of a traditional, EPRDF 
securocrat and that of an inspirational reformer. It is not clear 
yet which will prevail in the longer term.
There are pressing issues, however, which will force the mat-
ter. The first is the ongoing ethnic violence and the wider po-
litical crisis – the rise of radical ethnic nationalism and calls in 
some regions of the country (notably Sidama in the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regions) for statehood38 
or, in the case of Tigray, even secession39. The second is the 
forthcoming election, due to be held in 2020. This will be a 
37 F. Mbah, “Outrage Over Ethiopia’s Continuing Internet Blackout”, Al-Jazeera, 
25 June 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019); M. Mumo/CPJ Sub-Saharan 
Africa Representative, “In Era of  Reform, Ethiopia Still Reverts to Old Tactics 
to Censor Press”, CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), 9 July 2019, (last retrieved 
on 20 July 2019).
38 “Time for Ethiopia to Bargain with Sidama over Statehood”, Crisis Group, 4 July 
2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b146-time-ethi-
opia-bargain-sidama-over-statehood (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
39 “People of  Tigray Have Developed Sentiment for Secession”, Debretsion”, 
Borkena.Com,12 June 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
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major test of Abiy’s leadership, if indeed it is not delayed40. In 
that regard, Abiy will need to take a difficult decision. On the 
one hand virtually no substantive changes have been made to 
the country’s democratic machinery since Abiy’s election, and 
mounting violence could render polls both impractical and 
dangerous. On the other hand Abiy has staked his leadership 
on bringing genuine multi-party democracy to Ethiopia, and 
many opposition movements have already spoken out against 
calls to delay the election. There are fewer and fewer easy deci-
sions left for Abiy Ahmed to take.
40 A. Soliman and Abel Abate Demissie, “Can Abiy Ahmed Continue to Remodel 
Ethiopia?”, Chatham House, 12 April 2019, (last retrieved on 20 July 2019).
3.  Cyril Ramaphosa and South Africa’s 
     Development Path: 
     A Creation of Circumstance
Steven Friedman 
In December 2017, South Africa’s governing African National 
Congress elected as its President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, a 
former trade unionist and businessman. Weeks later, President 
Jacob Zuma was forced to resign and Ramaphosa became State 
President, a post he still holds. While Ramaphosa was serving 
as Deputy President to Zuma the two led opposing factions: 
Zuma’s presidency was associated in the minds of many with 
misuse of public office for personal gain, and Ramaphosa was 
widely seen as a champion of clean government. This chapter 
will argue that Ramaphosa’s leadership, throughout his career 
in public life, can best be understood as a reflection of South 
Africa’s development path in the period immediately before de-
mocracy was achieved in 1994 and during the democratic era. 
This also enables us to understand the likely impact of his pres-
idency on society and the economy.
It is common to see leadership as both the source of Africa’s 
problems and their solution. The continent’s problem is repeat-
edly said to be “bad leadership” and its solution the replace-
ment of bad leaders by good ones1.
1 S. Adeyemi “Africa doesn’t need charity, it needs good leadership”, World 
Economic Forum, 4 May 2017; R. Rotberg, “Good leadership is Africa’s missing 
ingredient”, Globe and Mail, 4 March 2013.
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This has become so common that it is rarely challenged, de-
spite the fact that it is questionable. The most obvious problem 
is that “bad” and “good” are highly subjective terms, and peo-
ple inevitably hold different opinions on which of the labels to 
apply to any particular leader. But even if we were somehow 
to agree on which leaders are good and which are bad, why 
do African countries almost always produce leaders we judge 
negatively? Unless we cling to notions of racial inferiority (for 
which no evidence exists), or imagine (also without evidence) 
that there is something in Africa’s air or water which produces 
particular kinds of leaders, there must be an explanation for 
constant disappointment with leadership on the continent. 
Similarly, if “good” leadership is the solution, how is it most 
likely to emerge? Do citizens simply wait and hope that it will 
happen, or can they do something about it? Reducing the con-
tinent’s prospects to the chance emergence of leaders who are 
considered fit for the task looks more like an attempt to avoid 
analysing constraints and possibilities than a diagnosis. Leaders, 
bad or good, do not magically appear out of thin air. They are 
products of circumstance: they emerge because concrete condi-
tions in society make particular types of leadership more likely 
and other kinds less likely. South Africa’s change of leadership 
in early 2018 illustrates the point.
In most writing on South Africa, the replacement of President 
Jacob Zuma with Cyril Ramaphosa illustrated perfectly the 
problem of leadership. In the minds of many Zuma was a 
prime example of the sort of leadership which is said to have 
created Africa’s difficulties, Ramaphosa a clear example of the 
type of leader who is needed. Zuma was widely associated with 
the abuse of public trust and misuse of resources. Ramaphosa 
seemed almost the polar opposite; his popularity greatly sur-
passed that of his party, the African National Congress2, which 
has governed since democracy was achieved in 1994. But closer 
2 I. Mahlangu and N. Goba, “Party crasher: Cyril is more popular than the ANC”, 
The Times, 10 May 2019.
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inspection reveals a more complicated story. Both Zuma and 
Ramaphosa are products of the economic path which South 
Africa has pursued since 1994, which is itself in many ways 
a continuation of its path under the white minority. While 
Zuma’s leadership, which concerns us here only as a point of 
comparison, reflects one side of this story, Ramaphosa’s reflects 
the other. There are many parallels between South Africa’s de-
velopment over the past three decades and Ramaphosa’s career 
in public life – so much so that we might almost see him as a 
personal embodiment of this history. This does much to explain 
the transition from Zuma to Ramaphosa, and the possibilities 
South Africa faces now.  
Ramaphosa – A Brief History 
Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa was born in 1952 in Soweto, the 
segregated Johannesburg township for black people which be-
came known around the world primarily for the 1976 upris-
ing against minority rule3. Unlike many other ANC (African 
National Congress) leaders he was a child of the cities – apart-
heid laws denied most blacks the right to live permanently in 
cities, so many other ANC figures have rural backgrounds. This 
will be very important later in explaining his political appeal.
In 1972, Ramaphosa registered as a student at the University 
of the North (at that stage the only university which people 
of his ethnic origin could attend) and became involved in stu-
dent politics, which at that stage were dominated by the Black 
Consciousness (BC) movement led by Steve Biko. While BC 
was never formally opposed to the ANC – at the time it re-
mained independent of all the resistance movements – it was 
not usually the choice of ANC supporters; later on there was 
violent conflict between activists sympathetic to the ANC and 
3 Biographical details are drawn from “Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa”, South African 
History Online.
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those who supported BC4. Like many BC activists, Ramaphosa 
was arrested after the movement staged rallies to celebrate the 
victory of the Mozambican freedom movement Frelimo in 
1974 – he spent eleven months in detention without trial. On 
his release he joined – and held office in – the Black People’s 
Convention, a key BC movement at the time. He was detained 
again in 1976 after the Soweto uprising mentioned earlier.
The path which was to lead him to the Presidency began 
in 1981 when Ramaphosa, who had obtained a law degree 
by correspondence, joined the Council of Unions of South 
Africa (CUSA), the trade union federation which supported 
the BC movement, as an advisor in its legal department. When 
CUSA formed a mineworkers’ union, the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), Ramaphosa was chosen to become its 
first general secretary. Unlike other unions for black workers at 
the time, the NUM did not need to fight a long battle to secure 
recognition from employers; it was established in December 
1982 and was recognised by the Chamber of Mines, which 
represented mine owners, only months later – before it began 
recruiting members5. So while other unions recruited members 
– often despite resistance from employers – and then pressed 
for recognition, which they often won because the strength of 
their organisation could not be ignored, the NUM won recog-
nition before building a significant membership. Its rationale for 
relying on persuading employers rather than building worker 
support was that mineworkers, living on mine property which 
could not be entered without permission, were largely cut off 
from the rest of the world; but it meant that recognition de-
pended on Ramaphosa’s powers of persuasion, not the support 
and commitment of its members. These beginnings, though, did 
not prevent the NUM becoming the country’s largest trade un-
ion for a time, nor stop its members embarking on mass strikes.
4 “Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report - Volume 3”, South African 
History Online, 29 October 1998.
5 National Union of  Mineworkers ‘NUM commemorates 35th year of  existence 
today’ 4 December 2017  
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The NUM may have been the creation of CUSA, but it did 
not remain in its fold for long. In 1985, Ramaphosa and the 
union played a role in the formation of the Congress of SA 
Trade Union (COSATU) which is now a formal ally of the 
ANC. This was a substantial change of political allegiance, be-
cause black resistance to apartheid was then divided into two 
main camps, the “charterists” who supported the ideology of 
the ANC and the Africanists and BC adherents who favoured 
a more militant black nationalism. CUSA was aligned with the 
Africanist and BC position; so the NUM was changing sides 
politically by joining COSATU. Ironically, given the NUM’s 
origins in the BC movement, it was to produce three Secretaries 
General of the ANC – Ramaphosa, Kgalema Motlanthe and 
Gwede Mantashe.
One effect of the NUM’s move to COSATU was to propel 
Ramaphosa rapidly to the top echelon of ANC-aligned politics. 
In late 1989, when the first batch of ANC leaders was released 
from prison by the apartheid state, Ramaphosa became chair 
of the national reception committee convened to welcome 
them back into public life. His committee was also in charge 
of arrangements for receiving the ANC leader Nelson Mandela 
when he was released in February 1990 – a photograph of 
Ramaphosa holding a microphone for Mandela as he delivered 
his first speech after his release became one of the symbols of 
the new era. His status as an ANC leader was confirmed in 
July 1991 when he was elected the movement’s first Secretary 
General since the ban on it was lifted in early 1990. 
It was Ramaphosa’s position as Secretary General which led 
him to play a key role in the negotiations which ended apart-
heid. He replaced Thabo Mbeki (who was later to become 
the second President of democratic South Africa) as head of 
the ANC’s negotiation team, a task for which his trade union 
experience had equipped him. He established a rapport with 
the apartheid government’s key negotiator, Roelf Meyer, when 
the latter replaced Tertius Delport, who was considered una-
ble to match Ramaphosa’s negotiating skills. Histories of the 
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time stress the personal chemistry between the two, and credit 
it with a pivotal role in making possible the negotiated settle-
ment which ended apartheid6. While some accounts tend to 
imply that the two were the only reason why a negotiated set-
tlement was achieved, despite the fact that they both represent-
ed constituencies whose approval was needed for a settlement, 
their partnership did make a negotiated compromise quicker 
and easier than it might otherwise have been. One product 
of Ramaphosa’s role was his election, in 1994, as chair of the 
Constituent Assembly which negotiated the final version of the 
constitution.
For a time, it appeared as if his swift rise to the top would 
catapult him into the presidency of both the ANC and the 
country at a very early age. Mandela, who insisted from early 
in his presidency that he would only serve one term, favoured 
Ramaphosa to succeed him7, at least partly because he was 
concerned about complaints that the ANC was dominated by 
Xhosa-speakers, the majority ethnic group among black people 
in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape provinces: Ramaphosa, 
a Venda-speaker, is a member of one of the smaller ethnic 
groups. But Mbeki, who had been elected Deputy President 
of the country in 1994, successfully mobilised ANC constit-
uencies in his support – the movement’s youth league in par-
ticular8. So effectively did Mbeki consolidate his support that 
it became clear to Ramaphosa well before the ANC was due 
to elect a new President that Mbeki would win comfortably. 
Not relishing the humiliation of a defeat, Ramaphosa opted 
to leave active politics rather than serve under Mbeki. In mid-
1996 he resigned as ANC General Secretary and as chair of the 
Constitutional Assembly9. He remained a member of the ANC 
6 A. Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of  South Africa’s Negotiated 
Revolution, Sandton, Struik, 1995.
7 C. Twala The African National Congress Youth League’s (ANCYL’s) Role as the 
“Kingmaker”: A Moment of  Post-Polokwane Blues?, 2009, pp.153-171, p. 161.
8 Ibid.
9 “Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa”…, cit.
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national executive committee, but opted to become a business-
man. Ramaphosa later insisted that Mandela had encouraged 
him to make this move because he felt that it would help to 
deracialise business leadership, then almost exclusively white10. 
In the event, the turn to business did no harm to his personal 
fortunes. Though he had no prior business experience his po-
litical profile made him particularly attractive to white-owned 
businesses. By the 1990s, businesses began to realise that all-
white boards and senior managements (the norm at the time) 
would seriously damage their credibility once democracy was 
established. Later, the post-1994 government introduced laws 
which made black participation a condition for receiving gov-
ernment contracts11. Including high-profile black politicians 
on company boards or forming partnerships with them of-
fered a double benefit – not only would the company be eli-
gible for more business, it would enjoy access to government 
decision-makers. Ramaphosa was soon appointed to the boards 
of major corporations, and in 2001 he formed Shanduka, an 
investment company which bought a wide collection of busi-
nesses12. He amassed considerable wealth and a wide network 
of contacts which later made him the preferred candidate of 
business.            
Although Ramaphosa was destined to remain a businessman 
for the next decade and a half, he had another opportunity in 
2007 to make a bid for the presidency. Then President Thabo 
Mbeki decided to run for a third term as ANC President even 
though he was not eligible for a third term as President of the 
country. This prompted resistance within the ANC: it was 
widely assumed that Mbeki wanted to use the ANC presidency 
10 G. Nicolson, “ANC Leadership Race: Cyril Ramaphosa – five years after his re-
turn, the prodigal son might finally get to be king”, Daily Maverick, 14 December 
2017.
11 P. Benjamin, M. Taylor and T. Raditapole, Black Economic Empowerment: 
Commentary, Legislation and Charters (BEE) Cape Town, Juta, 2005
12 Phembani History of  Shanduka, http://www.phembani.com/index.php/
history-of-shanduka/
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to ensure that the next State President did his bidding – by 
this time he had alienated a wide spectrum of ANC members. 
Jacob Zuma emerged as the candidate of Mbeki’s opponents, 
not because he was popular but because, as Deputy President 
of the ANC, he seemed well placed to beat Mbeki. Ramaphosa, 
too, was repeatedly mentioned as a candidate, and according to 
people close to him considered standing; but he thought better 
of it, insisting that he could not oppose Mbeki in an election13. 
This prompted some in the ANC to call him indecisive and 
lacking in political courage. 
He returned to active politics at the end of 2012 when he 
became Deputy President of the ANC – probably by accident! 
The then Deputy President of both the ANC and the country, 
Kgalema Motlanthe, accepted nomination for the presidency. 
Zuma and his supporters seem to have assumed that they could 
dissuade him from standing by signalling to him that unless 
he withdrew his candidacy he would not be kept on as Deputy 
President. That tactic could not work without a credible candi-
date for the post, and Ramaphosa was probably asked to stand 
in order to frighten Motlanthe into not opposing Zuma for 
the presidency. But Motlanthe refused to co-operate. It became 
clear that he was not bargaining for a position – he had become 
convinced, earlier than most in the ANC, that Zuma and his 
faction were abusing public trust; and he had decided to stand 
for election as a protest. He knew he would lose, but did not 
want to continue serving in the ANC leadership under Zuma 
anyway. Now Ramaphosa was obliged to contest the position, 
and to take office if he won. It has been claimed that the entire 
episode was engineered by Motlanthe to ensure that Ramaphosa 
became Deputy President; on this view, he was looking for an 
antidote to Zuma’s patronage politics and thought Ramaphosa 
was the strongest choice14. If this is true – and it is by no means 
certain – Ramaphosa was not party to the plan; he certainly did 
13 S’Thembiso Msomi, “I won’t fight Mbeki”, News 24 11 November 2007.
14 A. Butler, “Ramaphosa’s rise to power was a well-planned affair”, Business Day, 
22 May 2019.
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not jump at the chance to become Deputy President, and spent 
hours deciding whether to give up his business career in order 
to stand. Eventually he agreed, and was elected comfortably as 
a candidate for the Zuma slate, which was elected with a large 
majority. Shortly afterwards he also became Deputy President 
of the country.
New Office, New Factions 
Ramaphosa’s prominent position on the Zuma slate may 
seem confusing since he later became President by opposing 
Zuma’s candidate. But in 2012 the lines of division within the 
ANC were very different to those five years later. The coali-
tion which defeated Mbeki was still largely intact, and although 
Ramaphosa refused to campaign against Mbeki he was a mem-
ber of the ANC national executive which voted to remove him 
as State President in 200815. The faction which opposed Zuma’s 
candidates did not campaign on an anti-corruption platform, 
but seemed to be calling for a more militant racial nationalism. 
(Motlanthe was not party to this – he agreed to the faction’s 
request to oppose Zuma because he saw him as a threat to the 
ANC and the country). 
During Zuma’s second term of office, the alignments changed. 
The dividing line among ANC politicians became their attitude 
towards the patronage politics of Zuma and his faction, which 
would later be labelled “state capture”16, meaning a process in 
which business people close to governing party politicians use 
their wealth to buy influence which they use to turn government 
into a vehicle for their business interests. The six leaders elected 
on Zuma’s slate in 2012 were split equally, three supporting him 
and three opposing. The battle lines crystallised in December 
15 African National Congress, Statement by the National Executive Committee of  the 
ANC, 20 September 2008  
16 Public Protector of  South Africa, State of  Capture – A Report of  the Public 
Protector 14 October 2016.
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2015 when Zuma dismissed the Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla 
Nene, because he refused to release money for projects favoured 
by Zuma’s group and their business backers. Zuma replaced him 
with a junior politician who was clearly ill-equipped for the job 
but would give Zuma and his backers what they wanted. The 
decision prompted intense public resistance, which was effective 
because it was supported by Ramaphosa and two others in the 
top six. Zuma was forced to back down, and the appointment 
was revoked in less than a week17. 
From that incident until the ANC conference in December 
2017 the ANC was divided by intense factional strife. 
Ramaphosa, as Deputy President, was the natural leader of 
those opposing “state capture”. He and others in the group were 
later blamed for not leaving the ANC leadership in protest at 
state capture, but they calculated that the ANC would remain 
the party of government: if they wanted to stop Zuma they 
would need to defeat him and his faction in the conference of 
the governing party. So they stayed in their posts and began 
mobilising support within the ANC. It was initially unclear 
whether Ramaphosa would agree to become his faction’s candi-
date: his refusal to oppose Zuma in 2007 raised doubts about 
whether he was willing to risk losing to Zuma’s candidate.
His reputation was also dented by evidence at a Commission 
of Inquiry into the killing of miners by police at Marikana in the 
North West province during a strike18. Ramaphosa was a direc-
tor of the company where the strike occurred. In the period be-
fore the police shootings, company security guards were killed, 
allegedly by striking miners. The company asked Ramaphosa 
to use his access to the relevant minister to ask for police to be 
deployed to end the violence, which he did. The strikers’ un-
ion and Ramaphosa’s political opponents insisted that he was 
personally responsible for the police shootings – by asking the 
17 A. Areff, “TIMELINE: How South Africa got three finance ministers in four 
days”, News24, 14 December 2015.
18 T. Head, “Marikana: What was Cyril Ramaphosa’s role?”, The South African, 16 
August 2018.
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police minister to impose order, they said, he was signalling 
that greater force should be used against the strikers. The com-
mission, headed by a retired judge, found that Ramaphosa was 
not responsible for the police action – there was no evidence, 
it said, that he was asking the police to do anything more than 
simply enforce the law19. But this finding did not convince his 
opponents, who continue to use the incident to support their 
claim that he is simply a puppet of white business interests.
Nevertheless, Ramaphosa was persuaded to become a can-
didate for ANC President. In contrast to past ANC elections, 
in which candidates were expected to pretend they were not 
running for office, the 2017 contest was highly public, with 
candidates actively campaigning. Ramaphosa narrowly defeat-
ed Zuma’s candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, by 149 votes 
– but only because one of the ANC’s regional power brokers, 
David “DD” Mabuza, premier of Mpumalanga province, be-
came convinced that the ANC would not win more than 50% 
of the vote in the next general election if its candidate was a 
Zuma faction politician. Mabuza, who is now both Deputy 
President of South Africa and of the ANC, promised Zuma 
he would deliver all the province’s votes to his candidate, but 
then told his delegates they were free to vote as they saw fit, and 
enough of them voted for Ramaphosa to win him the election. 
Within weeks the ANC had forced Zuma to resign the pres-
idency (he was told that if he stayed the ANC’s Members of 
Parliament would support a vote of no confidence in him), and 
Ramaphosa became President. 
Ramaphosa inherited an ANC whose leadership was evenly 
balanced between his own supporters and Zuma’s20, and was 
therefore obliged to largely ignore public pressure to remove 
Zuma supporters from the Cabinet and other government 
jobs. But he has pursued an energetic campaign to undo the 
effects of state capture. He has appointed the first national 
19 Ibid. 
20 A. Winning and E. Stoddard, “No clean sweep for South Africa’s Ramaphosa 
in ANC race”, Reuters, 21 December 2017. 
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public prosecutor in the country’s history with no party-po-
litical connections or commitments; he has enhanced the ca-
pacity of the national prosecuting authority; and he has made 
sweeping changes to the boards and senior managements of 
state-owned enterprises, a key target of state capture. In an at-
tempt to strengthen democratic institutions he has widened 
the selection process for some government appointments, in-
cluding professional associations and other citizens’ groups in 
decision-making21. In May 2018 he led the ANC to victory in 
national elections, and although its majority was smaller than 
in the previous general election, it seems more than likely that 
his presence at the top of the ANC’s slate of candidates prevent-
ed a far worse showing – indeed, it might have lost its majority.
Making Sense of the History   
Perhaps the chief reason for Ramaphosa’s popularity is that 
he is seen as an antidote to Zuma. It is hard to imagine two 
more sharply contrasting politicians. Ramaphosa is a child of 
the cities, Zuma of the countryside. Ramaphosa has a profes-
sional qualification; Zuma only learned to read and write as 
an adult. Ramaphosa began his political life in a movement 
other than the ANC; Zuma’s generation joined the ANC as 
teenagers and have stayed in it all their lives. Zuma is associated 
with patronage politics, “state capture” and, in the minds of 
many, corruption. He has never seemed entirely comfortable 
in a constitutional democracy: when President, he tended to 
say what he really felt only when he was addressing traditional 
leaders, a constituency with whom he has a natural rapport. 
In these speeches he sometimes expressed doubts about an in-
dependent judiciary and about democracy itself22. Ramaphosa 
21 S. Ngqakamba, “NDPP appointment process a step in the right direction – 
Pikoli”, Mail and Guardian, 23 October 2018.
22 S’thembiso Msomi, “Populist Zuma rubbishes constitutional democracy he 
and ANC signed up for”, Sowetan, 14 September 2018.
Cyril Ramaphosa and South Africa’s Development Path 65
has championed clean government and is steeped in the ethos 
of constitutionalism – he is, after all, the politician most closely 
associated with the constitution. 
But while these differences are real, they are symptoms of a 
wider gulf. To understand the essential political difference be-
tween Ramaphosa and Zuma it is necessary to describe briefly 
the country’s development path since democracy was achieved 
in 1994. At that time, South Africa was a racial oligarchy, its 
political system, economy and social institutions monopolised 
by the white minority. The economy was highly concentrated 
– a handful of corporations controlled most of the country’s as-
sets23. In the period immediately before 1994 corporate leaders 
began to realise that a racial minority would no longer be able 
to monopolise control of the economy under majority rule, and 
they began to take some black people into leading positions in 
the economy, although its structure and way of functioning re-
mained largely unchanged. Instead of seeking to build a more 
open, competitive, economy in which people with talent and 
energy would find it easy to make headway, they mostly chose 
to co-opt black people into the concentrated economy. The in-
evitable result was that, as in the pre-1994 period, millions were 
unable to gain enough access to the market economy’s benefits, 
so the divide between “insiders” and “outsiders” persisted. Before 
1994, the insiders were white and the outsiders black; now, after 
25 years of democracy, some black South Africans have joined 
the whites as insiders while most black people remain outside24. 
(The new black entrants to the economy and social elite have 
many advantages denied to all black people in the past, but they 
still feel that they are discriminated against by the white elite). 
This division between insiders and outsiders runs through 
the ANC and largely shapes its politics. As this account sug-
gests, Ramaphosa is clearly an insider. When he worked as 
23 S. Roberts, “South Africa’s economy is badly skewed to the big guys: how it can 
be changed”, The Conversation, 13 March 2018.
24 D. Lipton, Bridging South Africa’s Economic Divide, Witwatersrand University, 
International Monetary Fund, Johannesburg, 19 July 2016.
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a trade unionist the members he represented were of course 
wage-earners, while many South Africans are unable to work 
in waged or salaried posts and must make a living in the infor-
mal economy25. As a businessman, he was again an insider. The 
faction he heads is also made up of insiders, defined as such by 
the fact that they are active in and reliant on the formal econ-
omy. Zuma’s faction does not represent the outsiders – who 
are mostly unorganised and not represented at all in national 
debate – but it does see them as an opportunity.
One option available to people who are excluded from the 
market’s benefits is to attach themselves to politics and poli-
ticians in the hope that this will provide an avenue into the 
middle class which is not available to them through the market. 
If politicians gain access to resources, they can not only ensure 
their own entry into the middle class – they can also offer this 
to others in exchange for their political support. This can be 
achieved either by using political office to gain access to public 
money or by forming relationships with business people who 
are willing to pay for political influence. That is the strategy of 
the politicians in Zuma’s faction. They are far less concerned 
about the health of the market economy, because their pros-
pects depend on public or private funds which are not immedi-
ately sensitive to changes in the market.
The way in which these differences express themselves po-
litically is best summed up by the removal of the Minister of 
Finance in December 2015, which severely threatened the 
health of the market economy – as shown by the sharp fall in 
the Rand as soon as the Minister was dismissed26. Within hours, 
therefore, a coalition stretching from Marxists in the trade un-
ion movement to the chief executives of the major banks was 
formed which forced an about-turn27. The patronage politicians 
25 V. Ranchhod, “Why is South Africa’s unemployment rate so high?”, GroundUP, 
4 February 2019.
26 “South Africa’s rand falls after Finance Minister Nene sacked”, Newsday, 10 
December 2015.
27 A. Areff  (2014).
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had made a bid to control the bulk of public resources, and be-
cause this threatened the market economy the “insiders” forgot 
their differences and united to defeat them. 
The change from Zuma to Ramaphosa, therefore, was not 
simply a move from one type of politician to another: it was 
a victory for those dependant on the market economy over 
those who use the state as a means to resources and influence. 
Ramaphosa’s popularity owes far more to the fact that he heads 
the former faction than to his personality or leadership style. 
There is, ironically, an important parallel between his elevation 
to the Presidency and Zuma’s. Zuma won the ANC presidency 
twice almost by default – he was probably not the first choice 
of those who voted for him either time. The first time, in 2007, 
he was elected by a coalition united only in its opposition to 
his predecessor, Mbeki; some, as noted above, would have pre-
ferred Ramaphosa. The left of the ANC alliance, a key element 
in the anti-Mbeki coalition, wanted a left-wing candidate28 
but supported Zuma because, as ANC Deputy President, he 
seemed most likely to win. The second time, in 2012, Zuma 
was elected as head of a slate of candidates for the top six po-
sitions – he received the lowest vote of any of the slate’s candi-
dates29, illustrating that support for the slate was greater than 
support for him. While Ramaphosa was the clear choice of his 
faction in 2017, many of those who supported him did so be-
cause, as ANC Deputy President, he again seemed the likeliest 
candidate to defeat the Zuma slate.
Perception and Reality
Ramaphosa’s undoubted support outside the ANC, particularly 
in business, also owes far more to social and economic realities 
than personality or leadership skills. 
28 “Vavi: We’ll take over the ANC”, Mail and Guardian, 9 March 2007.
29 D. Subramany, “Mangaung: The ANC’s newly elected top six”, Mail and 
Guardian, 18 December 2012.
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Business perceptions of Ramaphosa – shared by some in the 
media – are often quite at odds with reality. These admirers see 
Ramaphosa as a strong-willed leader who will act decisively to 
change anything which stands in the way of his goals. They as-
sumed that on taking over the governing party he would move 
swiftly to root out anyone associated with corruption and state 
capture. Many also assumed that because of his business career 
he could be relied on to make unpopular changes to economic 
policy and improve the environment for business. Since taking 
office he has moved, as indicated earlier, to restore institutions 
weakened by the Zuma years; but he has not met these expecta-
tions, and this has prompted repeated criticism in some of the 
media. Key Zuma supporters remain in his Cabinet, and several 
were re-elected to Parliament in May 2019. The Zuma faction 
still controls several provinces – only in one, Northwest prov-
ince, has it lost control since December, 2017. Its candidate was 
selected as Premier of KwaZulu Natal province, Zuma’s home, 
which is also the country’s second biggest. Despite a push to 
drum up investment, few of the economic reforms for which 
some business people hoped have been introduced.
None of this should be surprising to anyone who has studied 
Ramaphosa’s career. His critics within the ANC point to his 
refusal to run against Mbeki as an example of his indecision 
– they claim that he agonised about whether to stand, before 
finally deciding not to. Similar struggles before accepting the 
deputy presidency also fuelled suggestions that he was averse to 
taking political risks. His role in the Marikana shootings, men-
tioned earlier, could also be seen as a sign that he is a follower, 
not a leader. There is no evidence that Ramaphosa approved of 
the police shootings, let alone that he encouraged them; but 
the email correspondence presented to the commission does 
suggest that he was willing to act as the company’s messenger 
to government. This is not uncommon – many white-owned 
companies appoint black board members not because they re-
spect their talents but because they open doors to government; 
but Ramaphosa’s willingness to play the part suggested that he 
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was a follower rather than a shaper of events – that he was will-
ing to go along with white power in the economy rather than 
seeking to challenge it.
Even if these views are rejected, the common image of 
Ramaphosa is contradicted by the nature of his career in pub-
lic life. He began as a trade union negotiator, and an unusual 
one at that – one who won recognition from employers before 
recruiting members.  He went on to become a negotiator in 
the constitutional forum and then a businessman, a role which 
also requires fairly constant negotiation. The pattern is clear: 
Ramaphosa is a negotiator and conciliator; his inclination is 
to deal with conflict by trying to find common ground. This 
does not mean he is always conciliatory – parties negotiate to 
increase their power, and they also use power during the negoti-
ation process. In the constitutional talks Ramaphosa forced the 
apartheid government to replace its first negotiator, Delport, by 
consistently refusing to make any concessions to him: Delport 
was an excitable and aggressive negotiator and reacted with 
anger, whereupon Ramaphosa would appeal to the chair to 
ask Delport to control his emotions30. But he uses power in a 
particular way, one which seeks progress through compromise 
rather than confrontation; this has been his style throughout 
his career, and there was no compelling evidence for the expec-
tation that he would confront opponents and obstacles rather 
than seeking to negotiate a way round them.
Why then did much of business and a section of the media 
form an opinion of Ramaphosa so obviously at variance with 
the facts? One reason is wishful thinking: they project onto him 
what they would like him to be, not what he is. But there is 
another, which places his popularity among elites in its social 
context. Ramaphosa is the first ANC leader who was not exiled 
and who did not serve a long prison term for ANC activities 
(as noted earlier, he was twice detained but never convicted of 
30 R. Hartley, Ramaphosa: The Man Who Would Be King, Johannesburg, Jonathan 
Ball, 2017.
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a political “crime”). He is a child of the cities who has spent a 
decade and a half in business. Culturally this makes him much 
more compatible with business people and professionals than 
other ANC leaders have been (with the exception of Mandela 
who, in a sense, made it his business to become compatible).
There is a significant cultural gap between those who were 
exiled and jailed and those who were not. In exile, most ANC 
activists were largely cut off from the market: they relied on 
allowances from the movement (which were invariably small) 
or sometimes donor support, if they were fortunate enough 
to be living in Western countries. Political prisoners develop 
their own political sub-culture – inevitably, it is built on heat-
ed political debate rather than the daily routine of economic 
activity31. And so, however adaptable they were and however 
quickly they learned, there was almost always a difference be-
tween what they had been taught to value and the assumptions 
of the marketplace. Ramaphosa, by contrast, was born into the 
world of the urban market and never really left it: trade union-
ists and business people are both creatures of the marketplace. 
This made him the only ANC leader who mainstream business 
people, middle class journalists and professionals could see to 
some extent as “one of us”. And so they are inclined to assume 
(often incorrectly) that he sees the world as they do and will 
tend to act like a CEO rather than as the President of a nation-
alist movement.     
A Creature of Circumstance
This background has been given in order to clarify the point 
made at the outset, that Ramaphosa is more a product of eco-
nomic and political realities than their shaper. 
He was a competent and effective trade unionist who led his 
union during the period when it became, in a short time, the 
31 F. Buntman, Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2003.
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largest in the country32. He was also its General Secretary in 
1987 when it launched the longest and biggest strike in South 
African history33. But the union and its growth were a prod-
uct of the South African situation at the time. As pressure on 
apartheid began to build, government and businesses moved 
to contain change by granting black trade unions the bargain-
ing rights they had been denied for five decades34: that is why 
the mines recognised Ramaphosa’s union even before it had re-
cruited members. Joining unions and winning improvements 
in their conditions convinced black workers that they were not 
powerless, and that by acting together they could force greater 
and greater change35: that is why the union grew and was able 
to mobilise as many workers as it did. During the 1980s the 
ANC emerged as the dominant movement against apartheid, 
and trade unions which had been reluctant to ally themselves 
with it began to revise their stance; so Ramaphosa’s decision 
to move the union to COSATU and thus into a new political 
camp may have opened new opportunities for him and the un-
ion, but it was nevertheless very much a product of the times.
Ramaphosa was a skilled and effective negotiator in the con-
stitutional discussions, and his working relationship with Meyer 
smoothed the process. But those talks – and their aftermath – 
were the product of two decades of change as apartheid came 
under increasing pressure which the government tried to deflect 
by making concessions. Because apartheid could survive only 
by force of arms and could never, even with reforms, win signif-
icant black support, the process of change was bound to end in 
a recognition of civil rights, at least in principle36. Ramaphosa 
32 “The National Union of  Mineworkers start South Africa’s longest wage strike”, 
South African History Online.
33 Ibid. 
34 S. Friedman Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970-1984, 
Johannesburg, Ravan, 1987
35 Ibid.
36 S.C. Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa: Political Considerations Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1982.
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may well have smoothed that process, but he did not create 
it. It is also worth asking whether his rapport with Meyer was 
perhaps made much more likely by the cultural factor men-
tioned above. Despite his role in the resistance movement and 
his time in detention, Ramaphosa was surely a child of changes 
that were already well under way, at a time when black people 
who lived in cities and were steeped in urban culture were be-
ginning to acquire at least some of what had always been denied 
them – such as a university education and the opportunity to 
work as a professional. This must have made it far easier for him 
and Meyer to find each other and to create the dynamic which 
enabled the negotiations to progress.
As the leader of a business, Ramaphosa accumulated wealth 
and prestige; but even if he played the part with Mandela’s 
blessing (as he later insisted), it was in this role that he was most 
clearly a consequence rather than a cause of change. As a for-
mer ANC Secretary General and still a member of its National 
Executive Committee he was, given white businesses’ need to 
find black strategic partners, an ideal candidate for positions 
on the boards of major companies. And his role at Marikana 
showed that he and other former activists who turned to busi-
ness were expected not to change corporate South Africa but to 
oil its wheels by facilitating contact with the government. As 
noted earlier, the South African economy has developed since 
1994 in such a way that black people have become participants, 
but have not really changed it. Ramaphosa’s business activities 
illustrate this. He was a product of this pattern, and had no 
impact on it.
It was this career, too, which enabled him, after reluctantly 
becoming Deputy President of the ANC and of the country, to 
emerge as the leader of the anti-Zuma faction. Given his trade 
union and business career, he exemplified those black people 
who had been absorbed into the market economy. Nor does 
he represent this strand within the ANC only – as the reaction 
to the firing of the Finance Minister in 2015 showed, he is the 
product of a coalition which stretches beyond the governing 
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party into business and the professions. Ramaphosa’s defeat of 
Zuma may go down in history as a crucial victory for the insti-
tutions of constitutional democracy, one which set the country 
on a more democratic path; but it is also the product of a pat-
tern of economic development of which he is a product, not an 
architect.
In a sense, the history of Cyril Ramaphosa is also that of his 
society during the last years of apartheid and the first decades 
after its demise. This does not mean that he was merely a pas-
sive pawn in that history; but it does put into perspective the 
view of leadership which denies that leaders are a product of 
their societies or that their ability to shape destiny is greatly 
constrained by circumstances. Ramaphosa has made a differ-
ence to South Africa. But South Africa has made a great differ-
ence to him.
What Now? 
The link between Ramaphosa’s role and current realities in 
South Africa is particularly important when we consider his 
options as the country steers a course away from the Zuma era 
and the patronage politics which defined it.
When, in May 2019, Ramaphosa led the ANC to the elec-
tion victory which gave his presidency its popular mandate, he 
had been in office for a year and a half. During that time, his 
government had introduced changes which enjoy broad sup-
port throughout the insider coalition. These reforms, men-
tioned earlier, were in a sense designed to take the country back 
to 2009, before Zuma became President. This means restoring 
public institutions to the way in which they functioned then, 
but it does not mean tackling the economic development path 
which continues to exclude many from the market’s benefits. 
Mbeki may have had doubts about the course of that develop-
ment – he feared that incorporating black people in existing 
economic arrangements encouraged a culture of consumption 
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which he found distasteful37. But the growth path itself was 
central to his administration’s programme38.
If all Ramaphosa is willing and able to do is to go back to 
2009 then he will inevitably remain a product of his times: 
for though recapturing public institutions is important, he may 
find his changes only temporarily effective. Economic exclusion 
not only limits the growth of the economy: it also makes state 
capture and corruption far more likely. While corruption is a 
problem in all democracies, it is exacerbated when ambitious 
people are denied the pathway to middle class status usually of-
fered by the market and come to see politics as the only possible 
means of advancement. Businesses and politicians who see ad-
vantages in working with each other to further their interests at 
the expense of everyone else’s will continue to find opportuni-
ties which would not exist if the economy was more accessible. 
The road to change must therefore include significant reform to 
the way the economy operates39. 
Race, South African society’s key faultline, also remains an 
obstacle to progress. While (some) black people have been ab-
sorbed into the economic elite, they are not equal members. 
Habits of racial domination do not wear off in 25 years, so 
black professionals and business people continue to face prej-
udice which restricts their progress. This has prompted much 
anger among middle-class black people, who are willing to sup-
port demands for radical economic change not because this is 
important to them in its own right but because it enables them 
to express anger at the way things are. Demands such as that 
for the expropriation of land without compensation, which was 
at the centre of the national debate for much of Ramaphosa’s 
37 T. Mbeki, Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture by President Thabo Mbeki: 
University of  Witwatersrand, July 29, 2006, International relations and 
cooperation.
38 S. Friedman, “Seeing Ourselves as Others see Us: Racism, technique and the 
Mbeki administration”, in D. Glaser (ed.), Mbeki and After: Reflections on the Legacy 
of  Thabo Mbeki, Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2010, pp.163-186
39 D. Lipton (2016).
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pre-election term, are supported primarily by middle-class peo-
ple who are able to make themselves heard. Because they ema-
nate from the middle class, these demands always end in com-
promises which do not damage the market; but they unsettle 
and hamper the economy40. And so Ramaphosa’s first term as a 
President elected by voters rather than party delegates will need 
to see progress in dealing with racial division.
Both issues call for a process ideally suited to Ramaphosa’s 
strength – his ability to negotiate and conciliate. Because none 
of the economic actors can force their wishes on everyone 
else, the only way these issues can be addressed is through a 
negotiation process like the constitutional bargain in which 
Ramaphosa played a vital role, this time over the economy and 
social institutions. But, while he is suited to the task, it was 
not clear at the time he won his first elected term whether he 
was willing to begin negotiating these changes. The answer to 
this question will determine not only South Africa’s immediate 
history but the degree to which Ramaphosa is remembered as a 
shaper of the realities which shaped him.
40 “Land talks send SA business confidence to lowest point in 2018”, Bloomberg, 
11 September 2018.

4.  Regenerating Angola. João Lourenço 
     and the Legacy of the Dos Santos Regime
Alex Vines
At the opening of the Extraordinary Congress of his party 
the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in 
Luanda, in June 2019, President João Lourenço (widely known 
as JLo) emphasised that a fight against corruption was needed 
to end nepotism in political office and other spheres of pub-
lic service. Members of Angola’s political and economic elites 
are to blame for illicitly enriching themselves and plunging the 
country deeper into external debt, he suggested: “if the govern-
ment achieves this, more citizens will be taken out of poverty. 
The responsibility we have is urgent and needs to be expedit-
ed”. The private sector, he added, would become the engine for 
growing the economy1. Lourenço’s targets for his new adminis-
tration were ambitious.
After nearly four decades as President, José Eduardo dos 
Santos had decided not to stand for re-election but to step aside 
in late September 2017 for the MPLA’s chosen successor. João 
Lourenço was inaugurated after the MPLA won just over 61% 
of votes in the multiparty election of August 20172, but lost 
1 “João Lourenço arrasa os anos de presidência de José Eduardo dos Santos”, 
SIC Notícias, 16 June 2019.
2 M. de Alancastro, “Angola under Lourenço: Towards a Negociated Hegemony”, 
Notes de Ifri, February 2018; J. Pearce, D. Péclard, and R. Soares de Oliveira, 
“Angola’s Elections and the Politics of  Presidential Succession”, African Affairs, 
vol. 117, no. 466, January 2018.
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seats to the opposition. Many Angolans assumed that the dos 
Santos family would continue to pull the strings – JLo had been 
the compromise candidate of the MPLA. But six months later 
the puppet had become an action hero, and change has been 
quicker than many expected3.
This chapter charts Lourenço’s transitional politics following 
nearly 38 years of dos Santos rule, and assesses how far the new 
President has really changed Angola’s political and economic 
landscape4. Are Lourenço’s reforms mere window-dressing for 
the new MPLA elite, or a serious effort to renew the party, 
modernise the state and transform the economy5?
Who Is João Lourenço?
João Lourenço, born on 5 March 1954 in Lobito, had humble 
origins: his father was a medical practitioner and his mother 
was a seamstress. He joined the MPLA before independence 
from Portugal in 1975, and soon afterwards went into the army 
and received Cuban training. In 1978 he travelled to the Soviet 
Union and studied at the Vladimir Ilyich Lenin military acad-
emy. After returning to Angola he rose to the rank of General, 
married into a key MPLA family and became governor of sev-
eral provinces. Always the party loyalist, he was responsible 
for propaganda in the MPLA’s Bureau Político from 1992 to 
1997 and later became General Secretary, a post he lost in 2003 
when President dos Santos hinted that he was considering re-
tirement and Lourenço signalled interest in succeeding him. In 
fact Dos Santos was smoking out potential competitors, and 
3 Reform in Angola occurs during economic crisis, see, A. Vines, “Review article: 
Continuity and change in Angola: insights from modern history”, International 
Affairs, vol. 92, no. 5, September 2016.
4 This paper draws on interviews by the author with government, opposition, 
oil industry, banking and mining and civil society and meetings held at Chatham 
House from June 2017 to June 2019 – some of  which are referenced below. 
5 A. Vines, “Lourenço’s First Year: Angola’s Transitional Politics”, African Center 
for Strategic Studies, 20 September 2018.
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promptly demoted him. Learning from this tactical mistake, 
João Lourenço rebuilt his relationship with the President and 
was rewarded in 2014 by being made Minister of Defence. He 
enjoyed the reputation of an efficient technocrat, as did his 
wife, Ana Dias Lourenço, an ex-Minister who has also been 
Angola’s representative to the World Bank6.
Over his 38 years in office dos Santos sought to weaken the 
MPLA and centralise power in himself through a vast system 
of political patronage, but as his health gradually weakened the 
party began to reassert itself. Lourenço’s strong party and mil-
itary credentials made him a popular candidate with many in 
the MPLA, and in 2017 the party forced the President to accept 
JLo, then a 63-year-old army general untainted by major cor-
ruption allegations, as a compromise candidate7. 
The Tug-of-War Between Jlo and Dos Santos 
The power transfer was not straightforward, for dos Santos had 
not originally intended to step down as President until 2019 
at the earliest, and planned to remain head of the MPLA for 
longer still. Ill health, fatigue after nearly four decades in power, 
and an economic crisis made such aspirations unrealistic, but 
dos Santos was not ready to relinquish power rapidly.
A tug-of-war arose over the date for the Extraordinary 
Congress of the MPLA. In early 2018 the former leader, 
6 Ana Dias Lourenço has been active in the MPLA since her youth (she was 
detained under suspicion and mistreated during the Nito Alves coup attempt of  
May 1977), had a good technocratic reputation as Minister of  Planning and was 
well-liked by the business community. As First Lady, she is discreet but has sig-
nificant influence over her husbands’ thinking. She fell out badly with President 
dos Santos in 2012 and some observers credit her for influencing her husband 
in moving quickly against dos Santos’ interests. The couple have six children, all 
active in the MPLA and also have a family house in Bethesda, Maryland, United 
States (bought in 2013). 
7 Dos Santos’ favoured candidate to replace him was Bornito de Sousa, who 
became the Vice President of  the Republic after the 2017 elections.
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encouraged by his family and allies, said the congress should be 
in December that year or in April 20198, but the move failed 
and the new President continued to build up his support base 
by, for instance, appointing General Fernando Garcia Miala 
as head of the Serviço de Inteligência e Segurança de Estado 
(SINSE, the state intelligence and security service). Miala’s ap-
pointment ensured the support of the intelligence community 
and further weakened dos Santos’ grip on power, as did a num-
ber of other appointments of his more dissident followers. 
By his first anniversary as President of Angola Lourenço 
was riding high, having just consolidated his power base at the 
MPLA party congress held in Luanda in September, where he 
stood unopposed and secured 98.6% of the votes, formally re-
placing dos Santos as party leader. 
This ended the division of power between the presidents 
of state (Lourenço) and party (dos Santos), producing a situ-
ation unknown in Angola since 1979, for the separation be-
tween party and state had long been blurred. The relationship 
between the two individuals, also, had deteriorated after late 
2017 as Lourenço’s increasingly assertive reforms began to have 
an impact on dos Santos, his family and his allies. At times they 
have communicated only through go-betweens, and even the 
engagement of the President’s daughter Cristina Giovanna Dias 
Lourenço to the ex-President’s son Jovel Avelino Gourgel dos 
Santos in April 2019 has not improved relations between the 
two families.
Consolidating Power Through the MPLA 
The 7th Extraordinary Congress of the MPLA on 15 and 16 
June 2019 in Luanda further strengthened Lourenço’s hold on 
8 In 2017, the dos Santos family were increasingly nervous of  the upcoming tran-
sition. To her credit, Isabel dos Santos convinced her father to step down at the 
elections in August 2017. A. Vines, “Angola’s Transition to Technocracy Won’t 
Be Victimless”, Foreign Policy, 25 August 2017.
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power. The party’s Comité Central (CC, Central Committee) 
was enlarged from 366 to 497 members while the Bureau 
Político (BP, political bureau) now has 72 members against 52 
previously, bringing in additional new blood not associated 
with the dos Santos era and signalling also the preparation of a 
new generation to provide JLo’s successor in 2027. As many as 
61% of the new Central Committee members (134) are under 
the age of 45, and 15% (21) are female9.
This Extraordinary Congress was attended by 2,448 del-
egates. It elected Paulo Pombolo as the new MPLA General 
Secretary to replace Álvaro de Boavida Neto (a close ally of dos 
Santos appointed to the post by Lourenço).
Key supporters of ex-President dos Santos stayed away, such 
as the former Information Minister Manuel Rabelais and the 
party’s former spokesperson Norberto Garcia. Rabelais is barred 
from foreign travel as he has been charged with corruption, 
while Garcia was recently acquitted of similar charges. A week 
before the congress, dos Santos’ daughter Welwitschia (Tchizé) 
dos Santos had her MPLA and CC memberships suspended 
for absenteeism. Tchizé stayed away from the congress and has 
regularly accused Lourenço on social media of muzzling state 
institutions and seeking to obliterate her father’s legacy and 
promote the political careers of his associates under a pretence 
of fighting corruption10.
Former President dos Santos was invited to attend the con-
gress but was in Spain for medical treatment and his absence 
was noted by Lourenço in his opening speech. As mentioned 
above, Lourenço had been elected President of the MPLA at 
the party’s 6th Extraordinary Congress on 8 September 2018 
in Luanda, ending 38 years of dos Santos’ leadership of the 
party. At that congress the former President had admitted that 
he had made mistakes while in office, but he pointedly omitted 
to compliment Lourenço.
9 “Discurso do líder do MPLA no VII Congresso Extraordinário do partido”, 
Angop, 16 June 2019.
10 “Quem é ditador José Eduardo dos Santos ou João Lourenço ?”, RFI, 8 June 2019.
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Having got a firmer grip on the party presidency, JLo im-
mediately overhauled its Bureau Político: nearly half its mem-
bers were replaced by younger people, many of them not 
linked to dos Santos. Those released from the BP read like a 
Who’s Who of the dos Santos era – including Francisco Higino 
Lopes Carneiro, a one-time Minister of Public Works; Manuel 
Vicente, a former Chief Executive of Sonangol and Angola’s pre-
vious Vice-President; Juilão Mateus Paulo “Dino Matrosse”, a 
veteran of the liberation struggle and long-term MPLA General 
Secretary; and Kundi Paihama, a former Defence Minister and 
majority shareholder in Banco Angola de Negócios e Comércio. 
Some allies of Dos Santos were also retained, such as the lawyer 
Carlos Feijó and Rui Luís Falcão Pinto de Andrade, a one-time 
MPLA spokesman.
Women were openly promoted as agents of change in 
Lourenço’s drive to reform the party and the government. 
The appointments of Carolina Cerqueira as Minister of State 
for the Social Area and Maria da Piedade de Jesus as Culture 
Minister in June 2019 were part of this move11. The economist 
Vera Esperança dos Santos Daves de Sousa, Minister of State 
for Finance and the Treasury, was also being groomed for more 
responsibility, having been brought into the BP, and her fellow 
BP member, the Environment Minister Paula Cristina Coelho, 
was likewise seen to be growing in influence. With 40 members 
(including four Ministers of State) the new government was 
also bigger than that of the dos Santos era, and JLo seemed to 
be trying to leap-frog over a generation. This was somewhat 
visionary, but was bound to create jealousy and resistance to 
some of his reforms. If he proved unable to turn the economy 
around, this could create further problems.
11 “Carolina Cerqueira e Maria da Piedade de Jesus têm novos cargos no 
Executivo”, Jornal de Angola, 21 June 2019.
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Dismantling Dos Santos Era Networks
According to the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA) some $30bn 
of Angolan money was held outside the country, around half 
in personal accounts12. New legislation approved in May 2018 
requires the return of illicitly-exported capital over $100,000, 
with an amnesty until December 2018. 
Lourenço has overseen a purge of dos Santos-era family, friends 
and allies from key governmental and quasi-governmental jobs. 
While Lourenço was in New York in October 2018 touting 
his economic reforms and the war on corruption, dos Santos’ 
son José Filomeno (known as Zenú) was taken into custody in 
Luanda with his friend and business partner Jean Claude Bastos 
de Morais. The younger dos Santos was accused of trying to si-
phon off $1.5bn from the National Bank of Angola, but both 
men were released from jail in March 2019 as prosecutors an-
nounced that they had recovered “all the financial and non-fi-
nancial assets of the Angolan Sovereign Fund, which was under 
the control of Quantum Global”, or $2.3bn domiciled in British 
and Mauritian banks and another $1.0bn in other assets13. Their 
release and the dropping of charges indicated that for the cash-
strapped Lourenço administration the prime objective was getting 
the money back but it wasn’t the only judicial case Zenú faced. He 
and a former central bank governor Valter Felipe da Silva are to go 
on trial in late 2019 for the irregular transfer of $500 million from 
the Banco Nacional de Angola to a British bank. 
In August 2019, former Transportation Minister Augusto 
Tomás was jailed for 14 years. He has been made an example: 
his pleas of hardship have drawn little sympathy from the aver-
age Angolan although former dos Santos allies are keeping their 
heads down14.
12 See, meeting summary of  BNA Governor, José de Lima Massano, speaking on 
“Economic Reforms in Angola”, Chatham House, 8 October 2018. 
13 “Former Angolan president’s son freed from prison”, Mail and Guardian, 25 
March 2019.
14 “Augusto Tomás nega pela terceira vez responsabilidades financeiras”, Jornal de 
Leaders for a New Africa84
The arrests continued: just one day after the MPLA’s 
Extraordinary Congress in June 2019 General José Maria, the 
army’s former head of information and security who had held 
the position for more than 30 years under dos Santos, was 
placed under house arrest and charged in the Supreme Military 
Tribunal (STM) with insubordination and embezzlement of 
military equipment and classified documents.
This has played well among Angola’s middle class and has 
also weakened resistance to Lourenço’s reforms of the MPLA. 
JLo has firmly consolidated his grip on power and ended the 
duopoly of power between state and party. Dos Santos loyalists 
increasingly hoped that if they kept a low profile they would 
be left to enjoy some of the assets they had accumulated in the 
past. 
Opposition parties and anti-corruption activists welcomed 
the new anti-corruption drive, but pointed out that certain 
people close to Lourenço, too, have large fortunes which they 
have not been made to explain as should.  
Reforming the Angolan Economy
Lourenço inherited an economy in deep crisis, in recession for 
each of the previous three years and in  urgent need of sus-
tained reform. Angola was ranked 165th out of 180 countries 
in the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency 
International and also scored poorly in the World Bank’s re-
port Doing Business (in 173rd place out of 190 in 2018). The 
country’s oil-dependent finances were not sustainable, and 
reform was necessary and unavoidable. Lourenço’s first eight-
een months in office saw some key actions against the family, 
confidants and allies of former President dos Santos, many of 
whom had prospered substantially during the later years of his 
rule when his political grip was weakening. Any serious reform 
would have to confront this situation immediately. 
Angola, 7 June 2019.
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In April 2019, Lourenço ordered the renegotiation of two 
new contracts, cutting out two firms, Ubinveste and Landscape, 
owned by dos Santos’ daughter Isabel: in January 2016 a dos 
Santos decree had awarded them contracts worth $1.3bn in 
all15. This was not the first time Lourenço terminated contracts 
awarded by his predecessor to firms linked to the dos Santos 
family or allies: in July 2018 the President repealed a state guar-
antee worth US$1.5bn and a 30 year-concession for a new port 
at Barra do Dande to another firm linked to Isabel (Atlantic 
Ventures16).
Also in April 2019, Angola’s Ministry of Telecommunications 
and Information Technology cancelled the tender process for a 
fourth mobile phone operator’s licence. It had previously an-
nounced that the winner was Telstar, an Angolan firm formed 
in January 2018 with a share capital of just 200,000 kwanza 
($1,200), but quickly backtracked after complaints. Telstar is ma-
jority-owned (90%) by Manuel João Carneiro, a general linked 
to another Angolan telecoms firm, Mundo Telecomunicações, 
whose owners included the former Transport Minister August 
Tomás (detained last year on corruption charges), José Pedro de 
Morais (twice Finance Minister under dos Santos) and Higino 
Carneiro, a former Minister of Public Works and Governor of 
the capital, Luanda, who is currently under investigation for 
alleged graft17.
The re-election in March 2019 of Isabel dos Santos, Africa’s 
richest woman, to the Chair of the Board of Angola’s biggest 
telecommunications company UNITEL did not go unchal-
lenged: the four shareholders still cannot agree, as PT Ventures 
and Sonangol refuse to accept her. 
These examples show that the reform process is messy, and 
15 “Ministério retira direito de superfície à Urbinvest”, Jornal de Angola, 25 April 
2019.
16 “Angola’s President announces launch of  international public tenders in New 
York”, Macauhub, 26 September 2018.
17 “Angola launches a new public tender for fourth mobile phone license”, 
Macauhub, 23 April 2019.
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that reforming an opaque and nepotistic system of connections 
and entitlement requires a generational break and will continue 
long after Lourenço has left office. A key question for the future 
is whether the new President will become more equitable in his 
reform efforts during his first term or will mainly focus on the 
dos Santos family and its allies.
Protecting the “Golden Goose” 
While Diversifying Away from Oil 
Angola has one of the most oil-dependent economies in Africa. 
Crude oil production, which had already fallen to 1.48m bar-
rels per day (bpd) in 2018 from 1.63m bpd in 2017, continued 
to decline in the first half of 2019 (1.37m bpd in March, the 
lowest for 12 years) because of a combination of maturing oil-
fields, production issues and reduced investment18. Production 
is projected to further decline by over one third, to as little as 
one million barrels a day by 202319. Higher crude prices will 
not significantly compensate for such a sharp decline20.
In 2019 oil represented 95% of Angola’s foreign exchange 
earnings and more than 40% of its GDP. President Lourenço 
is fully aware that the country needs a robust and predicta-
ble cash flow from oil – he described the industry as the na-
tion’s “Golden Goose” – while he works out how to diversify 
the economy beyond hydrocarbons. The official ambition is 
to steady production at around 1.6m bpd, although a level of 
1.45m may be more realistic.
The new administration has been working with international 
oil companies to slow the decline, removing obstacles to the 
18 “Angola’s oil output fell in 2018 due to ageing fields – Sonangol”, Reuters, 25 
February 2019. In mid-2017 there were only eight active rigs (compared with 25 
in 2014) and seismic activity fell by 80%.  
19 “Angolan President Brings Reform to Critical Oil Industry”, Bloomberg, 12 June 
2019.
20 A. Vines, “Oil is Angola’s Trump Card for International Success, and the New 
President Must Bring About Reform”, Newsweek, 23 August 2017.
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development of new fields. One of Lourenço’s first actions 
as President, in late 2017, was to meet senior officials from 
Chevron, Total, BP, ENI, Exxon and Statoil (now Equinor) to 
discuss the industry’s future. An immediate result was the set-
ting up of a working group, soon followed by the firing of dos 
Santos’ daughter, Isabel dos Santos, as head of the national oil 
company Sonangol, along with most of her Board. Reforms 
have followed, such as draft legislation providing for companies 
to explore and produce natural gas in Angola and ensuring that 
the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the accounts of the 
oil and gas industry. The monopoly on fuel imports is also to be 
ended. A series of presidential decrees has signalled intentions 
for further reform, but actual progress has been slow, and few 
tangible investments have materialised21.
A broader overhaul of Angola’s oil and gas industry is in 
fact under way. By the end of 2020 a new agency, the Agência 
Nacional de Petróleos e Gás (ANGP) will fully take over the 
role of concessionaire from Sonangol. The latter will focus just 
on hydrocarbon exploration, production, refining and distribu-
tion, and will sell off non-core subsidiaries as well as its equity 
in some oil blocks. In late 2018 the state company secured $1bn 
of finance for restructuring from a consortium of banks in-
cluding Standard Chartered and African Export-Import Bank. 
The Ministério dos Recursos Minerais e Petróleos (Ministry of 
Mineral Resources and Petroleum, MMRP), which will remain 
in charge of policy, revealed that there could also be an IPO to 
sell off a stake in Sonangol itself, although no decision has been 
made on when and where to list the shares. After operating 
for decades with little accountability, Sonangol would suddenly 
become subject to shareholder scrutiny. 
These reforms are also meant to raise investors’ interest in the 
country’s oil industry. Positive developments for that industry 
21 “Angola: Total launches full-field production on Kaombo with the start-up of  
the second FPSO”, Total, 2 April 2019; “Eni announces the start-up of  a new 
production well in the Vandumbu field in Block 15/06, offshore Angola”, Eni.
com, 24 January 2019.
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since mid-2018 include new agreements with ExxonMobil, BP 
and Total. An auction licensing round for ten on-shore and off-
shore oil exploration blocks in the country’s Kwanza, Benguela 
and Cunene basins, planned for late 2019, will be Angola’s first 
since an offering of pre-salt blocks in 2011. The ANPG said it 
will offer as many as 55 blocks: 31 through public bidding over 
the next five years and the rest through direct negotiation by 
202522.
Attracting new investment into the oil and gas industry is 
critical, but the government does not expect the huge signa-
ture bonus payments of the past. It also understands that global 
competition for investment is fierce: indeed, this has driven the 
reform programme to offer more favourable terms and support 
cost-cutting, although the pressure to create Angolan jobs (local 
content) is still significant.  
These efforts should help stabilise oil production over the 
next decade. The country’s transition from a single focus on oil 
to include gas will also help to offset the decline in oil produc-
tion and to develop opportunities for domestic energy supply. 
With a limited domestic market for natural gas beyond a soli-
tary LNG train, limited effort has so far been put into develop-
ing gas fields, exploring for gas or appraising the size of existing 
gas finds.
Historically, most of Angola’s production-sharing contracts 
have related only to oil and not gas, leaving Sonangol in theo-
retical control of gas finds. This is now changing, and upstream 
investors have been offered control of all hydrocarbons discov-
ered on their blocks. Angola is also planning to join the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum23. In addition to providing addi-
tional supply for a new gas consortium for Angola LNG out 
of Soyo, the government has this year signed a memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) with a US-based group backed by 
private equity (New Fortress Energy) to build the country’s first 
22 “Angola to offer 10 blocks in bid round”, Oil and Gas Journal, 5 June 2019.
23 “Reform at last for Angolan oil”, Macauhub, 4 January 2019.
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LNG terminal. Luanda also intends to build as many as three 
refineries to reduce dependence on fuel imports.
Despite this progress in reform, Lourenço fired Sonangol’s 
Chief Executive Carlos Saturnino in May 2019, together with 
its Board, following a countrywide fuel shortage caused by a 
strain on the company’s liquidity and other supply-side issues. 
Saturnino was replaced by Sebastião Pai Querido Martins, then 
a non-executive director but previously head of the company’s 
production subsidiary P&P for ten years under the then Chief 
Executive and former Vice-President of Sonangol, Manuel 
Vicente. Martins’ experience will be valued, but his appar-
ent connections to Vicente and his recent spell (2015-17) as 
Chairman of the Board of Somoil, Angola’s largest indigenous 
oil company, may also raise questions about Lourenço’s real 
commitment to reform. Saturnino’s sacking may have been po-
litically expedient, but it will slow down the reform process, as 
Martins is more risk-averse and less decisive than Saturnino.
President Lourenço recognises the urgent need to diversify 
away from oil in order to ensure greater resilience in coping 
with commodity price cycles and to create new jobs. His ad-
ministration has also started to reform the mining industry. In 
late 2018 Anglo American confirmed that it was applying for a 
prospecting licence, and Rio Tinto is in talks with the govern-
ment. Angola also plans to privatise around 74 state companies 
over the next few years, including the state diamond company 
Endiama, while some key infrastructure projects have been re-
viewed. A Chatham House study of Angola’s non-oil infrastruc-
ture showed significant graft and poor oversight in projects up 
to 201624. A recent Deloitte assessment indicates that Angolan 
banking, too, urgently needs thorough reform25. 
According to analysis by the China Africa Research Initiative, 
Luanda received $21.2bn or 23% of the $89.6bn loaned by 
24 S.K. Jensen, Angola’s Infrastructure Ambitions through Booms and Busts: Policy, 
Governance and Reform, Chatham House Research Paper, 14 September 2018.
25 “Angola’s banking sector grows by 16% in 2016, Deloitte say”, Macauhub , 20 
October 2017.
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China to African countries between 2000 and 2014. Much of 
this was for infrastructure. The country’s biggest Chinese lender 
was the CDB, with $11.3bn, followed by the Export-Import 
Bank of China with $7.36bn. Almost half of all Chinese loans 
were guaranteed by Angolan oil26.
With Chinese construction sites spread across Angola and 
tens of thousands of Chinese workers in the country (down 
from an acknowledged peak of over 250,000 four years ago), 
there is no doubt that China is a strategic partner. It is the lead-
ing destination for Angolan crude, and a prime source of loans 
and critical infrastructure27. 
The CDB loan of $2bn in October 2018 was agreed on con-
dition that some of it was used by the Angolan government to 
pay outstanding debts to Chinese contractors. There is a long 
list of large-scale infrastructure projects, new and old, including 
completion of Luanda’s new international airport, power trans-
mission lines, the Luanda water supply system and a new naval 
academy in Kwanza Sul province. The Aeroporto Internacional 
de Angola (an alternative to Luanda’s existing Quatro de 
Fevereiro International Airport) is controversial: it is typical of 
“old Angola”, its completion badly behind schedule and over 
budget, and much of it being constructed by an opaque private 
company listed in Hong Kong, the China International Fund 
(CIF)28. With new finance, the Angolan government hopes it 
can be completed by 2020. CIF is led by Sam Pa (also known 
as Xu Jinghua), named by an American Congressional report 
as head of the “88 Queensway Group” of businesses that also 
includes China Sonangol which holds oil equity in Angola. 
China Sonangol has a joint venture with Sinopec (China’s 
26 China Africa Research Initiative, http://www.sais-cari.org/
research-chinese-loans-to-africa
27 A. Vines, “Angolan agency and Chinese and US oil politics, 1975-2014”, in D. 
Zweig and Y. Hao (eds.), Sino-US Energy Triangles: Resource diplomacy under hegemony, 
Routledge, 2015, pp.129-148.
28 A. Vines, “How Different Is the ‘New Angola’ Under Lourenco?”, World 
Politics Review, 16 October 2018.
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second-biggest oil and gas producer) in Sonangol Sinopec 
International, which holds 50% of Block 18 in Angola. Apart 
from Block 18, China Sonangol also has an equity interest in 
eight other oil blocks in Angola29.
Sam Pa seems to have survived the scrutiny of Lourenço’s an-
ti-graft campaign for now because he is closely associated with 
former Vice President Manuel Vicente, who was instrumental 
in setting up Sonangol’s partnership with China and remains 
a confidant of Lourenço (and close to Sonangol’s, Sebastião 
Pai Querido Martins). In May 2018, a Portuguese court ruled 
that Vicente, charged with graft and money-laundering by 
Portuguese prosecutors, can be tried in Angola under Angolan 
law (because it is a Community of Portuguese Language 
Country, CPLP). This resulted in a political rapprochement 
between the former colonial power Portugal and Angola, as the 
case had chilled diplomatic relations. Lourenço made an official 
visit to Portugal towards the end of 2018. 
That Vicente and Pa feature as they do in the “new Angola” 
suggests there are limits to Lourenço’s reforms. His anti-graft 
drive is as much about Angola’s domestic transition and clean-
ing up the image of the ruling party as it is about modernising 
the country. Targeting the dos Santos family and their friends 
was always going to be the easier part of reform. Comprehensive 
and deep structural change is complicated, slower, and requires 
more serious compromises.
There are also signs that Lourenço maintains some old-style 
family-linked business and political networks. His sister Edith 
do Sacramento Gonçalves Lourenço Catraio, a career diplomat 
based in Brussels, this year became a shareholder in the diamond 
company Dicorp30. In early 2018, Lourenço promoted his 
brother General Sequeira João Lourenço to become deputy head 
of the President’s Intelligence Bureau, which oversees the military, 
29 A. Vines, L. Wong, M. Weimer, and I. Campos, Thirst for African Oil: Asian 
National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola, Chatham House, August 2009.
30 “Irmã de João Lourenço envolvida no negócio de diamantes”, Rádio Angola, 
26 April 2019.
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the police and the intelligence services. Two months earlier, he 
allegedly sold a state-owned aircraft to his brother’s aviation 
company without a public tender and at an undisclosed price31. 
It is a reminder that, whatever the sector, Lourenço’s reforms will 
not do away entirely with deep-seated nepotistic habits.
Addressing the Debt Burden
The economy has remained fragile, with only modest growth, 
high debt and high inflation. After an impressive annual expan-
sion of 7.6% in 2000-201432, growth slowed markedly in 2015. 
The recession of the next three years was expected to continue 
in 2019, the government slashing its annual growth forecast 
from 2.8 to 0.4%33. Angola’s medium-term debt strategy, the 
Estratégia de Endividamento de Médio Prazo (2019-2021), en-
tails a 2.2% contraction in oil sector GDP in 2019, with 1.5% 
growth in the non-oil sector. The IMF predicts that real GDP 
will contract by 4.5% in 2019. This outlook highlights the con-
tinuing weaknesses of the economy, but the debt burden is now 
projected to steadily decline to 66% by 2024 if current com-
modity prices hold.
Debt servicing is the country’s single largest expenditure 
item and 2018 was also a year of debt maturities for Angola. 
The country’s total debt – excluding that of the state oil com-
pany Sonangol – was projected to reach $77.3bn or 70.8% of 
GDP by the end of 2018. In fact, the ratio of debt service to 
revenue reached 89% in 2017, and public debt as a share of 
GDP has more than doubled since 2014, from 39% to 84% at 
the end of 2018. 
31 “Angola: President Lourenço’s grace period is over”, Mail and Guardian, 16 
January 2019.
32 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2019 (last retrieved on 2 July 
2019).
33 See meeting summary of  Vera Daves, Secretary of  State for the Treasury, 
“Economic Reform and Financial Management in Angola”, Chatham House, 
28 January 2019.
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Angola’s current debt to China amounts to $ 23bn, or 56.1% 
of its external debt34. To remedy this, Lourenço and a high-level 
ministerial delegation went to China for a state visit in October 
2018, hoping to negotiate up to $11bn of new credit facilities 
for infrastructure development. The deal they struck in the end 
was for $2bn in funding from the China Development Bank 
(CDB). In addition to China, Angola has oil-backed loans 
from Brazil and Israel. There is now little room for manoeu-
vre, and the government has been forced to turn to commercial 
borrowing.
This is did successfully by issuing about $3bn of Eurobonds35. 
Around the same time (in late 2018) the country re-engaged 
with the IMF and entered a financial service support programme 
(an Extended Fund Facility, EFF) with access to loans, aimed 
at restoring investor confidence and facilitating much-needed 
private-sector growth outside the oil industry. The IMF en-
gagement is a positive development, helping Angola’s interna-
tional reputation and encouraging control of expenditure and 
long-term debt rescheduling. But it may also restrict fiscal and 
monetary policy and have some social impact in the short term 
in terms of unemployment and lower real incomes. Other con-
ditions of the EFF include targets for improved governance and 
credit-risk management at public banks and new anti-mon-
ey-laundering legislation. 
In mid-2019 the IMF completed its first evaluation of 
Angola’s $3.7bn EFF and released a second tranche of fi-
nancing worth $248m. The IMF noted that the government 
had “demonstrated strong commitment to policies under the 
Fund-supported program”, but it observed that a “weakened 
external environment” and volatility of oil prices was “posing 
challenges to their reform efforts”36. There was also praise for 
34 P.C. Roque, “Angola’s Foreign Policy”, Egmont Paper 98, October 2017.
35 “Angola plans to issue another US$2 billion in Eurobonds”, Macauhub, 4 
February 2019.
36 “IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review Under Angola’s Extended 
Arrangement and Approves US$248.15 Million Disbursement”, IMF Press 
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the government’s adjusted 2019 budget, though with calls for 
a “prudent fiscal stance” and a reiteration of the importance of 
ensuring debt sustainability. In private the IMF was concerned 
that the Angolan government’s economic reforms – particular-
ly the planned ending of fuel subsidies and the introduction 
of VAT in October – might be too abrupt and lead to social 
consequences. 
The Angola currency, the kwanza, has fallen by more than 
40% since a dollar peg was abandoned at the beginning of 2018 
for a floating foreign exchange regime. This has eased pressure 
on international reserves, which had fallen from $28bn in 2014 
to a ten-year low of $12.8bn in February 2018. A lack of for-
eign currency and concerns about corruption had forced for-
eign companies to restrict operations. This has made nurturing 
the oil and gas industry a top priority for Lourenço’s govern-
ment until it can work out how to sustainably diversify away 
from hydrocarbons. 
Changing the Security Sector and 
Neutralising the Opposition
Given his military record and background as Minister of 
Defence, Lourenço is well placed to begin serious reform of the 
security sector. On paper, at up to 100,000 personnel Angola’s 
armed forces (the Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA) are among 
the largest in Africa. Since the civil war ended in 2002 the mil-
itary has played a key role in facilitating post-conflict recon-
ciliation within the elite and job creation. Maintaining such 
a large military is unsustainable in the long term, and changes 
appear to be under way: while, for example, 21% of the nation-
al budget was allocated for defence as against 11.3% for educa-
tion and 7.4% for health in 2018, these allocations were revised 
the following year and defence was cut by 5.1%37. 
Release 19/212, 12 June 2019.
37 “Orçamento angolano reforça verba para Educação”, África 21 Digital, 6 June 
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A package of three laws reforming the armed forces was also 
approved by the National Assembly in July 2018, and paves 
the way for significant downsizing. The plan was to halve the 
size of the armed forces and to professionalise and depoliticise 
many posts.
Meanwhile, the FAA Chief of Staff, General Geraldo 
Sachipengo Nunda, was fired in April 2018 because of corrup-
tion allegations against him, along with the external intelligence 
chief, André de Oliveira Sango, a long time dos Santos loyalist. 
Nunda (an ex-UNITA guerrilla fighter) had been a technocrat-
ic appointment but did not have the necessary political support 
to continue. He was replaced by General António Egídio de 
Sousa Santos “Disciplina” (previously the FAA’s head of educa-
tion), an appointment that strengthened the President’s grip on 
the military in preparation for structural reform.
Over a couple of years, Lourenço also appointed some 130 
new generals and admirals to the defence and security servic-
es and retired about 150 others. These reforms continued into 
the following year with the sacking of 61 commissioners of 
the National Police and the appointment of Domingos André 
Tchikanda as Secretary of State for former combatants and vet-
erans of the homeland38.
Lourenço’s reforms also have little to do with rooting de-
mocracy or political pluralism more firmly in Angola. With a 
firm grip on the party and a stabilising economy, the President’s 
priority will be to stimulate growth, create jobs and improve 
government delivery. The reforms are all aimed at rebuilding 
support for the MPLA in anticipation of Angola’s first ever mu-
nicipal elections, whenever they are held, as the party fears it 
could lose control of some parts of the country39. By bringing 
2019.
38 “PR reformula chefias militares das Forças Armadas e da Polícia Nacional”, 
VerAngola, 17 May 2019.
39 There remains a debate over when these will be held. Scheduled currently as 
a selective electoral exercise in 2020 or 2021 or even  merged with the national 
elections of  2022 to cost save.
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young people onto the MPLA’s Central Committee Lourenço 
trying to make his party more attractive to voters in the up-
coming local elections. He is also manoeuvring for an increased 
MPLA majority in the next general election in 2022 (the party 
secured just over 61% of the parliamentary vote in 2017), and 
a second term for himself. 
This strategy is causing problems for the opposition: both 
UNITA and the CASA-CE coalition are finding that the MPLA 
is stealing their ideas and proving better at internal leadership 
renewal40. Lourenço has reached out to opposition and other 
activists in a way that never occurred during the dos Santos 
era. He has also sought to heal the scars of past conflicts, for 
example giving permission for the reburial on 1 June 2019 of 
the former UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi at a ceremony in his 
home village of Lopitanga 17 years after his death, a powerful 
gesture of reconciliation. Development and wildlife conserva-
tion projects, including some in UNITA strongholds, are also 
partly designed to weaken the opposition’s grip on those areas 
so as to offset the fickle and unpredictable support of urban and 
suburban voters along the coast (especially in Luanda), who 
have high expectations of what the state should deliver41. The 
actions against the Dos Santos family should also be seen as 
partly aimed at winning the support of disenfranchised urban 
voters for the MPLA. These initiatives are popular, but many 
Angolans still want to see convictions. At times, the President 
has also shown himself overly influenced by public opinion: the 
sacking in 2019 of Carlos Saturnino from Sonangol was prob-
ably a panic response, to placate a hostile press and a public 
angry over fuel shortages which were not of his making.
40 See meeting summary of  Angola cross-party meeting, Political Reform in Angola: 
Challenges and Priorities for Elected Officials, Chatham House, 31 October 2018.
41 See speech by Minister for the Environment, P. Coelho, Mine Clearance, 
Conservation and Economic Development in Angola, Chatham House, 17 June 2019.
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Conclusion
Lourenço’s reform agenda is a balancing act. The IMF-
encouraged economic strategy – including the introduction of 
VAT in October 2019 – will hit the lower and middle classes 
hardest. Fuel shortages (and the end of subsidies) and the de-
preciation of the kwanza have also revealed the fragility of the 
reform efforts and the need for quick results. The President’s 
anti-corruption campaign has frightened away some existing 
business and is slow to attract new investment. It always had 
two wider objectives: to tighten Lourenço’s hold on power by 
rebuilding support for the MPLA in the forthcoming munici-
pal and then national elections, and to turn around the fragile 
economy by diversifying it away from its addiction to oil rents. 
What is not new in Lourenço’s Angola is that he is ensuring that 
the next generation of leaders are also from the MPLA. 
The President now controls the party, the executive and the 
armed forces and intelligence apparatus. He is also responsible 
for appointing senior members of the judiciary and the lead-
ership of the parastatals. This concentration of power in the 
presidency could pose a longer-term risk for the country, par-
ticularly if Lourenço’s reforms fail to deliver. Angola currently 
lacks credible institutions to restrain its executive with checks 
and balances, and after the last two party congresses the ruling 
MPLA is more tightly controlled by the President than ever.

5.  Rebuilding the Congo: 
     After the Kabilas
Kris Berwouts, Filip Reyntjens
This chapter begins with an historical moment in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s post-independence 
history, when a new president took over from his predeces-
sor in a peaceful fashion. This event can only be understood 
by looking at the sixty years that preceded it. We first look at 
the Mobutist years, marked by steady state decay after a brief 
period of reconstruction. The current situation must be seen 
in light of decades-long pervasive kleptocratic rule. This pro-
foundly rotten system was overthrown by a formidable regional 
coalition that brought Laurent Kabila to power. His rise was 
an accident of history, as was his son Joseph’s accession to pow-
er after his father’s assassination. Neither Laurent nor Joseph 
Kabila were able or even willing to break with Congo’s flawed 
governance. After Joseph Kabila succeeded in hanging on to 
power for two years after the end of his constitutional second 
term, he was forced to abandon his ambition to run for a third 
one. Although opponent Félix Tshisekedi won the presidential 
election, Kabila managed to retain crucial levers of power. The 
chapter concludes by looking at the challenges and constraints 
Tshisekedi will be facing.
Leaders for a New Africa100
The 2018 Elections: Breaking Away from the Past?
The outcome of the presidential election held on 30 December 
2018 has been hailed as “the first peaceful transition since in-
dependence”. Peaceful it has been, at least for the time being, 
but it was all but democratic, and the longer-term consequence 
may well be a dangerous stalemate.
At the end of 2016, Joseph Kabila’s second and last consti-
tutional term came to an end, but he managed to hang on for 
another two years through what the Congolese refer to as le 
glissement or “sliding”. After failing to have the constitution and 
the electoral law amended, Kabila used the electoral commis-
sion (Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante, CENI) to 
postpone the poll. An agreement with the opposition struck 
under the auspices of the Catholic Church at the end of 2016 
provided for polls in December 2017, but that deadline again 
passed as a result of instability in certain parts of the country 
and alleged logistical and financial difficulties.
Under the pressure of both the international community and 
Congolese civil society, and the Episcopal Conference CENCO 
(Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo) in particular, Kabila 
was forced to abandon his ambitions for a third term, and he 
could no longer postpone the polls. So throughout 2018 the 
stage was set for presidential, parliamentary and provincial elec-
tions to be organised on 23 December. The road was replete 
with incidents and contestations. In a country without prop-
erly functioning population registers, the identification and 
registration of voters was not only difficult, but it also gave rise 
to suspicion and accusations of fraud. A series of representa-
tive nationwide opinion polls in 2017 and 2018 (the latest in 
January-February 2018) returned a strong negative opinion of 
Kabila, but at the same time showed a scattered vote for the 
opposition. Distrust in the ability or willingness of CENI to or-
ganise free and fair elections was widespread1. Later on, CENI’s 
1 Fondation Berci and Congo Research Group, A Political Opinion Poll. An Update 
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introduction of so-called “voting machines”, meant to print 
ballot papers in the voting stations, caused new controversy. 
They were seen as technically unreliable and raised concerns 
over fraud and the secrecy of the vote2.
An unforeseen event had a potentially major impact on 
the campaign. On 8 June, former Vice-President Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, a fierce opponent of Kabila, was acquitted by the ICC’s 
appeal chamber, after having been sentenced to 18 years in pris-
on for war crimes and crimes against humanity. His release was 
a major threat for Kabila, but it also made the opposition’s at-
tempts to mount a common front behind a single presidential 
candidate more complex3. This quest was complicated further 
in October, when a new opinion poll gave Félix Tshisekedi – 
chairman of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social 
(UDPS) party – the lead with 36%, well ahead of the pack, 
including Kabila’s anointed successor Ramazani Shadary who 
scored 16%4. This not only meant that the scale of fraud would 
need to be massive if Shadary was to be declared the winner, 
but also that, in the single-round voting system in place since 
2011, Tshisekedi would win the election directly, thus mak-
ing the opposition’s rallying behind a common candidate even 
more difficult.
This was borne out in November 2018, six weeks before 
the elections, when the main political families of the opposi-
tion met in Geneva. They united on a platform called Lamuka 
(“Awake” in Lingala) and, encouraged by international play-
ers, agreed on a single presidential candidate: Martin Fayulu. 
Yet, 24 hours after Fayulu’s designation, Félix Tshisekedi and 
Vital Kamerhe reneged on their promises, left Lamuka and set 
on A Contentious Political Process, Pulse Poll Report, no. 3, March 2018.
2 International Crisis Group, Electoral Poker in DR Congo, Africa, Report no. 
259, Brussels, 4 April 2018, pp. 3-4.
3 International Crisis Group, DR Congo: The Bemba Earthquake, Briefing no. 
140, 15 June 2018.
4 T. Kibangula, “Présidentielle en RDC: un sondage contesté par le camp Kabila 
donne Félix Tshisekedi favori”, Jeune Afrique, 30 October 2018.
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up a new coalition called Cach (Cap pour le changement). So it 
seemed the main contenders were to be Fayulu, Tshisekedi and 
Shadary.
After incidents such as a fire that gutted a CENI ware-
house in Kinshasa and widespread violence in Yumbi, Beni 
and Butembo in mid-December, the polls were delayed for a 
week, and they eventually took place on 30 December. On 10 
January 2019, the final results of the presidential election were 
announced by CENI: Félix Tshisekedi was the winner with 
38.5%, Martin Fayulu obtained 34.7% and Shadary was cred-
ited with 23.8%. Turnout was a mere 47.6%. Although an op-
position candidate ostensibly won, this was an elaborate hoax. 
According to two sets of data, one leaked from CENI itself and 
the other based on voting results collected by 40,000 CENCO 
observers, Martin Fayulu had won the election with between 
59.4 and 62.8% of the votes; both Shadary and Tshisekedi 
scored well under 20%5. Several sources claim that, when the 
Fayulu victory became clear, this was seen by Kabila as a major 
threat because Fayulu was supported by two barred candidates, 
Jean-Pierre Bemba and Moïse Katumbi, who were powerful 
and popular opponents. To keep Fayulu out of power, Kabila 
then struck a deal with Tshisekedi who eagerly accepted this 
electoral “victory”6.
Given the official outcome of the parliamentary elections, 
this will in all likelihood prove to be a poisoned gift. Indeed, 
Kabila’s Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC) won an over-
whelming majority in the National Assembly, and is thus in the 
position to impose a government on Tshisekedi. In addition, it 
captured the majority in all 26 provincial assemblies. This is not 
only important at the decentralised level, but also nationally, 
5 “Congo voting data reveal huge fraud in poll to replace Kabila”, The Financial 
Times, 15 January 2019; Congo Research Group, Congo Election Leaks, 15 January 
2019; CENCO, “Transmission du rapport intermédiaire”, sent by CENCO to 
CENI on 15 January 2019.
6 K. Berwouts, “President-on-a-Leash Tshisekedi and the DRC’s paradoxical new 
politics”, African Arguments, 24 January 2019.
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as the Senate is indirectly elected by the provincial lawmakers. 
The senatorial elections were marred by corruption, with can-
didates paying tens of thousands of dollars for each vote. In the 
end, the FCC captured 90% of the seats. Tshisekedi thus fac-
es an overwhelming opposition in both Houses of Parliament. 
Of course, the parliamentary elections have been as fraudulent 
as the presidential poll. Even accepting the official outcome, it 
cannot be explained how the FCC presidential candidate ob-
tained around 24% of the vote while the FCC captured almost 
75% of the seats in the National Assembly and a majority in all 
provincial legislatures. However, in the case of these elections, 
the CENCO observers were unable to independently verify the 
outcome as the results were not displayed at the compilation 
centres, contrary to what happened with those of the presiden-
tial poll7.
Tshisekedi will thus be a “President-on-a-Leash”8, and Kabila 
will retain his hold on power. So the Congolese elections of 
December 2018 have been all but a democratic exercise. Rather 
they have ignored the choice of the people and may well lead 
to dangerous stalemate. This may even contribute to further vi-
olence. For instance, former warlord Mbusa Nyamwisi said he 
was ready to mobilise his forces in North Kivu where many reg-
istered voters were barred from participating in the polls9. No 
wonder Mo Ibrahim and Alan Doss stated that “the result of the 
presidential election in the DRC is a defeat for democracy”, and 
expressed fear that “the Congolese people could resort to other 
methods to reverse the unbearable status quo”10. Africa and the 
West have sent out a signal that may be disastrous for Africa 
7 More details on this “electoral robbery” can be found in K. Berwouts and F. 
Reyntjens, The Democratic Republic of  Congo: The Great Electoral Robbery (and how and 
why Kabila got away with it), Brussels, Egmont Institute, Africa Policy Brief, no. 25, 
19 April 2019.
8 K. Berwouts (2019).
9 “As Tshisekedi takes over in DRC, he faces legitimacy hurdles”, The East African, 
26 January 2019. 
10 M. Ibrahim and A. Doss, “Le résultat de la présidentielle en RDC est une dé-
faite pour la démocratie”, Le Monde, 1 February 2019.
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and the world. While claiming to support genuine democra-
cy, they have accepted an outcome they knew was everything 
but democratic, and in so doing have betrayed the right of the 
Congolese people to elect their leaders. This signal strongly dis-
credits their own alleged commitment to democracy and the 
exercise of political rights. This ambiguous policy is not just ad-
dressed to the Congolese, but to people elsewhere who struggle 
against fraudulent dictatorships that cling to power, no matter 
what the price. 
Mobutu’s Zaire: The Institutionalisation 
of Bad Governance
The Congolese state had a very difficult start at independence. 
The country had gone through an extremely harsh period of 
predatory exploitation under one of the worst regimes in terms 
of human rights in history, Leopold II’s personal rule over the 
Congo Free State (1885-1908). Under pressure of international 
criticism, Belgium took over control of the country which official-
ly became a colony in 190811. Belgium developed a paternalistic 
regime without  contemplating Congolese independence until 
the late 1950s. The colonial model was infantilising: a huge num-
ber of Congolese children had access to primary school, a much 
smaller group received training to the level of lower civil servants, 
but only a handful of students obtained university degrees. After 
an improvised decolonisation process that lasted just 18 months 
(4 January 1959 – 30 June 1960), Congo became independent 
without an intellectual elite, a political tradition or managerial 
capacity to take control over the state and the economy.
The take-over took place in an emerging political landscape 
crystallising around a basic cleavage. On the left, there was a 
group of radical nationalists, influenced by the movement of 
non-aligned countries which started to take shape after the 
11 A. Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of  Greed, Terror and Heroism in 
Colonial Africa, Boston-New York, Mariner Books, 1998.
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Bandung Conference in 1955. They were inspired by Kwame 
Nkrumah’s Pan-African ideology and considered independence 
as a first step to a totally new social order, offering better chanc-
es to the masses. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba spearheaded 
this group. In 1958 he had founded the Mouvement National 
Congolais (MNC), which became the only truly national party 
able to mobilise people beyond ethnic and regional constitu-
encies. On the right were leaders considered by the Belgians as 
much more moderate, less critical of the existing order and in-
terested first and foremost in occupying the top echelons of the 
colonial pyramid as Congolese évolués. Their organisations, of-
ten based on region or ethnicity, transformed themselves in the 
late 1950s into political parties, of which Joseph Kasa-Vubu’s 
Abako (Association des BaKongo) was the best organised and the 
most powerful. For this group, Congo’s future was to be feder-
al, with strong provinces. The financial and economic lobbies 
in Western Europe and in North America obviously were in 
favour of Kasa-Vubu’s vision, and the Eisenhower administra-
tion in Washington was afraid that Lumumba could become an 
African counterpart of Fidel Castro, who had recently come to 
power in Cuba12.
The first months of independence were particularly chaot-
ic. The country experienced its first implosion in its first week 
of existence, with the secession of the provinces of Katanga 
and South Kasai, both endowed with abundant mineral re-
sources. In September 1960, after ten weeks in office, elected 
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was politically neutralised by 
President Kasa-Vubu, arrested by commander-in-chief Joseph-
Désiré Mobutu and eventually assassinated in Katanga on 17 
January 1961 by troops loyal to secessionist President Moïse 
Tshombe13. After five years of political upheaval, violent con-
flicts and unstable governments, Mobutu took power through 
a coup d’état on 25 November 1965.
12 K. Berwouts, Congo’s violent peace; Conflict and struggle since the Great African War, 
London, Zed Books, 2017, p. 9.
13 L. De Witte, The assassination of  Lumumba, London-New York, Verso, 2001.
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Congo went through thirty-two years of neo-colonial dicta-
torship under Mobutu, supported by Western Europe and the 
United States to safeguard Western economic interests in the 
mining sector and as a bastion against communism in Africa on 
the geo-strategic chessboard of the Cold War. This happened at 
a time when a number of African heads of state declared them-
selves adepts of African or Arab socialism.
In the first years of his presidency, Mobutu managed to in-
carnate optimism after years of chaos. His rule enjoyed broad 
support, the country stabilised and a relatively effective admin-
istration was put in place. Mobutu “pacified” Congo (at least 
he killed or “bought” rebel leaders and defeated their insurrec-
tions) in 1968 and started to demilitarise his regime. He began 
to wear civilian clothes for public appearances and introduced 
the accessories of traditional chiefdom like the leopard-skin hat 
and the carved ebony walking stick14. He created the feeling 
that a better economic future was waiting just around the cor-
ner, even if a lot of money was spent and lost on the so-called 
“white elephants”: extremely expensive large-scale prestige pro-
jects that never functioned as planned or brought any benefits 
to the ordinary citizen15. But his economic stabilisation pro-
gramme managed to bring inflation under control, and import 
and export taxes were introduced. By 1968, the previously high 
inflation had fallen to 2.5%, while growth rates had increased 
to 8%. Price stability and wage increases were felt positively, and 
growth continued to be significant during the early 1970s16.
The main instrument for Mobutu to exercise his rule be-
came the political party he had founded in 1967, the MPR 
(Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution), which soon became the 
14 D. Van Reybrouck, Congo. The epic history of  a people, New York, Harper Collins, 
2014, p. 341.
15 Including the Inga-Shaba power line, the Makulu steel mill and the Tenge-
Fungurume copper mines.
16 G. Hesselbein, The rise and decline of  the Congolese state. An analytical nar-
rative on state-making, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 21, 
November 2007, p. 25. 
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only party allowed in Congo. The MPR became the engine of 
the patrimonial system Mobutu set up to manage the extensive 
patronage networks which covered all areas of public life, and 
corruption was the fuel to keep it running. But in the mid-
1970s the machinery started to sputter because copper prices 
collapsed and oil prices skyrocketed. Meanwhile, the debt bur-
den rose dramatically because of the prestige projects built by 
foreign companies and equipped with the most sophisticated 
materials and technology. They were conceived as beacons for 
Zaire’s triumphant entry into modernity but in practice turned 
out to be total disasters because the economic output never 
came close to expectations.
For many people in Africa and beyond, Mobutu represented 
a new type of African leadership: successful, flamboyant, auto-
cratic, with a leadership rooted in African tradition and steeped 
in local symbols. Mobutu increased the personality cult around 
his regime and invested in an international status as one of the 
inspiring personalities in what was then known as the Third 
World. In 1971, he tried to give his reign its own ideological 
content through zaïrisation, an authenticity campaign which 
was meant to be a kind of cultural upgrading of African pre-co-
lonial identity as an attractive alternative to African socialism. 
Congo became Zaïre, many cities and even the citizens were giv-
en new names, supposedly rooted in local history. But the main, 
and dramatic impact of the zaïrisation campaign was econom-
ic: the expropriation of European-owned industries and other 
enterprises was to become economic suicide for Mobutism in 
the medium term, because the means of production were dis-
tributed among the elite of the regime, often people without 
the vision, competence or will to manage in a responsible or 
sustainable way what had been entrusted to them17. By the time 
Mobutu organised a high mass to celebrate his access to the 
Pan-African pantheon by hosting the “rumble in the jungle”, 
the fight for the heavyweight boxing championship between 
17 K. Berwouts (2017), p. 13.
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Muhammad Ali and George Forman in Kinshasa in October 
1974, greed and incompetence had already destroyed most of 
Zaire’s economy18. By the end of the 1970s, former architect 
of Mobutism Etienne Tshisekedi and other prominent mem-
bers of Mobutu’s MPR founded an opposition party, the UDPS 
which continued to grow in the eighties and nineties.
Very soon mismanagement had assumed such endemic pro-
portions that Congo-watchers had to create the word kleptoc-
racy and started to define the process as “self-cannibalisation of 
the Congolese state”19, the dismantling of the state because its 
assets were eaten by its agents. Beyond this turning point, the 
second half of Mobutu’s reign has been presented by scholars as 
a classic example of state failure, with its often deadly cocktail of 
violence, dictatorship and corruption resulting in the complete 
failure of the economy and the total destruction of the state. 
Increasingly during the 1980s, Mobutu got stuck between the 
international creditors who started to realise that Zaire would 
never be able to repay its debt and growing protest within the 
population against the social impact of IMF-imposed austerity 
measures. The long decline of the bureaucratic state in favour 
of networks of patronage was triggered through economic de-
cay20. Mobutu was very much a product of the Cold War and 
his days were numbered when it finally came to an end in the 
late 1980s.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, 
Mobutu and many of his fellow presidents in Africa lost their 
relevance for the West. With the June 1990 speech of French 
President François Mitterand during the Summit of the French-
speaking countries in La Baule as an important milestone, 
Western countries pressurised their African allies to democ-
ratise and respect human rights. In several African countries, 
18 M. Deibert, The Democratic Republic of  Congo. Between hope and despair, London, 
Zed Books, 2014, pp. 31-34.
19 R. Rotberg, State failure and state weakness in a time of  terror, Washington DC, 
Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
20 G. Hesselbein (2007), pp. 36-37.
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the result was an accelerated democratisation process which in 
some cases led to the implosion of the state. In Central Africa, 
complex regional dynamics made local cleavages and national 
conflicts spill over national borders. Each country in the region 
has a complex internal situation and a violent recent history, 
where local contradictions polarised and entangled with those 
of neighbouring countries. Following the end of the Cold War 
and throughout the 1990s these regional dynamics developed 
into an avalanche of military conflicts, massive killings and 
far-reaching destruction. The DRC’s natural resource wealth 
has been an important factor in fuelling conflict as warring fac-
tions competed for control of parallel networks engaged in the 
illegal flow of resources from the DRC onto international mar-
kets. The result was a collapsed state, a crisis of impunity and, 
most of all, profoundly victimised populations.
Laurent-Désiré Kabila: The Hour of the Rebels
After the genocide in Rwanda (April - July 1994), a massive ex-
odus of Hutu refugees fled to neighbouring countries, includ-
ing two million to the Zairean Kivu provinces. Most of them 
ended up in huge refugee camps, which became a base for hit-
and-run actions to destabilise the new RPF (Rwanda Patriotic 
Front) regime in Kigali. In October 1996, Rwanda, with the 
support of Uganda, invaded eastern Zaire to stop these infiltra-
tions. To give their campaign a local façade, the Rwandans and 
Ugandans handpicked an old Zairean rebel, Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila, as one of the leaders of a new coalition against Mobutu, 
the AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération 
du Congo-Zaïre). In the first months of the rebellion, Kabila’s 
PRP (People’s Revolutionary Party) managed to impose itself 
upon the three other, even smaller members of the coalition. 
At independence, Kabila, born in 1939, was a young politi-
cian from northern Katanga’s Luba-speaking community (the 
Balubakat) who had supported Lumumba’s regime. He was a 
rebel leader in the sixties and the seventies, and was a footnote 
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in the country’s history as the only insurgent of his generation 
who was never defeated or bought off by Mobutu. From the 
late 1970s, his interests seemed to shift away from his political 
struggle and he acquired considerable wealth through gold and 
timber trade on Lake Tanganyika and real estate in Tanzania. 
Kabila’s rebellion was supported by a broad range of African 
countries and the insurrection could be read as an attempt 
by a new generation of African leaders to get rid of Mobutu’s 
reign. They saw it as a classical neo-colonial dictatorship which 
had become an anachronism of an evaporated state led by a 
moribund leader. As such, two years after Nelson Mandela’s in-
stallation as the first post-apartheid President of South Africa, 
Kabila’s rapidly advancing conquest was considered by a part 
of Western public and political opinion as a second liberation 
struggle of Congo21. The man himself was, at least for a while, 
seen as part of the new leaders of the “African Renaissance”, like 
Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Ethiopia’s 
Meles Zenawi or Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki. Now that the Cold 
War and apartheid had disappeared, the broader international 
community saw a momentum for such an African Renaissance 
without Mobutu’s Zaire22.
It took the rebels and their allies seven months to kick out 
Mobutu. Terminally ill, he left Zaire, and on 17 May 1997 the 
AFDL soldiers walked into Kinshasa. Kabila, who in all these 
months never had come anywhere close to a frontline, arrived 
in the capital on 20 May and swore in as President on 29 May. 
Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo again. 
On 7 September the man who had sworn that he would never 
be referred to as “the ex-President of Zaire” died in exile in 
Morocco23.
21 P. Roessler and H. Verhoeven, Why comrades go to war: liberation politics and the 
outbreak of  Africa’s deadliest conflict, London, Hurst & Co, 2016.
22 G. Prunier, From genocide to continental war. The ‘Congolese’ conflict and the crisis of  
contemporary Africa, London, Hurst & Company, 2009, pp. 113-149.
23 K. Berwouts (2017), p. 17.
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The new President developed a policy very much in line with 
his Maoist antecedents, with a focus on “democracy without 
parties” through a grassroots structure of popular people’s com-
mittees, a centrally managed state economy, the development 
of the rural areas and a firm rejection of Western influence. 
Laurent Kabila sought closer cooperation with countries like 
Libya, China, Zimbabwe and North Korea24. The people of 
Congo were very relieved with the departure of Mobutu’s ruling 
class and enthusiastic about Mzee’s25 announcement of radical 
change, but President Kabila was unable to hold on to this mo-
mentum for more than a few months. He could not materialise 
Congo’s renaissance, develop a vision or deploy a plan to re-
habilitate the state, did not succeed in channelling the initial 
enthusiasm and never connected to other forces in society, such 
as the militant civil society or the lively scene of opposition par-
ties against Mobutu, still spearheaded by Étienne Tshisekedi. 
He failed to respond to the huge expectations of the Congolese.
Eventually, Kabila turned out to be what Prunier has called 
“a political Rip van Winkle whose conspiratorial political style 
had been frozen at some point back in the 1960s and who still 
lived in a world seen strategically as a deadly struggle against im-
perialism and tactically as a mixture of conspiracies and infor-
mal economics”26. His government was a medley of people with 
different backgrounds, half of them from the diaspora, some 
technocrats and some ideologues, some labelled as progressive 
and others as conservative, some experienced and others new, 
but all of them overshadowed by the overwhelming personality 
of Mzee, who “seemed to think that pitting these various men 
(and groups they represented) against each other would enable 
him to remain in full control of what one hesitates to call the 
24 E. Kennes, “Laurent-Désiré Kabila, of  de schaduwzijde van de Congolese 
geschiedenis”, Mo, April 2000.
25 Laurent-Désiré Kabila was often refered to as “Mzee”, a very respectful Swahili 
term meaning “old man”.
26 G. Prunier (2009), p. 149.
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‘state apparatus’”27. He governed the country in a way not very 
different from how the “liberated zones” were governed at the 
time of his first rebellion28.
Parallel to the disappearing belief (in Congo and interna-
tionally) in Kabila’s capacity to put the country back on track 
and embody a new order of peace and stability, relations be-
tween the regime and its most important partner, Rwanda, 
started to sour and eventually collapsed. This happened in part 
because Congolese public opinion saw that the role of Rwanda 
after its overwhelming contribution to the military operations 
against Mobutu did not decrease, and that Rwandan officials 
occupied strategic positions in the Congolese government and 
army. Many concluded that Kabila was not much more than 
the puppet of his ally. On 27 July 1998, seventeen months after 
Mobutu’s fall, Kabila ordered all Rwandan and Ugandan troops 
to leave the country29. One week later, both countries started 
a new military campaign with the objective to replace Laurent 
Kabila as soon as possible.
This triggered an avalanche of violence which was soon la-
belled “The Great African War” because, in addition to a high 
number of Congolese and neighbouring countries’ nonstate 
armed groups on the ground in eastern Congo, the regular ar-
mies of nine African countries got involved in the conflict. This 
not only caused massive destruction and tremendous human 
suffering, it accelerated two devastating processes: from a cul-
ture of violence towards total impunity, and from an informal 
towards a militarised economy30. At some point during the war, 
the systematic plundering of Congo’s natural resources became 
an objective in itself for all belligerent parties.
27 Ibid., p.151.
28 Between 1967 and 1988, Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s PRP controlled a small zone 
in the mountainous area around Fizi-Baraka.
29 F. Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996-2006, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 157-158.
30 K. Berwouts (2017).
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This second war created the opportunity for Kabila to take 
up his legitimacy as a fighter and a rebel leader, but it pushed 
him in even greater isolation, since he was not able to maintain 
himself on the international chessboard and was rapidly seen as 
the main obstacle to diplomatic initiatives to end the violence. 
On 16 January 2001, he was shot and killed in his presiden-
tial palace under circumstances which, nearly two decades later, 
still are not clear.
Joseph Kabila: Old-School Warlordism 
in Times of Globalisation
On 26 January 2001, Joseph Kabila, not yet thirty years old, 
took the oath as the new President of Congo as successor to 
his father. He became President of a war-torn country, with 
millions of people dying and devastated local economies, infra-
structure and social cohesion, and with an extremely complex 
connection between conflict at grassroots level and conflicts 
with provincial, national and regional dimensions.
The young President was not only timid and politically inex-
perienced, he was barely known even in his own country. Many 
local and international observers considered him a compromise 
figure put in place to give his father’s regime, after Mzee’s unex-
pected death, the time to decide which direction to take31. But 
in the first months of his presidency, he replaced the hawks of 
his father’s inner circle with technocrats and people with a civil 
society background, and he managed to put the peace agree-
ment, signed in 1999 but never implemented, back on track32. 
This led to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the withdraw-
al of the foreign troops in 2002, a difficult transition (2003-
2006) with the legendary 1+4 government33, and eventually 
31 G. Prunier (2009), pp. 249-254.
32 F. Reyntjens (2009), pp. 223-226.
33 30 June 2003 was the day the transition started, as a result of  the negotia-
tions since the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The country was governed by a large 
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the historical elections of 2006, which he won with Jean-Pierre 
Bemba as his main challenger. Étienne Tshisekedi’s UDPS boy-
cotted the elections.   
Joseph Kabila, who enjoyed support in the provinces of 
Katanga (where his father was born), Maniema (where his 
mother was born) and South Kivu (where he was born him-
self ), owed his electoral victory to his popularity in the east of 
the country, where Swahili is the vehicular language and where 
the war had raged for a decade. For the people in the affected 
areas, he was the man who had managed to put an end to the 
hostilities and to the presence of foreign troops in Kivu. His 
electoral campaign had focused on “les cinq chantiers”, the five 
construction sites, areas where his presidency would make the 
difference. Through better access to health care, education, wa-
ter, electricity and work, the life of the simple Congolese citizen 
would look completely different by the end of his first term.
The 2006 victory boosted his confidence and his ego. He was 
no longer the son of the murdered arch-rebel who was thrown 
into the presidency by the tides of history and his mighty allies, 
nor the primus inter pares of an unworkable transitional gov-
ernment. He had won the first more or less free elections since 
time immemorial. However, not much progress could be seen 
on the ground. The government led by Prime Minister Antoine 
Gizenga (2006-2008) and later Adolphe Muzito (2008-2012) 
never managed to create the impression that it would go in an 
efficient operational modus any time soon, mainly because the 
old demon of corruption continued to rule the system. The in-
security in the east persisted. Although the open war had come 
to an official end in 2002, the low-intensity conflicts in the 
eastern provinces continued to expose the civilian populations 
to the gravest violations of human rights. Nevertheless, Kabila’s 
position was strengthened when he brought in a new and 
strong partner by signing an important cooperation contract 
coalition government, led by President Kabila and four Vice Presidents. The 
government was referred to as “1+4”.
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with China. During this period, the Congolese franc remained 
quite stable. In 2009, GNP per capita was $200, much higher 
than the $80 of 2000, but far under the $450 of 196034.
However, the most important evolution took place in the 
wings of power. The way of governing and decision mak-
ing changed. The semi-presidential system set out in the 
Constitution was steadily replaced by a more presidential sys-
tem. More importantly, the political inner circle that surround-
ed Kabila since the beginning of the transition, and that had 
made the major decisions with him, started to disintegrate in 
the years after the elections. Already in 2007, his adviser Samba 
Kaputo died. His close collaborator, former spokesperson and 
then Speaker of Parliament Vital Kamerhe broke with Kabila 
in 2009 and became an opposition leader in 2010. In the same 
year, police chief John Numbi was suspended from office for 
his involvement in the assassination of human rights pioneer 
Floribert Chebeya. In February 2012, three months after the 
2011 elections, Kabila’s own Rasputin, the organiser of the 
system and the man with the keys to the cash box, Augustin 
Katumba Mwanke, died in a plane crash. 
Kabila won his second term in elections that had not 
been held to consolidate democracy but to consolidate pow-
er. Despite the fact that the elections had been anything but 
free and fair, and the refusal of his main challenger Étienne 
Tshisekedi to acknowledge defeat, Kabila remained strongly in 
office but he had lost the people who had coached him for a 
decade. Since then, insiders of the regime called him a “ship 
without a compass” whom nobody dared to contradict. After 
the death of Katumba Mwanke, Kabila increasingly fell back 
on himself and a handful of family members35.
34 D. Van Reybrouck (2014), pp. 509-510.
35 This and some other quotes in this chapter come from confidential inter-
views with key players on Congo’s political scene, including people working in 
the heart of  decision-making. For obvious reasons, it is not possible to mention 
their names.
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From 2014 onwards, the political class and public opinion in 
general were obsessed by the question of whether Kabila would 
be prepared to leave office after his second and constitutionally 
last term. Or would he attempt to create the conditions for 
extending his presidency beyond its constitutional limit? The 
regime envisaged options to revise the constitution, but did not 
find the necessary political support to achieve that aim36. An 
attempt to amend the electoral law so that Kabila could remain 
in office for at least three more years was blocked by demonstra-
tions and street violence37. The only strategy that did work for 
some time was to simply not organise elections. The uncertain-
ties about the plans of the President on the political future of 
the country after 2016 had a devastating impact on governance 
within the regime, described by someone inside the system as “a 
Titanic feeling”: the panic that arises when you know that you 
will sink. The fin de régime atmosphere encouraged many with-
in the regime to grab as much as possible while the opportunity 
was still there38.
Joseph Kabila did not manage to reinvent the Congolese 
state. Neither the transition nor the elections brought peace 
back to eastern Congo. After the withdrawal of foreign troops 
at the end of 2002, armed violence remained a part of everyday 
life, committed by groups whose origins, structure, vision (if 
any) and objectives were very locally rooted, but whose impact 
remained global by the fact that they were one of the factors 
impeding the renaissance of the Congolese state and the return 
of the rule of law. 
Like his predecessors, Joseph Kabila governed through a pat-
rimonial system, relying on “an extremely narrow circle of trust-
ed individuals and a network of international alliances to keep 
itself at the top of those scrambling for control over Congo. It 
is a power structure that has built a patronage system rather 
than a political base on which it can draw. It has not created 
36 K. Berwouts (2017), p. 147.
37 Ibid., pp.148-149.
38 Ibid., p. 147.
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institutional structures that will resolve Congo’s underlying is-
sues”39. As a result, the Congolese state remained very weak. 
Many observers considered this a deliberate choice of its rulers, 
because the weakness of the state offered the best opportunities 
for illegal accumulation. 
After two elections, Congo formally had state institutions 
and a system of governance very similar to those in the West, 
with an elected President, a legislature, a government, a con-
stitution, an army and an administration. All were framed in 
terms of democracy and development, which is a condition for 
a regime to be accepted at international negotiation tables. But 
underneath the surface, patrimonial and predatory governance 
continued to be the norm. Clientelism had shaped the democ-
ratisation process in its own image much more than democracy 
had managed to reign in the logic and rigour of clientelism. 
Indeed public assets continued to be rerouted to those in power 
who desperately needed them to retain their clients40.
After a short passage in the hands of his father, Kabila inher-
ited the state of Mobutu’s Zaire where governance had been so 
bad that the world had to invent the word kleptocracy for it. 
One of the key questions had been: will he succeed in improv-
ing that legendary bad governance? Eighteen years later, the 
conclusion is that he did not. Many observers suggest he didn’t 
even try. Joseph Kabila’s government remained a polished ver-
sion of his father’s41. He sophisticated the system and adapted 
it smoothly to the globalised world order where new and much 
more diverse economic key players set the rules. But the main 
reason for the anger and frustration of people in Congo’s villag-
es and suburbs is that, after Mobutu’s death and despite all the 
talk of democracy, cinq chantiers and the Third Republic, their 
daily living conditions have deteriorated rather than improved.
39 M. Deibert (2014), p. 202.
40 G. Prunier (2009), pp. 333-338.
41 M. Deibert (2014), p. 202.
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Félix Tshisekedi and the Chances for a New Dawn
We have seen earlier that the new regime started under extreme-
ly adverse circumstances, with Kabila remaining at the centre 
of the parallel kleptocratic networks which have governed the 
country since Mobutu’s days. The challenges facing the DRC 
are daunting, and the observations made by the International 
Crisis Group in 2007, after Joseph Kabila was first elected, 
remain relevant today: “To rebuild the state and augment its 
authority, the government must strengthen democracy or risk 
being paralysed by recurrent unrest, structural impotence and 
renewed instability in ever more parts of the country. Only a 
change of governance can provide the legitimacy and capacity 
to raise the revenues necessary to distribute peace dividends to 
all sectors of society”42. 
For decades, the DRC has ceased to be an empirical state. 
And yet, reconstructing a polity which can perform minimal 
state functions is an essential condition for both national devel-
opment and regional stability. In light of the extent of state de-
cay, the sheer size of the country, the degree of fragmentation, 
and indeed the nature of the political leadership and of the po-
litical culture more generally, this is a colossal task. Obviously, 
a collapsed state cannot be entirely reconstructed overnight. 
The cost will be immense and the effort will take many years. 
Therefore, putting Humpty Dumpty together again will have 
to happen sequentially, starting with the main functions of 
sovereignty. 
First, the state must regain control over its territory and 
re-establish links with its population. Territorial control means 
physical control, together with the presence of an effective ad-
ministration. Physical control requires the rebuilding of a truly 
national army and police force. The Congolese military mirrors 
the failed state. The Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 
42 International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report no. 
128, Kinshasa-Brussels, 5 July 2007.
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du Congo (FARDC) often behave like a militia and perpetuate 
the practices of their predecessors: violence against civilians, 
racketeering and plunder. They are a source of insecurity rather 
than of security. Realising that security sector reform was fail-
ing, Amnesty International warned over ten years ago that it is 
a precondition for peace and stability43. Physical control also 
requires overseeing borders, including effective customs and 
immigration services both at land/river crossings and at air-
ports and airstrips. Beyond physical security, territorial control 
means creating an effective administration as a way of establish-
ing a link between the state and its citizens, a link that is now 
very weak, even in the capital city Kinshasa.
Second, the state must simultaneously recover its funding 
capacity. The DRC is often depicted as a “geological scandal” 
and as a potentially rich country that has the means of funding 
its own development. This is true, but one does not buy much 
with “potential”. Therefore, the fiscal capacity of the state must 
be rebuilt, with revenues collected and spent in a transparent, 
efficient and honest fashion, and resources (mines, forests, hy-
dro-power and agriculture) harnessed as public goods. This pre-
supposes that the criminalisation and privatisation of the state 
and the economy come to an end, again a matter of state ca-
pacity. A vicious circle needs to be broken: while the “de-priva-
tisation” of natural resources will prove an essential element of 
state reconstruction, only a reconstructed state can garner these 
assets as public goods.
A third priority is legal security and the rule of law, essen-
tial not only for the protection of the Congolese people’s fun-
damental rights and for the fight against impunity, but also 
because considerable domestic and international investments 
will be needed for Congo’s reconstruction. However, venture 
capital will be attracted only if, for instance, contracts are hon-
oured, and, when they are not, if contract parties can rely on 
43 Amnesty International, DRC: Stability threatened as country fails to reform 
army, London, 25 January 2007.
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a well-functioning, predictable and honest judicial system to 
offer relief. In a similar vein, entrepreneurs will need a reliable 
judiciary in their dealings with the state, e.g. in the areas of 
tenders, taxation and investment incentives.
Finally, if the regime is to gain the legitimacy its predecessors 
have lacked, credible democratic institutions need to be built. 
For this, ensuring the integrity of electoral processes and sub-
stantive popular representation will prove essential, also in light 
of the aspirations consistently expressed by Congolese citizens.
While the rebuilding of state capacity is crucial, a number 
of other lessons can be learned. One is that impunity and in-
ternational tolerance of aggressive and criminal behaviour can 
only encourage the perpetrators. They test the limits of that 
tolerance, and – when realising there are none – they cross one 
Rubicon after the other. They must be reined in at an early 
stage. Second, local and regional engineers of violence are con-
stantly engaged in a rational calculation of costs and benefits, 
knowing that war, instability and state decay are more prof-
itable than peace, stability and state reconstruction. In these 
conditions the only way to come to terms with the spoilers is to 
make conflict more expensive and peace more attractive. Third, 
lessons one and two can only be applied if the so-called in-
ternational community is minimally united and coherent. The 
opposite has happened, and the consequences of division have 
been disastrous for millions of people in the Great Lakes region. 
Recently, the way in which Africa and the West have accepted 
the electoral robbery of December 2018 for the sake of short-
term stability at the expense of structural change may have dire 
consequences in the longer term. Fourth, the question is how 
far the residual legacy of the Mobutist state, continued under 
the Kabilas, will remain an obstacle to the promotion of politi-
cal stability and development. 
It remains to be seen how Tshisekedi will face these many 
and difficult challenges in the extremely adverse and constrain-
ing environment described earlier. His political experience is 
limited, although he is seconded by his chief of cabinet Vital 
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Kamerhe who is an astute veteran of Congolese politics. A for-
mer ally of Kabila, he knows the inner workings of the system 
very well. Tshisekedi spent most of his adult life in Belgium, 
where he worked in occasional jobs and was active in the UDPS 
branch. After having been the party’s national secretary for in-
ternational relations from 2008 to 2016 and deputy secretary 
general from 2016 to 2018, he became chairman in 2018, a year 
after his father Étienne’s death. Despite, or perhaps because of, 
his lack of intimate knowledge of Congolese political culture, 
barely one month after his inauguration, Tshisekedi published 
a “programme of urgency” for the first 100 days of his tenure44. 
This document contains rather technical interventions in areas 
such as roads, health, education, housing, energy, labour, trans-
port and agriculture. The amount needed for the initial phase is 
estimated at 304 million USD, money that is to come from the 
treasury, the road maintenance fund (Fond national d’entretien 
routier, FONER) and the industrial promotion fund (Fonds de 
Promotion de l’Industrie, FPI). It is unclear how all this could 
be implemented in just three months. However, the document 
also includes a one page outline of crucial “sectoral actions” in 
the areas of justice (release of political prisoners), security (dis-
armament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups), 
politics (return of exiled opponents), fight against corruption 
(through the justice system and other structures), good govern-
ance (code of institutional ethics), diplomacy (political cooper-
ation based on openness and respects for national sovereignty) 
and mines (creation of a focal point in the president’s office). 
While this ambitious project will obviously take years to im-
plement, this list does address many of the ills of Congolese 
politics. If steps can be made towards the realisation of these 
sectoral actions, perspectives of state reconstruction could be-
come more real than they have been during decades of decay.
44 République démocratique du Congo, Présidence de la République, “Programme 
d’urgence pour les 100 premiers jours du chef  de l’Etat”, 27 February 2019 (last 
retrieved on 14 April 2019).
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It is unclear whether Tshisekedi will be able to pursue that 
path. Article 166 of the constitution provides that the two 
Houses of Parliament, assembled in a joint session, can decide 
to prosecute the president by a two-thirds majority. The FCC 
have the majority needed to put this provision in practice in 
case of a political stalemate or even as blackmail if Tshisekedi 
embarks on policies, e.g. in the area of fighting corruption, 
seen by FCC leaders as threatening their privileges. On the 
other side, if he doesn’t deliver on his promises, Tshisekedi may 
rapidly lose the support of his UDPS constituency and the 
Congolese population more generally. At the regional level, the 
skirmishes between Rwanda and Uganda and between Rwanda 
and Burundi, just across Congo’s porous borders, could render 
efforts to restore state authority in the east of the country even 
more difficult than it is today.
Conclusion
The challenges the new President is facing are daunting and the 
political environment in which he will function is very con-
straining. Rebuilding the state almost from scratch, harnessing 
the country’s assets, tackling a deeply corrupt political culture, 
meeting the expectations of the Congolese people: all this will 
require considerable political skills. At the time of writing, it 
is impossible to predict whether Tshisekedi will be able to de-
liver on his promises, particularly in the context of a political 
dispensation in which those intent on maintaining the status 
quo retain considerable power. For both the development of the 
DRC and regional stability, this uphill struggle must succeed. 
For this to happen, Félix Tshisekedi will need all the support he 
can muster. 
6. iRwanda under Kagame: 
     Political Leadership and 
     Developmentalism
Frederick Golooba-Mutebi
Rwanda is among the most talked-about countries in sub-Sa-
haran Africa today in terms of the progress it has made on 
many fronts since the violence that engulfed it and the tragedy 
that struck it in the early 1990s. Its President, Paul Kagame, 
is as talked-about and admired as he is controversial outside 
Rwanda, and popular as well as revered inside the country. This 
chapter examines the trajectory that the country has followed 
since the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and the role Kagame 
has played in its evolution. Of key interest are the strategies 
Rwanda adopted and the results it has achieved, and whether 
these qualify it for the label “developmental state”. 
The “New” Rwanda: A Star Is Born – or Not?
Had Rwanda been a human being it would be someone who 
literally died and came back from the dead. At the end of the 
civil war and the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, it had, 
for all intents and purposes, been destroyed, the social fabric 
of Rwandan society torn to shreds. Hardly anyone, even those 
who had won the war, expected the country to recover, let alone 
prosper as fast as it has done. Few believed it would recover at 
all. Nor did they believe that what they saw as an illegitimate 
power grab by an unpopular minority would last. Rwanda did 
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recover, however, courtesy in no small measure of the leader-
ship of, and firm steering by, its widely-acclaimed and maligned 
President, Paul Kagame. 
Under his leadership, the small east-central African nation 
has posted an economic growth rate averaging 7.5% between 
2008 and 2018 (with per capita income up by some 4.7% a 
year). Economic growth has been accompanied by equally im-
pressive social performance and achievements, including an in-
crease in life expectancy at birth from 48 years in 1980 to 67 in 
20161; a two-thirds drop in child mortality; a 77% reduction 
in maternal mortality between 2000 and 20132; near-univer-
sal primary school enrolment; a decline in poverty rates from 
77.2% in 2000 to 55.5% in 20163; and a health insurance 
coverage reaching over 90%4. In addition, Rwanda boasts the 
highest percentage of women parliamentarians in the world, at 
64%, and is the second easiest country in Africa to do business 
in, behind Mauritius5. 
In spite of the country’s many achievements, however, 
Kagame remains the subject of far more debate and controversy 
than any other leader in the Great Lakes region of East and 
Central Africa. There are several specific points of controversy, 
but he is primarily accused of authoritarianism, with Rwanda 
designated a dictatorship. The country is evidently not home to 
competitive multi-party politics, let alone a liberal democracy. 
It thus does not have the kind of official opposition which in 
democracies is meant to hold the ruling party in check. There 
1 “Rwanda - Life expectancy at birth”, Countryeconomy.com, (last retrieved on 
29 May 2019).
2 H. Worley, “Rwanda’s Success In Improving Maternal Health”, PRB, 24 
February 2015, (last retrieved on 29 May 2019).
3 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of  population), World 
Bank, World Development Indicators, (last retrieved on 11 June 2019).
4 “Progress towards Universal Health Coverage”, Rwanda, Social Protection in 
Action: Building Social Protection Floors, International Labour Office, April 
2016, (last retrieved on 29 May 2019).
5 “Rwanda”, World Bank, DOINGBUSINESS Measuring Business Regulations 
(last retrieved on 29 May 2019).
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are no public displays of dissent: no demonstrations or oth-
er forms of mass action. Kagame is also criticised for violating 
human rights, jailing opponents and critics, and forcing others 
to flee into exile – even killing some. Elsewhere he is said to 
preside over a power monopoly by the minority Tutsi group, 
in the same way previous leaders presided over power monop-
oly by Hutus6. A related criticism focuses on his longevity in 
power. According to detractors, Kagame is power-hungry and 
has refused to step down in much the same way as a number 
of other African leaders7. Then there is lack of freedom of the 
press, speech and expression. Here the government of Rwanda 
and sometimes Kagame himself are accused of intolerance of 
criticism and castigated for imprisoning, exiling and killing 
journalists8.
There are many things a long-term observer of post-geno-
cide Rwanda could say about these negative assessments. Here 
I restrict myself to two broad comments. One is that such re-
proaches have shaped the way large numbers of people across 
the world perceive Rwanda and Kagame. The other is that, even 
as to varying degrees several of the criticisms contain elements 
of truth, in general terms they paint an inaccurate picture of the 
country and its President. 
There was a time when some of the criticism levelled at 
post-genocide Rwanda would have been largely accurate. That 
was when Rwanda was still at war, when the government was 
battling insurgents operating inside the country and from out-
side its borders, in the early stages of its efforts to establish and 
6 See, for example, F. Reyntjens, Political Governance in Rwanda, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. On power monopoly under previous regimes, 
see S. Strauss, The Order of  Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda, Ithaca & 
London, Cornell University Press, 2006.
7 T. Mhaka, 2018. “Like Mafia Dons, African Leaders Never Leave Office 
Voluntarily or Peacefully”, The Huffington Post, 15 May 2018 (last retrieved on 18 
June 2019). Also, P.A., 2015. ‘Rwanda’s Leader Must Step Down”, The New York 
Times, 17 December 2015 (last retrieved on 18 June 2019). 
8 See, for example, A. Sundaram, Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship, 
London & New York, Bloomsbury Paperbacks, 2017.
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consolidate its authority and power. During that time, pacifi-
cation, stabilisation and re-establishment of security across the 
country’s entire territory were far higher priorities than securing 
and guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms and creating 
or opening up political space for dissent or competition among 
different groups vying for power9. Also, there were grounds for 
arguing that, for a country emerging from a genocide and thirty 
years during which successive governments systematically di-
vided the population10, allowing freedoms – such as media free-
dom and freedom of speech – without limits would have en-
dangered efforts for reconciliation and national unity. Indeed, 
the more the government has consolidated its power, the more 
security has been established, and the more the country has 
stabilised, the more space has been opened up for greater – if 
not completely unrestrained – exercise of various rights and 
freedoms, including freedom for individuals and groups to or-
ganise politically. 
This gradual opening up can be seen in the government’s 
decision to stop regulating the media and to leave that responsi-
bility to the media fraternity itself via a semi-autonomous body, 
the Media High Council (MHC)11. In addition, it can be seen 
in the tremendous growth in the number of private media out-
lets, especially radio and television networks which enjoy far 
higher consumption internally than print or online media12. 
There is still some degree of self-censorship linked to Rwanda’s 
violent history and the role media have played in it13, as well 
9 See, for example, Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest, London, Africa Rights, 
1998.
10 G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis. History of  a Genocide, London, Hurst & Company, 
1998.
11 See: “Promoting Freedom, Responsability And Professionalism of  the Media”, 
Media High Council (MHC).
12 There are 12 television stations, only one of  which is state controlled, more 
than 20 radio stations, only a handful of  which, all affiliates of  the government’s 
Rwanda Broadcasting Agency (RBA), are state-controlled, and more than 50 
print and online publications. 
13 See, for example, A. Thomson, The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, London & 
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as to the government maintaining a strong line against hate 
speech and divisionism14. Nonetheless, electronic media outlets 
routinely hold talk shows on a wide range of subjects. Invited 
panellists, including those that style themselves “opposition” 
or that are not supporters of the government or the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), speak freely as do members of the public 
who call in or send comments via social media. 
In politics, Kigali has very exacting rules for registering po-
litical parties and for regulating their activities. Rwanda is not a 
democracy in the conventional sense. Inter-party competition 
is restricted by legislation. Campaigning for office is limited to 
short periods of time. As a result of an “elite pact” arrived at via 
inter-party negotiations during and after the war and genocide, 
under which the national constitution guarantees formal pow-
er-sharing, the official approach to politics is to prioritise con-
sensus-building over winner-takes-all adversarial contestation15.
Political groups that seek to operate outside this pact, such 
as the Europe-based FDU-Inkingi, which the government per-
ceives as sectarian and promoting a genocidal ideology, have 
so far not been able to register and operate in the country. 
However, there are 11 recognised political parties. All of them 
are members of the National Consultative Forum of Political 
Organisations (NFPO). Membership used to be mandatory 
but is now voluntary. Each political party, regardless of size, is 
represented by four members, of whom two must be women. It 
is within the NFPO that inter-party consensus-building on po-
tentially divisive issues happens. This is why it is rare for politi-
cal disagreements among political parties to spill into the public 
domain. In principle, all decisions are arrived at on the basis of 
Ann Arbor, Pluto Press. 2007.
14 See, for instance, local human rights lawyer, Thierry Gatete’s blog: “For the 
respect of  mankind: My reaction to the indefinite closure of  BBC-Kinyarwanda 
service”, Gatete Views (last retrieved on 18 June 2019). 
15 F. Golooba-Mutebi and D. Booth, Bilateral Cooperation and Local Power Dynamics: 
The Case of  Rwanda, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Reports and Studies, 
2013 (last retrieved on 18 June 2019). 
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complete consensus. The NFPO is funded by the state, and in 
turn finances activities such as capacity-building for individual 
political parties without discrimination16. 
The arrest of some prominent politicians, particularly 
Victoire Umuhoza Ingabire and Diane Rwigara, coincided with 
their declarations that they intended to stand for the presiden-
cy against Kagame. While the media portrayed these cases as 
straightforward evidence of political persecution, they ignored 
or paid scant attention to information suggesting that the in-
dividuals concerned combined legitimate political ambitions 
with activities that provided the police with justification for 
detaining and prosecuting them17. 
Similarly, a number of people have left the country over the 
years proclaiming themselves political opponents of the gov-
ernment (though some had served in that government them-
selves at one point or another), and have sought political asy-
lum across the world. The claims that their lives were in danger 
because they had fallen out with Kagame have often been taken 
at face value by commentators, with no effort made to verify 
them. In a number of cases, however, it appears that those who 
flee do so for a wide range of reasons, some of them unrelated 
to politics18. At least two exiles, former intelligence chief Patrick 
Karegeya and Former Minister Seth Sendashonga, have been 
killed and the government accused of the murders. Needless 
16 National Consultative Forum of  Political Organizations, http://forumfp.org.
rw/index.php?id=2&-About-FPP-(last retrieved on 19 June 2019).
17 Interviews with investigators and law enforcement officers. See, also, A. 
Mukuralinda, Qui Manipule Qui? Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, des Pays Bas au Pays de 
Mille Collines, Marcinelle, Editions du CEP, 2017. Also, J. Busingye, “Impunity? 
Not in Rwanda, that’s why Diane Rwigara is behind bars”, The East African, 4 
September 2018 (last retrieved on 22 June 2019).
18 Several interviews with several officials, civilian and military (since 2007). For 
a typically critical media report that is uninformed – as shown by research in 
Rwanda about the victim’s career history - but categorical in its claims, see C. 
Du Plessis, “Shooting death of  Rwandan exile in Cape Town could be Pandor’s 
first big diplomatic test”, The Daily Maverick, 3 June 2019 (last retrieved on 18 
June 2019). 
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to say, these are extremely serious allegations. To provide a full 
picture of the political situation inside the country, however, 
one should also note that a number of people who once fled 
have returned and continue to return and to settle down again, 
some forging new careers in politics19. The media show limited 
interest in these cases, probably because they do not fit the es-
tablished narrative of people fleeing from persecution. 
Within the limits of the current system there are achieve-
ments that render Kigali’s political environment far more fa-
vourable to a future evolution into a fully-fledged democracy 
than those of neighbouring countries which are today regarded 
as practising more competitive multi-party politics. Rwanda’s 
election campaigns, for example, are without violence, verbal 
or physical, among candidates running for office as well as 
among their supporters. It is not common for voters’ names 
to be missed off the electoral register. All those who wish to 
vote are therefore able to vote on election day, something that 
is not always the case elsewhere. Late delivery or non-delivery 
of voting materials, both of which have often disenfranchised 
voters in some of Rwanda’s neighbours, are also not normally a 
problem. The efficiency with which voting materials are deliv-
ered ensures that voting starts on time, is orderly, and does not 
take place amidst heavy deployment of troops, police or mili-
tary. It also helps make sure that before polling stations close 
everybody who wants to vote has done so. Also, all competing 
candidates are by law accorded specified amounts of coverage 
by state media, and no political party or candidate for office has 
gone to court to contest the outcome of an election, arguably 
testifying to the high regard in which the National Electoral 
Commission is generally held. Rwanda is the only country in 
the Great Lakes region where citizens living outside its borders, 
19 Among prominent returnees are Dr. Frank Habineza, Member of  Parliament 
and President of  the Democratic Green Party of  Rwanda; Evode Uwizeyimana, 
Minister of  State for constitutional and legal affairs; and Pierre-Celestin 
Rwigema, former post-genocide Prime Minister and currently one of  Rwanda’s 
9 representatives to the East African Legislative Assembly. 
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anywhere in the world, are able to vote. Voting is voluntary, and 
both inside and outside the country voter turnout is very high, 
in many cases well over 90%20, suggesting that, among eligible 
voters, elections enjoy a high degree of legitimacy21.  
The criticisms levelled at the government, and at the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front and Kagame personally, ultimate-
ly seem to contain significant exaggerations. Both in-country 
observations and some non-mainstream publications suggest a 
more nuanced picture. Yet the power of established narratives is 
such that publications offering a different view do not draw as 
much attention as those that perpetuate the image of Rwanda 
as a country that has done well on the economic front but not 
in matters of governance22. Whatever one’s view, however, Paul 
Kagame’s centrality in Rwanda’s post-genocide evolution is be-
yond dispute. 
Who Is Paul Kagame?
Kagame was born in Rwanda, which he fled with his parents in 
1961 at the age of 4, ending up as a refugee in Uganda where 
he spent thirty years of his life. He left school early because he 
couldn’t raise the necessary fees to continue. As a young man, 
Rwanda and the plight of Rwandan refugees became a constant 
preoccupation, as did the yearning to one day return to live in 
20 C. Mwai, “Presidential Election: Over 96% voter turnout recorded”, The New 
Times, 6 August 2017, (last retrieved on 19 June 2019). 
21 For a fitting contrast among different countries in the Great Lakes region, see 
F. Golooba-Mutebi, 2017. “Make a point to enjoy and celebrate campaigns and 
elections”, The East African, 13 August 2017 (last retrieved on 17 June 2019). 
22 For alternative views, see, for example, J.-P. Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda. 
Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction, Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2019; P. Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation 
in Rwanda, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010; R. Johnson, “The 
Travesty of  Human Rights Watch on Rwanda”, 2013 (last retrieved on 18 June 
2019). Also, S. Gody Nshimiyimana, “Fabrications and distortions”, The Rwanda 
Focus, 12 January 2016 (last retrieved on 18 June 2019). 
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his homeland. In his early 20s he joined the National Resistance 
Army, a guerrilla outfit that brought Uganda’s President, Yoweri 
Museveni, to power in 1986. He was one of thousands of young 
Rwandan refugees who participated in Uganda’s five-year civ-
il war and eventually decided to fight their way back home23. 
Kagame led this war after the tragic death of the first rebel lead-
er, Major-General Fred Gisa Rwigema. 
Paul Kagame became President of Rwanda in 2000, when 
he was chosen by the RPF to replace his predecessor Pasteur 
Bizimungu. Until then he had been Vice-President and Minister 
of Defence. After the RPF seized power in 1994, the party lead-
ership and members – as well as other parties – had wanted him 
to be President and applied some pressure on him. He declined. 
He is said to have preferred to be in charge of security, the one 
domain in which he was most specialised and in which he felt 
he would be most useful. Also, it is understood that sections of 
the RPF leadership felt it inappropriate, given the circumstanc-
es – specifically the deep suspicion and fear with which the re-
turnees were viewed by the Hutu majority – for a Tutsi returnee 
to immediately occupy that position. They believed that a pe-
riod of “settling down” and confidence-building was necessary, 
and here the role of the Hutu political elite who had embraced 
the RPF’s ideology of non-sectarianism would be critical24. 
Both Gregoire Kayibanda’s First Republic (1962-1973) and 
Juvenal Habyarimana’s Second Republic (1973-1994) had 
spent the entire post-colonial period demonising the Tutsi 
minority and sowing fear in the minds of the majority Hutu 
that were the Tutsis to take power they would be persecuted, 
enslaved and dispossessed. It was therefore essential that the 
post-genocide government be constituted in ways that would 
23 For a comprehensive history, see: National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission, History of  Rwanda: From the beginning to the end of  the twentieth century. 
Kigali, NURC, 2016. For a detailed biography of  Paul Kagame, see S. Kinzer, 
A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It, Hobken, NJ, John 
Wiley and Sons, 2008.
24 Interviews with RPF veterans.
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reassure a potentially restive majority, not feed the fears planted 
in their minds during three decades of poisonous indoctrina-
tion25. However, Bizimungu’s performance had proved unsatis-
factory. Tensions within the RPF stemming from dissatisfaction 
with his performance eventually led to his resignation26.
Kagame, who was elected to the presidency by the National 
Assembly by 81 votes to 5, was no random choice. He had been 
among the founders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, an organ-
isation whose over-riding objective was to ensure that exiled 
Rwandans who wanted to return to the land of their ancestors 
could do so, and of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), its 
armed wing that was created to ensure that the return happened 
by force of arms if necessary. He had therefore been at the fore-
front of keeping alive the dream that one day those Rwandans 
who had been forced to live outside their country and who 
wanted to regain their rights as citizens would do so27. To un-
derstand the importance of the right to return, it is essential 
to recall that the Habyarimana government had made clear its 
position on the matter: Rwanda was full, and therefore had no 
land to accommodate the exiles. They had therefore been ad-
vised to seek citizenship in the countries where they lived, and 
promised support for their endeavours28.
Also, Kagame had proved his leadership talents and capabil-
ities during the civil war. At the time he took over leadership 
of the RPA it had virtually disintegrated owing to the shock, 
panic, and demoralisation that the death of its first leader, Fred 
Rwigema, had caused among the fighters only a day after they 
had invaded Rwanda from Uganda – namely, 2 October 199029. 
25 S. Strauss, The Order of  Genocide: Race, Power, and the War in Rwanda, Ithaca & 
London, Cornell University Press, 2006. Also, A. Wallis, Stepp’d in Blood: Akazu 
and the Architects of  the Rwandan Genocide Against the Tutsi, London, Zero books. 
2019.
26 J.-P. Kimonyo (2019). 
27 S. Kinzer (2008). 
28 A. Wallis (2019). 
29 J.-P. Kimonyo (2019), p. 85. 
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Kagame, abandoning a military course in the United States, 
headed to Rwanda, re-organised and rebuilt the RPA and led it 
to eventual victory against a much larger and better-equipped 
national army, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), and its 
French and Zairian allies30. He had again shown his capabilities 
when, as the first post-genocide Minister of Defence, he had 
guided the RPA’s successful tackling of the insecurity that had 
threatened to derail the new government when insurgents from 
inside the country and from across the border in Zaire, sup-
ported by external actors, mounted determined attacks31.   
All that said, just as it was by happenstance that he became 
leader of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) after the death of 
his predecessor, Kagame became President of Rwanda without 
actively seeking the position. In both instances he took over 
at a time when there was a great need for strong, capable and 
focused leadership. In the first instance, he had found the RPA 
in disarray and facing total defeat. In the second instance, by 
1999 a significant number of the RPF’s membership felt that 
their Movement had veered from the values on which it had 
been founded, of “sacrifice, selflessness, integrity, and service 
beyond the call of duty”32. Those values had enabled it to tri-
umph against a larger, better-equipped military force that en-
joyed the support of powerful external actors. 
As commander of the RPA he distinguished himself as a 
leader of exceptional talent and ability. As President of Rwanda, 
the vast majority of Rwandans and many outsiders, some albeit 
grudgingly, agree that he has done the same. Even allowing for 
weaknesses and failures of which there are many, the gains cited 
above leave no doubt about how well the country has done 
in terms of social and economic progress in the last two dec-
ades. What are the drivers behind them? What has Kagame’s 
role been? 
30 Interviews with numerous RPF and RPA veterans since 2007. 
31 Rakiya Omar…. Insurgency in the North….
32 Interview with a senior RPF cadre and war veteran, 3 January 2013. 
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Leadership, Politics and Stability in Rwanda 
under Kagame
The leader and the party
There is no doubt that Kagame towers over the rest of the coun-
try’s leadership. However, in their efforts to explain the coun-
try’s post-genocide evolution to the world, analysts and watch-
ers of Rwanda tend to focus too much on him. One effect of 
this is to disregard the very important fact that Kagame works 
within a framework set by the highly organised and effective 
political organisation, the RPF, of which he is the Chairman. 
When analysing Rwanda’s evolution since 1994 it is important 
to bear in mind one peculiarity of power distribution and man-
agement among and by the country’s political elite. 
There are countries in Africa where the political organisa-
tion or party in power was founded by the incumbent who 
recruited other people into it, and where, therefore, it is re-
garded as “his party”. Members and supporters pay allegiance 
to him. In some instances, where the “founding father”, as they 
tend to designate themselves, has died, such parties have then 
come under the leadership of those founders’ progeny. Kagame 
is not the founder of the RPF. The party is therefore not re-
garded as “Kagame’s party”. Members do not pay allegiance to 
the Chairman, but upon joining the party new members must 
swear an oath of allegiance to the organisation and familiar-
ise themselves with its very strict code of conduct, to which 
they must adhere at all times. Violating the code of conduct 
invites sanctions, regardless of the rank or status of the violator. 
The RPF works in very particular ways, and plays a pivotal role 
in governing Rwanda and providing the necessary leadership 
alongside its Chairman, the President.
Political leadership
To best appreciate the issue of leadership in Rwanda, it is im-
portant to revisit certain key features of the country’s current 
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political system. One is the restricted nature of political compe-
tition. Soon after the war the country’s post-genocide political 
elite agreed that unrestrained adversarial political competition, 
given what the country had just been through, risked derail-
ing the long-term collective effort to turn it away from its bad 
post-colonial history. As a result, in Rwanda there are limita-
tions on political competition. Political parties are subject to 
strict rules regulating their activities, including recruitment of 
members. Above all else, restrictions prohibit parties that vio-
late rules against sectarianism. This has meant that political par-
ties do not seek to grow their support bases on ethnic or even 
regional identity, as was the case before the genocide. 
The other essential feature of the present political set-up 
is the sharing of power and responsibility. The RPF formally 
shares power – and responsibility for ensuring that never again 
should the country descend into destructive conflict and an-
other genocide – with other legally registered political parties 
which obtain a certain share of the vote in parliamentary elec-
tions. These arrangements are often dismissed by critics as some 
kind of ruse by the RPF to co-opt and dominate potential op-
ponents. Given that the RPF is the largest, most organised and 
wealthiest party in the country, this is probably not far-fetched. 
However, over the last two decades and a half these arrange-
ments have contributed to preserving peace and stability in 
Rwanda. Peace and stability have in turn allowed the country’s 
collective leadership to concentrate on developing the coun-
try rather than incentivising political groups to focus on efforts 
to win power for themselves. Since winner-takes-all constitu-
tional arrangements arguably play a role in undermining polit-
ical stability and the quality of policy-making in a number of 
African countries33, given Rwanda’s history of division there are 
grounds for arguing that, while the choice may not tally with 
what is considered “best practice”, it passes the test of “best fit”. 
33 See, for example, P. Collier, 2010. Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous 
Places, London, Vintage, 2010.
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On a separation-of-powers principle, under the 2003 con-
stitution ministerial posts cannot be held by MPs. However, 
they are shared among the legal parties that qualify under the 
specified rules. The largest party, in this case the RPF, holds no 
more than 50% of the portfolios34. By convention, the Prime 
Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, the President of the Senate, 
and the President of the Supreme Court usually come from a 
different party or tendency from that of the President35. These 
arrangements soften the sense of exclusion among losing par-
ties. In addition, they enable cabinets to work co-operatively in 
pursuit of collective long-term aspirations and interests. 
For these reasons Rwanda does not have a conventional op-
position in Parliament. This reduces the need for the ruling par-
ty to buy off its opponents to secure support for its positions, 
as is often seen in some neighbouring countries. Proceedings in 
Parliament are guided by consensus-building, not adversarial 
contestation. Under normal circumstances, therefore, criticism 
of policies tends to be channelled into policy adjustments, not 
political horse-trading in search of support. Where and how 
does President Kagame feature in all this?
The Kagame Factor
The idea underlying the portrayal of post-genocide Rwanda as 
some kind of “one-man show” is that this is a country where the 
President is everything, cast in the mould of the famed “African 
big man”36. Kagame’s dominance in Rwanda as well as his pow-
er and influence within both the government and the RPF are 
uncontested. However, his rather common portrayal as some 
34 National Constitution 2003 (Article 116). 
35 Interviews with Rwandan Government Minister, Permanent Secretary, and 
high-ranking security official, Kigali, December 2007 and March 2009.
36 See, for example Gerard Prunier’s blog, “Portrait of  Paul Kagame – President 
of  the Republic of  Rwanda” (last retrieved on 29 May 2019).
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kind of typical African “big man” is misleading37. Close exam-
ination of the way Rwanda works in practice provides a more 
nuanced picture. For a start, it is important to look at how 
policy-making happens. According to a former Senior Minister, 
policy does not arise from Kagame waking up and saying “let 
us make a law on agriculture”. The official emphasises that pol-
icies are generated within the party through multi-level consul-
tations throughout the country, through party structures, and 
directly between officials and ordinary citizens38. 
In addition, a key factor in Rwanda’s recovery from the ef-
fects of the war and genocide against the Tutsi has been the 
commitment with which many government officials have ap-
plied themselves to the task of reconstruction. A pointer to this 
is the speed with which policies are formulated, implemented, 
and revised or changed altogether when they are deemed not 
to produce the expected results. Things tend to happen very 
quickly. This is why Rwanda has been dubbed “a country in a 
hurry” by some, including its development partners who usual-
ly find themselves unable to keep up with the pace of change39. 
Here, Kagame’s exhortation to government officials that “where 
others can afford to walk, we must run” is important. As a 
Senior Cabinet Minister summed up: “President Kagame often 
says that while there are people who can afford to fail, he has 
no room for failure in his mind. His approach to discipline in 
all public life motivates those around him. You are judged and 
you progress in your career on the basis of self-application and 
success at what you do”40.
37 For an informative description of  “big man politics”, see, for example, M. 
Berger, 2018. “Big man Politics”, Politics Web, 3 July 2018 (last retrieved on 29 
May 2019). 
38 Interview 7 February 2007.
39 E. Littlefield, “A country in a hurry: On the 20th anniversary of  the Rwandan 
genocide, this small African country looks forward”, The Opic Blog, 9 April 
2014 (last retrieved on 29 May 2019). 
40 Interview 20 September 2010.
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Over and above the pressure he exerts on officials and the 
encouragement that accompanies it, however, is a deeper un-
derlying source of motivation. Another official explains:
It is the desire to create a Rwanda which is different from the 
old one. Kagame has always urged us not to forget where we 
have come from, and to strive to build a country in which our 
children will never have to be victims in the same way that our 
generation was. Our generation is sacrificing itself for the sake of 
the future. I do not want my children to grow up in a Rwanda 
which is like the old Rwanda. Nearly every Rwandan lost a rela-
tive during the genocide. That history drives our determination 
to move on completely from the Rwanda of old41.
Moving on from the old Rwanda has two strands. One was the 
liberation of the country from leaders under whom the country 
had been mired in social division and institutionalised discrim-
ination against whole sections of society. The other is freeing 
society from poverty and deprivation. 
Beyond Kagame: Other Drivers 
of the Transformation Process 
Besides Kagame’s personal authority and influence, and his sin-
gle-minded determination to remake Rwanda which is under-
lain by “a permanent sense of urgency”42, there are also features 
of the overall political economy that play equally significant 
roles. They include top-down implementation incentives, and 
the detection and correction of implementation failures and 
abuses. These are supported and enforced by specific institu-
tional arrangements. One is the Annual National Dialogue, one 
of a number of accountability mechanisms that are inspired by 
traditional practices which had been devalued by colonialism. 
41 Ibid.
42 F. Soudan, Kagame: Conversations with the President of  Rwanda, Paris, Nouveau 
Monde Editions, 2015.
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Officials, including Ministers, are called to account on a regu-
lar basis and are sometimes removed from office for poor per-
formance in relation to set targets. Then there is the imihigo 
system. Imihigo are performance contracts. Some officials sign 
these with the President while others sign with their immediate 
supervisors. Assessment for promotion focuses on their out-
comes. As a result they are a source of top-down pressure to 
deliver on agreed targets and commitments.
Equally important is the local government system, which 
serves as a policy implementation mechanism. As with other 
developing countries, Rwanda was not spared by the donor-in-
spired wave of reforms in governance that sought to transfer 
major responsibilities from central governments to local au-
thorities constituted on the basis of the popular will via demo-
cratic elections. In the countries where it has happened, decen-
tralisation has produced a complex division of labour between 
line ministries and public agencies on the one hand and local 
authorities on the other. Ministries set policies and monitor. 
Agencies implement at the national level. Meanwhile local 
authorities are responsible for providing a wide range of pub-
lic services. This, however, is the end of similarities between 
Rwanda and other countries which have embraced democratic 
decentralisation. 
Local authorities in Rwanda, unlike other countries, have 
limited autonomy. They are subject to a fairly high degree of 
control and direction by the central government. Another dif-
ference is that while local elections in other countries entail 
competition among candidates sponsored by political parties, 
in Rwanda although the political affiliations or leanings of as-
piring mayors or councillors are known they stand not as the 
candidates of political parties but as individuals on their per-
sonal merits. As with Ministers and other public servants at the 
national level, mayors and local civil servants sign performance 
contracts (the above-mentioned imihigo) which specify the tar-
gets they are to achieve. 
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One advantage of the limited autonomy of local authorities 
is that the central government is able to get them to prioritise 
what it considers to be most important in terms of implemen-
tation. This, of course, does not guarantee that local authorities 
are an efficient delivery instrument. As with other organs of 
the state, local authorities have significant weaknesses, some of 
which are related to the constant pressure for performance. For 
example, some local authorities have taken to misrepresenting 
their achievements in order not to be seen to fail. However, the 
top-down, centrally-driven performance culture ensures that 
there are strong incentives to minimise poor delivery.
External Relations: Kagame, International Donors 
and Regional Powers
Kagame’s Rwanda is a highly assertive country, seen by some 
in the region and beyond as excessively so. It is rather unusu-
al for African governments to be so bold, certainly not with 
Western (donor) counterparts, let alone “the big powers”. Two 
examples that come to mind as notable exceptions are Eritrea 
and Ethiopia. This assertiveness on the part of the small and 
would-be insignificant east-central African country has earned 
it both friends and detractors. Kagame’s Rwanda has a clear 
view of its interests and of how to advance and protect them, of 
the position it currently occupies in the world and of the one it 
would like to occupy43. 
In Kigali’s efforts to advance and protect its interests, it 
usually does not matter who the adversary is, or how big and 
powerful or small and weak they are. Although very much a 
Kagame personal trait according to people who know him 
personally44, this assertiveness and willingness to take on any 
adversary seems to be ingrained in the DNA of the Rwandan 
43 See, for example, F. Soudan (2015). 
44 Interviews with several current and former advisors and officials, civilian and 
military. 
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Patriotic Front as a liberation movement. When the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) attacked Juvénal Habyarimana’s regime 
it had only a few thousand fighters to face a government army 
several times its size. Towards the end of the war the RPA had 
about 12,000 fighters battling the 80,000-strong FAR together 
with its French and Zairian allies and several militias45.
There have been several manifestations of this assertiveness. 
Soon after the war and the genocide in Rwanda, the new gov-
ernment came under attack from insurgents operating inside 
the country and from across the border in Zaire, where large 
numbers of veterans of the former national army, the Forces 
Armées Rwandaises, had fled together with fighters from its al-
lied militias. These armed elements were living and organising 
their activities in the same refugee camps as ordinary civilians, 
and were being fed and sustained by international NGOs which 
were in turn funded by Western governments and multilateral 
organisations to look after the refugees. The Kigali government 
wanted the international community to separate ordinary ref-
ugees from armed elements who, it argued, should be held to 
account for the crimes they had committed in Rwanda. 
The international community dithered for a long time as 
cross-border attacks on Rwandan territory intensified. Kagame, 
who at the time was Vice President and Minister of Defence, 
warned that Rwanda would find its own solution if the inter-
national community did not act within a specified period of 
time. They failed to act. Rwandan troops moved in, dismantled 
the camps, forced the refugees to return to Rwanda and the 
insurgents to flee. The decision to dismantle the camps drew 
much condemnation from across the world. For Rwanda, how-
ever, it went some way towards addressing its internal security 
problems arising from the insurgents’ use of the camps as safe 
havens46. 
45 Interviews with General James Kabarebe, former Kagame Aide de Camp; 
Chief  of  Staff; Army Commander; and Minister of  Defence, currently Senior 
Security Advisor, Office of  the President – 25 May 2019. 
46 See, for instance, F. Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional 
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In 2006, forty senior Rwandan military and civilian officials 
were indicted by a French investigating judge on charges of be-
ing responsible for shooting down the plane in which President 
Juvénal Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart Cyprien 
Ntaryamira were travelling from the Tanzanian town of Arusha 
on 6 April 1994, an event some argue was the “trigger” for the 
genocide against the Tutsi. The government of Rwanda inter-
preted the indictment as part of a campaign of harassment 
waged on the country by the government of France since the 
end of the war47. Kigali reacted by expelling the French am-
bassador and withdrawing its own ambassador from Paris. It 
then shut down every organisation associated with France, in-
cluding the French school and the French cultural organisation, 
Alliance Française, in Rwanda. 
As far as the government of Rwanda was concerned the time 
had come to bring out into the open a conflict which had hith-
erto been raging behind the scenes. Even when one of the in-
dicted officials, retired Colonel Rose Kabuye, was arrested in 
Germany on an Interpol warrant issued by the government of 
France and was given the option of being tried in Germany 
instead of extradited to France, she was encouraged by the 
Rwandan government to choose to be tried in France48. 
That French trial, seen by some as a fast-track to conviction, 
was taken by the government of Rwanda as a suitable oppor-
tunity for exposing the French government’s machinations. It 
asserted that the French authorities had no evidence on the ba-
sis of which a successful trial could be conducted; and the trial 
did indeed eventually collapse for lack of evidence. It took sev-
eral years for the two countries to restore diplomatic relations, 
after the French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited Kigali and 
expressed regret at the “grave errors of judgement” committed 
in and against Rwanda by his country49.  
Geopolitics, 1996-2006, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
47 Interview with the then Minister of  Foreign Affairs, Dr. Charles Muligande.
48 Interview with Colonel Rose Kabuye, 2008. 
49 “On Visit to Rwanda, Sarkozy Admits ‘Grave Errors’ in 1994 Genocide”, The 
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In 2016 the East African Community (EAC) countries of 
Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania agreed to reduce the im-
portation of used clothes as a measure intended to boost their 
local textile industries. The US, which is a major exporter of 
used clothes to the EAC, reacted to these plans by accusing the 
four countries of interfering with free trade. It threatened to 
withdraw the benefits of the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA), a piece of legislation that allows certain countries 
to export a range of products to the US duty-free. Uganda, 
Tanzania and Kenya backed down and dropped the proposed 
measures. Rwanda, even after much back-and-forth engage-
ment and pressure from the US, maintained the policy and has 
continued to pursue its aspirations of trying to grow a domestic 
apparel and textile industry. 
This assertiveness is just as evident in Rwanda’s relationship 
with its development partners on matters related to develop-
ment aid. The starting point for assessing Rwanda’s relation-
ship with donors is the fact that the country still receives ample 
foreign aid, currently standing at 16% of the national budget, 
down from 30% to 40% only a few years ago50. Kigali has 
been the beneficiary of great generosity mainly on the part of 
Western donors, the key contributors being the US and the 
UK. It is unlikely that the country would have made as much 
progress as it has in improving service delivery in the health, ed-
ucation and agricultural sectors, and in rebuilding its economy 
generally, without donor support. 
Despite the significant dependence on aid over the years, 
however, and the country’s embrace of major international in-
itiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and more recently the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
the government of Rwanda insists on taking the lead in decid-
ing the priority areas to which resources should be directed. Its 
attitude here can best be summed up as: “don’t tell us what to 
New York Times, 25 February 2010, (last retrieved on 19 June 2019).
50 R. Hutt, “5 things to know about Rwanda’s economy”, World Economic 
Forum, 7 April 2016 (last retrieved on 29 May 2019).
Leaders for a New Africa144
do; help us to do what we want to do”. The government is said 
to prefer to delay its plans because of lack of resources rather 
than to be deflected from what it wants to do by the diktats or 
the subtle pressures that traditionally accompany aid51.
At the regional level Rwanda has been keen to cultivate cor-
dial relations with its neighbours and others in its neighbour-
hood. It really has no other choice: being landlocked, with all 
that this implies in terms of dependence on its neighbours for 
access to the sea, co-operation is a key imperative. At continen-
tal level Rwanda has been punching above its weight, playing 
key roles in championing freedom of movement, the liberali-
sation of Africa’s skies to allow the African airline industry to 
grow, and greater trade among African countries. 
Elsewhere, as a result of the achievements Rwanda has regis-
tered on the home front, Kagame has been chosen by his peers 
to spearhead the reform of the African Union and its insti-
tutions. All this has seen both Kagame and Rwanda grow in 
stature and influence. Indeed, the President has become one 
of the most influential leaders on the continent, and Rwanda 
is increasingly an example for many Africans in terms of the 
progress it has made since 1994. 
Here, too, in its relations with its immediate neighbours and 
other countries on the continent, it remains as assertive of its 
interests and aspirations as it is with its development partners 
and other actors. This forwardness explains why it has tended 
to conflict with its neighbours and countries farther afield, such 
as South Africa. For example, some commentators are wont to 
regard Rwanda’s incursions into the Democratic Republic of 
Congo as motivated by a desire to loot that country’s vast min-
eral wealth, but in fact it is debatable whether Rwanda would 
have sent its troops in had its security not been threatened be-
cause of the insurgents who had sought refuge there, whom nei-
ther the government of the DRC nor international actors had 
proved able to restrain. Also, during the presidency of Jakaya 
51 Interview with a former Senior Cabinet Minister (4 February 2009).
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Kikwete in Tanzania, relations between the two countries were 
tense because of his government’s alleged support for the Forces 
Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the in-
surgents whose leaders and some of whose rank and file had 
participated in the genocide against the Tutsi52. Kikwete be-
lieved that the Kagame government should engage in dialogue 
with them, and publicly urged them to do so. 
Laudable as the call for dialogue might be, the FDLR had 
repeatedly stated its determination to return to Rwanda and 
“complete the work” – i.e. exterminating the Tutsi – which they 
had not been able to complete because of the defeat they suf-
fered at the hands of the Rwanda Patriotic Army. Given the 
FDLR’s ambitions, it was hardly surprising that the government 
of Rwanda, whose preoccupation with the insurgents’ genocid-
al ideology is no secret, reacted angrily to Kikwete’s insistence 
on dialogue. There were other underlying issues53, but this, in 
the eyes of the Rwandan government, amounted to crossing a 
red line of sorts54. Relations with Uganda and South Africa have 
also been rocked by those two countries’ active support for in-
dividuals and groups with declared agendas for regime change 
in Rwanda. Kigali has accused both Pretoria and Kampala of 
not taking Rwanda’s security concerns seriously55. 
52 See, for example, M.-F. Cros, 2019. “Rwanda/RDCongo: L’histoire des FDLR, 
a partir des documents de justice”, La Libre Afrique, 21 June 2019 (last retrieved 
on 21 June 2019)
53 See F. Golooba-Mutebi, “Analysis: Powers behind Rwanda-Tanzania ailing re-
lations”, The East African, 11 September 2013a. 
54 For an elaboration of  the context in which the row broke out, see F. Golooba-
Mutebi, “Kikwete in trouble over FDLR, but does he really know who they 
are?”, African Arguments, 2013b.
55 For an insight into the specific issues that Rwanda has raised with Uganda, 
see, for example: “Rwanda’s twelve warnings to Uganda”, The New Times, 29 May 
2019 (last retrieved on 29 May 2019). For some of  the issues rocking relations 
with South Africa, see: M. Frikberg, “How Rwanda’s Paul Kagame’s bad relations 
could cause destabilisation”, IOL, 16 May 2019 (last retrieved on 29 May 2019). 
Also, F. Golooba-Mutebi, 2014. “Rwanda and South Africa should not sever 
relations over Nyamwasa/Karegeya row”, African Arguments, 11 March 2014 (last 
retrieved on 29 May 2019).
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Rwanda’s relations with development partners, neighbours, 
regional powers and external actors are therefore driven by its 
leadership’s particular understanding of its national interests 
and its determination to pursue and safeguard them with a 
level of assertiveness that is unusual for a small, poor African 
country still significantly aid-dependent and vulnerable to dest-
abilisation from within and without because of its very complex 
history of internecine conflict. 
Developmentalism: 
Rwanda as a Developmental State
Rwanda has been referred to by various commentators as a de-
velopmental state, or at least as one in the making. According 
to scholars working on the “Developmental Regimes in Africa” 
project at the Overseas Development Institute56, the defini-
tion of a “developmental state” in the context of contemporary 
Africa focuses on three key things in any particular country: 
economic policy content, approach to policy-making, and the 
prevailing political settlement. Regarding policy content, a re-
gime qualifies as developmental on the basis of its economic 
and social policies. It ought to be actively promoting and sup-
porting a productivity revolution in agriculture and/or pursu-
ing a deliberate industrial policy in order to build capabilities 
and acquire new comparative advantages for exploitation with-
in regional or global markets. The reason for approaching the 
definition in this way is because policy differences explain most 
of the post-independence divergence in economic performance 
between Africa and Southeast Asia57. 
56 D. Booth, T. Kelsall, et al., “Developmental regimes in Africa”, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), Research reports and studies, January 2015 (last 
retrieved on 19 June 2019).
57 See D. Henley and J. Kees van Donge, “Policy for Development in Africa: 
Learning from Southeast Asia”, Policy Brief  01, Developmental Regimes in 
Africa , 2012 (last retrieved on 19 June 2019). 
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The key question regarding the policy process is whether or 
not it is of a problem-solving and iterative learning kind, fo-
cused on finding solutions to identified problems. According 
to another research project, Tracking Development58, a devel-
opmental regime must practice problem-driven iterative ad-
aptation (PDIA) in choosing and implementing policies. The 
feasibility of PDIA depends on how politics in a country works 
or, put differently, on the nature of the prevailing political set-
tlement. There is a common thread running through the vari-
ous definitions of “political settlement”: the idea of agreement, 
formal or informal, among the most powerful members of a 
society, as we have seen for Rwanda, about the conditions un-
der which they are prepared to engage in some form of peaceful 
political competition rather than resort to violence59. Crucially, 
there is no presumption that the more progressive types of pol-
icy process and political settlement are dependent on adopting 
formal institutions of a particular type or complying with liber-
al democratic norms and practices. 
On these criteria Rwanda qualifies as a developmental state. 
As with most of East and Southeast Asia, the country’s leader-
ship believes that economic and social transformation is a must 
if a repetition of its ugly post-colonial history is to be avoided 
in the future. This belief is well articulated in the document 
Rwanda Vision 2020. The document serves as a key reference 
point for political leaders and public servants at national and 
local level60. This belief is underlain by the assumption, strongly 
contested by some analysts61, that rapid economic and social 
58 D. Henley, Asia-Africa development divergence; A question of  intent, London: Zed 
Books, 2015, https://www.kitlv.nl/publication-research-project-tracking-devel-
opment/ (last retrieved on 19 June 2019). 
59 E. Laws, “Political Settlements, elite pacts, and governments of  national uni-
ty”, Background Paper 10, Development Leadership Programme, University of  
Birmingham, 2012.
60 This finding is based in part on direct observation of  several Annual National 
Dialogue sessions and the testimony provided by participants in ministerial retreats.
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progress will ensure that a new generation emerges whose iden-
tity as Rwandans will not focus on their belonging to this or 
that social group as it had in the past. This orientation can best 
be understood in the light of the implicit threat to long-term 
political stability and national reconciliation posed by the lega-
cy of violent conflict, a threat in which poverty and deprivation 
have been factors62.
Since it came to power the Kagame government has had 
great ambitions for projects to drive the economy forward. In 
its very early days the leadership had the idea of leap-frogging 
agriculture and aiming for services as the key driver of econom-
ic growth. This had nothing to do with either the traditional 
neglect of agriculture by African governments or the political/
economic context. Rather, it was because at the time, given the 
lack of land and the high population growth, the government 
did not think smallholder agriculture could possibly be the en-
gine that would drive the economy forward. Eventually, howev-
er, this changed, and the government embarked on reforms in 
the sector geared at raising productivity to ensure food security 
and production for export63. Elsewhere great efforts have gone 
into pursuing ambitions to make Rwanda the regional ICT64 
and logistics hub65 and to promote manufacturing66.
Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, Madison, WI, 
University of  Wisconsin Press, 2011.
62 J.-P. Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Popular Genocide: A Perfect Storm, Boulder, CO, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2016.
63 D. Booth and F. Golooba-Mutebi, Policy for Agriculture and Horticulture in Rwanda: 
A Different Political Economy?, Working Paper 038. London, Future Agricultures 
Consortium/PEAPA, 2012.
64 I. Gagliardone and F. Golooba-Mutebi, “The Evolution of  the Internet in 
Ethiopia and Rwanda: Towards a “Developmental” Model?”, Stability: International 
Journal of  Security and Development, vol. 5, no. 1, 2016, pp. 8.
65 K. Esiara, “Rwanda aims to be East Africa’s logistics hub”, The East African, 
23 January 2016. 
66 See, for example, B. Shepherd and A. Twum, Review of  Industrial policy in Rwanda. 
Data review, comparative assessment, and discussion points, Paper F-38426-RWA-1, 
International Growth Centre. November 2018 (last retrieved on 19 June 2019). 
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There are also other initiatives seen as complementing ambi-
tions in agriculture and industrialisation. These “pillars needed 
to hold up the economy” include a new airport67 and a railway 
connecting Rwanda to Tanzania, through which more than 
80% of its exports and imports transit, and to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, a potential large market for its goods and 
services68. These initiatives are strongly driven by Kagame who, 
as we mentioned, constantly exhibits a sense of urgency, one 
factor to which rapid change in the developmental states of 
Southeast Asia is attributed69. According to a senior Minister: 
“Kagame tells us that we should always be ahead of our own 
plans. He does not believe in waiting to do things for when they 
were planned. For him, it is a question of mindset. He urges 
us to develop a mindset that drives us to seek to achieve our 
objectives quickly”70.
Overall, there is no doubt that over the last 25 years Paul 
Kagame has been a central actor in post-genocide Rwanda’s 
evolution into a country that is jealously protective of its in-
terests; where systematic discrimination, marginalisation and 
violence towards whole sections of society have been ended; 
where political competition is carefully managed in a context 
allowing for the gradual expansion of political inclusion and 
popular participation; where the rule of law and human rights 
are increasingly respected – however imperfectly – and particu-
larly when compared to the low points reached in the past; and 
where the government pursues its agenda for transforming soci-
ety with a single-minded determination and a sense of urgency 
characteristic of the “developmental state” model as successfully 
implemented in other parts of the world.
67 L. Leardi, “Rwanda’s Bugesera International Aiport to Set Records for 
Sustainability”, Arch Daily, 20 February 2019 (last retrieved on 21 June 2019).
68 The Citizen, “Rwanda seeks $1.3bn to finance standard gauge railway linking 
Tanzania”, Rwanda Today, 23 May 2019 (last retrieved on 22 June 2019).
69 D. Henley (2015). 
70 Interview 20 September 2010, cit.

7.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
Giovanni Carbone, Camillo Casola
Politics in sub-Saharan Africa has long revolved heavily around 
individual leaders, arguably more so than is normally the case 
in some other areas of the world. Today, leadership dynamics 
remain crucially important for the unfolding of the region’s po-
litical scenarios and development prospects. Yet some funda-
mental changes have taken place since multiparty politics was 
introduced across the region in the 1990s. For a start, despite 
mainstream media attention indulging on long-serving pow-
er-holders, Africa has become less and less a place for overstay-
ing rulers. While a 53% majority of the leaders in office in 1990 
had been there for ten years or more (i.e. 25 out of 47), as of 
mid-2019 this share had dropped to a less abnormal 22% (i.e. 
9 out of 49). Crucially, electoral mechanisms have been adopt-
ed and have taken roots across African regimes, albeit with a 
wildly diverse spectrum of situations in terms of actual respect 
of political and civil freedoms. In many countries, such mech-
anisms helped regularize periodic leadership handovers, and 
sometimes even allowed turnovers between political adversaries 
to take place.
In what remains the world’s poorest region, however, a key 
question is whether leaders do make a difference in terms of 
their impact on the social and economic progress of the coun-
tries they rule. One way of addressing this question is by look-
ing at the general picture and asking what types of leaders have 
proved most successful, south of the Sahara, since independ-
ence in the 1960s. This requires investigating some 360 leaders 
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across 60 years and 49 countries. We carried out this kind of 
analysis based on our original Africa Leadership Change (ALC) 
dataset1 and summed up the results in chapter one of this vol-
ume. Development progress in Africa generally benefited from 
the shift to pluralist arrangements and electoral incentives, 
partly also where the new practices did not truly amount to 
democratic advances. This, however, should not be taken as a 
one-size-fits-all finding. Rather, it is a broad trend that still al-
lows for a variety of real-life trajectories and the presence of a 
number of outliers. The region’s pre-multiparty history includes 
some unelected autocrats who were somehow able to pursue 
their countries’ economic growth, for example, cases that range 
from monarchic Burundi to one-party Malawi in the mid-
1960s, from Jerry Rawlings in 1980s military Ghana to Yoweri 
Museveni in 1990s no-party Uganda. Even during the subse-
quent era of pluralist politics, the fastest growing countries in 
post-2000 Africa comprise the likes of Ethiopia and Rwanda, 
both ruled by strongmen who were only elected under clearly 
non-democratic conditions. These countries owe a large part 
of their recent successes to their single-minded leaders, how-
ever, which makes the recipe difficult to replicate when such 
out-of-the-ordinary individuals depart from office. Electoral 
institutions as a mechanism for selecting leaders and exerting a 
degree of pressure on the way they behave – on the other hand 
–  can be a helpful, transferable, replicable and adaptable tool 
that more often than not supports development efforts.
Universal suffrage and multiple parties are formally granted 
across the region, with only a few countries still somehow re-
sisting or delaying their introduction. As pointed out, however, 
Africa’s electoral regimes display a high degree of variation in 
terms of their actual “democratic substance”. Several among 
them remain deeply authoritarian. A number are relatively apt 
at granting significant political and civil freedoms. Others have 
1 G. Carbone and A. Pellegata, Political leadership in Africa. Leaders and development 
South of  the Sahara, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020 (forthcoming).
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proven open to actual contestation and alternation in office. 
The new leaders that over the past couple of years emerged in 
key countries across the region reflect this diversity. The coun-
try studies presented in this volume allowed us to zoom in on 
the new faces at the helm in Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia 
and South Africa, while also accounting for Rwanda’s example 
of enduring and developmentally-successful leadership. 
The advent of these new leaders tells different stories, each 
one specific to the politics and society of the nations they rule. 
They are also told from somewhat different perspectives, in-
cluding with concern to power-holders’ potentials. Yet such 
stories do share some commonalities. Key among them is that 
the rise and early steps of these leaders came as a reaction to 
the prevailing circumstances, an effort to try and sort out some 
major challenges facing the country. Digging into individual 
cases also sheds light on the shifting political alliances and con-
sensus building processes, particularly within the ruling parties, 
as crucial determinants of who eventually emerged victorious in 
the fight for the country’s top job. It similarly warns us of the 
unpredictable road ahead, during which former office-holders 
who have been ousted from power, and their networks, strive 
not to be fully marginalized. 
Ethiopia’s leadership handover represents arguably the most 
dramatic, fragile and consequential case. Abiy Ahmed’s ap-
pointment as Prime Minister must be traced back to the coun-
try’s growing instability and the related dynamics unfolding 
within the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF). While the country’s economy kept growing at 
an impressive pace, the political path defined by the EPRDF 
under Meles Zenawi’s stewardship had gradually come to a 
standstill after his death in 2012. Amidst growing social un-
rest and ethno-political tensions, his successor, Prime Minister 
Hailemariam Desalegn, resigned to allow opening a novel 
phase. But Abiy’s surprising rise went beyond expectations and 
ushered in an entirely new season – promoting both political 
and economic changes, with wide-ranging implications at the 
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domestic as well as the regional level – if a frail one whose out-
come remains highly uncertain.
In South Africa, Ramaphosa’s rise was strictly intertwined 
with the crisis of governance (‘state capture’, in the expression 
chosen by South Africans) observed during the years of Jacob 
Zuma, whose presidency was associated with the spread and 
deepening of questionable practices. An ‘insider’ fully integrat-
ed in the national political and economic system – and the per-
son Mandela reportedly wanted to fill his own shoes once he 
retired – Ramaphosa was deemed by many the country’s safest 
bet to fight the misuse of public resources and institutions and 
to restore the rule of law. The African National Congress thus 
demonstrated a capacity to respond to a profound leadership 
failure and offer a degree of renewal at the top, albeit the Zuma 
network still retains influence within the party as well as the 
government. The new president will need all his credibility and 
negotiating skills to untie the knots that cost Pretoria major 
economic and political setbacks and to restore the country on a 
more virtuous path. 
The reforms that are required to “regenerate” Angola after 
nearly forty years of uninterrupted rule by one single individual 
are even deeper and more far-reaching. Upon taking office in 
2017, João Lourenço displayed an unforeseen assertiveness as 
he began head on to dismantle key elements of José dos Santos’s 
power networks and huge business interests, including the 
purge of personalities belonging or linked to the former presi-
dent’s inner circle. This surprised observers who had expected 
that the dos Santos family would keep pulling the strings. A 
former Ministry of Defence, Lourenço swiftly moved to ensure 
fuller control of the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação 
de Angola and made the need to differentiate the economy 
away from oil a priority in his reform agenda. Lourenço repre-
sents an unforeseen case of change within continuity.
A historic leadership handover – the country’s first ever taking 
place through an election, albeit an extremely controversial one 
– also came about in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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Notwithstanding Joseph Kabila’s effort to cling on to power, 
after a two-year delay a presidential vote was eventually held 
which set the stage for a government turnover. Félix Tshisekedi 
was sworn in as the country’s new head of state, but observers 
reported widespread irregularities and tampering with the vote. 
A backroom deal purportedly led to the candidate less hostile 
to the outgoing president being declared victorious. Much 
like the Tigrayan elite in Abiy’s Ethiopia, the Zuma faction in 
Ramaphosa’s South Africa and the dos Santos family in Angola, 
Kabila’s inner circle is trying to resist a diminished role. Control 
of a large parliamentary majority will be the main asset for the 
former president to retain political influence. Yet in spite of sev-
eral adverse starting conditions (lack of political experience, an 
undemocratic and divisive election, a non-aligned legislature), 
some of Tshisekedi’s moves seem to hint that he is trying to be 
his own man. He will need that if he is to address the innu-
merable challenges faced by one of Africa’s most complex and 
troubled countries.
The true outsider among our case studies is actually very 
much an insider of contemporary African politics. Having 
ruled Rwanda for over two decades, Paul Kagame has long won 
his battle for political survival – a battle that, of course, no 
leader wins once and for all. With the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
he first restored stability to a country devastated by genocide 
and war, and then went on to bring about impressive social and 
economic progress and transformations, turning Rwanda into 
a model of Africa’s so-called developmental states. The one key 
area in which Kagame-ism stirred controversy and continues to 
draw strong criticism, however, is the political realm: a leader-
ship style and a political set up that, in spite of electoral pro-
cedures, only allows for political openings at the margins. Yet 
not all observers agree with the prevailing narrative. Dissenting 
voices stress how, under the dramatic and divisive circumstanc-
es left by the genocide in a small, poor and landlocked coun-
try, some gradual political openings have actually been allowed 
– including a decision-making process that involves a broader 
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number of participants and intermediary bodies than is nor-
mally conceded, if only around Kagame’s uncontested author-
ity and towering figure – and represent the safest way forward 
for this tiny nation in the middle of the region.
The ascension of these and other new leaders in today’s Africa 
has fed great expectations. Their room for manoeuvre, true goals 
and actual impact – like the regimes and societies they operate 
in – will vary greatly. Yet many of them will likely contribute 
to defining not only the political horizons of the continent, but 
also its development prospects.
Policy implications 
The following broad guidelines can be drawn for Europe’s ap-
proach to sub-Saharan Africa from the study of political lead-
ership and leadership transitions, and of their broader impact, 
examined in this volume:
• the adoption and deepening of electoral institutions 
and practices should be supported and protected as, in 
spite of the many obstacles and failures, they have grad-
ually opened up political space across the region;
• electoral mechanisms and habits can also play a role 
in sustaining the social and economic development of 
African countries, particularly when supplemented by 
additional components of democratic politics, by mak-
ing national leaders increasingly accountable to their 
citizenry, if often in flawed manners, and by favouring 
a degree of rotation in office. The preservation of such 
practices and the improvement of their actual function-
ing should thus be a high priority;
• in nondemocratic polities where starting conditions 
appear unpromising and continuity seems to prevail, 
leadership successions can at times create a momentum 
for broader political and economic change. In such cas-
es, international partners should carefully consider sup-
porting the reform agenda of incoming leaders;
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• where authoritarian rulers have been successful in the 
pursuit of development, international partners should 
strike a delicate balance between supporting such pro-
gress and promoting a medium-term goal of making po-
litical and social space more open, free and contestable.
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